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Abstract 
Ni'ma, K. Muhammad, (1991), 'The Influence of the Application of Shariy`a on 
Crime and Public Security: The Sudan Case'. Ph. D. Thesis, Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Durham. 
Deterrence has been one of the basic rationales for the use of punishment by Criminal 
Law. An inverse relationship has been assumed leading deterrence theorists to claim 
that penal sanctions deter crime. In this thesis, the deterrence hypothesis was exam- 
ined with special attention to the Sudan's experiment, involving the application of the 
criminal components of Shariy`a (Islamic Law). The full enforcement of these laws 
in the Sudan allowed for the first time the infliction of harsh, corporal, and publicly 
imposed penalties for a range of crimes classified under three categories of punish- 
ments; Al hidud (Limits), Al qisas (retaliation) and Al ta`aziyr (discretionary). 
Primarily based on a theory of deterrence, the major assumption of this thesis has 
been that Shariy`a was anticipated to reduce crime and hence create a climate more 
conducive to public security. The analysis utilised a victim survey conducted in 
Khartoum (Sudan) in 1989. Specifically the analysis involved a contrast of a sample 
reports about, fear, safety, and victimisation experience when Shariy`a was/was not in 
operation. 
The main findings were that although the Shariy`a experiment did appear to reduce 
public fear of crime, there was no direct evidence that it reduced victimisation. 
However discussion of the findings in relation to western research suggests that some 
"objective" measures used in the latter are faulty and that there is a complex pattern 
of relationships behind the apparent discrepancies between fear and real victimis- 
ation experience. 
The knowledge obtained by this study provides some implications both for policy 
purposes and interested future researchers. At least the discussion of the results offer 
a useful background information for policy and future research needs. 
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Introduction 
NR Establishing the field. of the study 
It has been observed that "a sense of personal security is basic to the quality of life in a 
community, and that personal security is affected more by crime than by anything else" 
(Conklin, J., 1975: 1) Conklin considers that, among the catch phrases that have been used 
to summarise fear and concern about crime in society are: "The crime problem" and "law 
and order" (Ibid. ) Rosco Pound is also quoted to have said: "In civilised society men must 
be able to assume that those with whom they deal in the general intercourse of society will act 
in good faith. When fear of crime is pervasive such an assumption is often missing" (Ibid. ) 
The costs of concern with crime and security involves more than protecting one's self and 
property. Besides, there are the social costs which are distributed throughout the society. 
Public reactions to such concern may far exceed the direct losses suffered by the victims 
of crime. It is believed that using security arrangements and devices such as burglar-alarm 
systems, additional locks on doors, bars on windows, and brighter lights onyards to prevent 
property theft may exceed the value of all property stolen in actual burglaries. However, 
this behaviour is sometimes necessary since it is expected to increase the occupant's sense 
of security in protected homes. It is also noted that concern about crime leads the public 
to be more alienated and thus reduces trust and attachment to the community as a whole. 
This suggests that crime weakens informal social control in the community by reducing 
social solidarity, which in turn results in more disturbance of the social order. This process 
has been described as follows: 
'As social interaction is reduced and fear of crime becomes fear of the 
stranger, the social order is further damaged. Not only are there fewer persons 
on the streets and in public places as there might be, but persons who are 
afraid mayshow a lack of concern for each other" (McIntyre, J., 1967 `Public 
Attitudes Toward Crime and Law Enforcement': 41). 
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The foregoing suggests that the subject of `security' as affected by fear of the crime 
threat has become important enough to deserve some attention. This justifies the 
demanding need for ever better understanding of means of controlling crime as one 
of the most current problems affecting people living together in a safe society. Hence, 
the `how' to achieve order and security within society is of interest to a variety of 
people; to policy-makers and to policemen, to judges and juries, to social workers and 
sociologists, and most importantly, to the public and society who pay the real costs. 
Critical to the control of crime in the social control field are the processes that are 
important to regulation of social behaviour. Sociologists recognise four major types 
of norm governing human conduct in the society: Folkways, mores, customary law 
and enacted law. Folkways come through a slow process of unplanned growth of social 
values, for example, involving social rules imposed on the individual through informal 
ways of control such as: gossip, ridicule or ostracism. Though folkways are generally 
based on a sense of obligation, and a feeling of `should', this is relatively weak in this 
case. As to the mores, they are distinguished from folkways by their greater insistence 
on observance. While folkways involve weak social disapproval, violation of the mores 
involve much strong-moral indignation. 
Customary law on the other hand reflects different aspects of the norms which are 
imposed at the communal level or by the community's formally selected repre- 
sentatives. In this case it is the social group which takes action against the guilty and 
confronts the transgressor. Finally, enacted law includes formally instituted rules 
concerned with crimes - acts committed against society as a whole. In such a case, a 
ruler or a legislative body imposes the rules for the purpose of preventing violation 
of the norm as stated in the rules. Andenaes, 1966, summarises this role of the criminal 
law as follows: 
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"By means of the Criminal Law, and by means of specific application of this 
law, 'messages'aresent to members of a Society. The Criminal Law lists those 
actions which are liable to prosecution, and it specifies the penalties involved. 
The decisions of the Courts and actions by the police and prison officials 
transmit knowledge about the Law, underlining the fact that criminal laws 
are not mere empty threats, and providing detailed information as to what 
kind of penalty might be expected forviolations of specific laws. To the extent 
that these stimuli restrain citizens from socially undesired actions which they 
might otherwise have committed, a general preventive effect is secured. " 
(Andenaes, J, 1966: 949) 
The four types of social rules make up the normative system in the Sudan. However, 
since its introduction, Islamic religion continued to provide the main elements 
internalising the values affecting the norms at the different levels of control. This 
thesis introduces shariy`a as an aspect of normative law system recently applied and 
supported by the state for the purpose of regulating conduct in the Sudan. 
E The Shariy`a and Legal Reform in the Sudan 
From a purely religious point of view it is believed that shariy`a is a divine law involving 
all the authority of God underlying it. But this had to be promulgated by human 
authority. The genesis of shariy`a lies within the Islamic religion. Islam was revealed 
by God to His Messenger Muhammad to declare to men the concluding words of 
God's eternal message. Literally, the term shariy`a is used to refer to the right way or 
the clear path to be followed. All Muslims accept that such a path is to be the same 
path shown by God through His messenger Muhammad. This means that the rules 
come directly from God. Accordingly in its legal context shariy`a is defined to mean 
the Sacred Law of God (Gordon, C. 1985). 
The teachings of shariy`a as a system of Law are embodied in four main Sources: The 
Qui'a n which is the holy book of Islam; The Sunna, which include a collection of 
records concerning what the prophet has said, done, approved or forbidden; the 'Ijma` 
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or (consensus of opinion) involves the agreement between Muslim scholars concern- 
ing particular juristic points and, finally the Qyyas, which involves achievement of 
legal decisions by means of analytical deduction or independent reasoning that must 
not contradict any of the previous sources. 
According to Muslim jurists the shariy a includes three categories of rules (or ahkam 
in the Islamic term). The rules of each category are treated under a special branch of 
Science. Those concerning faith and belief in God are studied under `ilm al kalam; 
those concerning moral education are dealt with under `ilm al'akhlaq, and finally the 
last category concerns acts of worship and other inter-personal actions affecting the 
individual in the Society. The latter are dealt with under the general science known 
as `ilm al figh. The special part of this category dealing with crime and punishment is 
known as al'akham al jina'iya or (Penal Rules). The shariy`a penal system includes 
three sets of rules: Al hidud (limits), Al qisas (retaliation) and, Al ta`aziyr (discretion- 
ary). This will be explained in full detail in the special chapter dealing with the Islamic 
Penal Legislation. 
The significance of shariy`a for the Sudanese Society has deep roots in the history of 
the Sudan. Historians agree that the process of Islamisation in the nineteenth century 
resulted in the emergence of an Islamic society. This was responsible from the gradual 
absorption of the country into the Islamic system of tradition and teaching. Since then, 
the Sudanese have established the dominant religious structure affecting both the 
individual and institutions in the society. 
Attempts at Islamisation and adoption of shariy`a as a means of legal reform conti- 
nued from 1956 (Independence) and throughout the 1970s. However, it was not until 
1983 that the shariy`a was constitutionalised as the main source of the Law to be in 
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force. It will be seen that the radical shift for the adoption of the shariy`a in its fullest 
legal sense has been affected by urgent political events. 
This was observable during the rule of Ja'far Numayri,, the former President of the 
Sudan. 
M Sudan: The Country 
Q Location, People and Culture 
The Republic of the Sudan is the largest African country in size. Located in Northern 
Africa the country extends between latitudes 45° and 23° N and longitudes 21° 45" - 
38° 30" E. Its immense borders touch eight other, African countries: Egypt in the 
north, Central Africa and Chad in the west, Libya in the north west, Kenya, Uganda, 
Zaire in the south, and Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea in the east. 
The country is divided into two main divisions: (1) The Northern Sudan: includes six 
regions in the north; and (2) The Southern Sudan (includes six regions in the south). 
The regions of each divisions are divided further into smaller administrative divisions 
called provinces. Of the three regions of the north, Khartum has the special status of 
being the national capital city of the Sudan. 
In 1985 the population was estimated as totalling 22 million with a growth rate of 2.8 
per annum. Originally the Sudanese people were part Arab, part Negro, and part 
Nubian. The majority of the people in Northern Sudan adopt the Arabic-Islamic 
traditions. The Sudan's Arabic-Islamic heritage has deep roots in history. Contact 
between the country and Arabia started earlier before Islam. With the spread of 
Islam, Muslim immigrants from the Arabian east dominated the northern part of the 
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country. Since then an Islamic value system has been established which continues to 
affect all aspects of life in the region. 
On the other hand the Sudanese in the southern part represent one third of the 
country's population, mainly Negro and pagan. The majority of this minority are 
non-Muslims, but in areas of Islamic influence there are significant numbers of 
Muslims. 
Q The Economic Situation 
Sudan does not have a record of high economic growth. The average growth rate 
between 1960 and 1970 was estimated at 2.8% to 3% between 1970/74. In 1976 the 
gross domestic production showed slight decline from 10% in 1974 to 9.4% in 1976. 
By 1980 a negative trend followed. This was estimated at 4.6% in 1980/81 and dropped 
again in 1982/83 (EIU, 1985). 
Theoretically agriculture has great potential for the Sudan's economy. According to 
official estimates the country has about 200mn feddans of arable area. According to 
Al-Farouk (1991) agriculture has recently contributed 30% to 40% of the country's 
GDP and about 98% of its exports. It also provides the livelihood of about 80% of 
the population. Also much of the Sudan's industry comes from agricultural produce. 
Almost one quarter of bank investments go to this sector and almost as much to 
agro-industries. Shortly agricultural output has an overriding effect on all aspects of 
the national economy. 
During the late 1970s when plans were projected for the country to take off economi- 
cally, there was much hope that Sudan would be `the bread basket of the Arab world'. 
With the promise of $6 bn in Arab aid for a long term programme, the government 
introduced a six-year project of economic and social development (1977/78-1982/83). 
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The plan aimed at raising the GDP at an annual 7.5%. Unfortunately events did not 
help fulfilment of the development plan. Externally Sudan's economy was badly hit 
by a shift in oil prices and a lag on trade as a result. Internally, revenue needed to 
finance development dropped drastically, because of the urge of current expenditure. 
In addition agricultural export earnings were not increasing sufficiently and the 
government consequently relied on deficit financing. 
Due to accumulation of external debt, reserves of foreign currency were exhausted 
and basic imports (fuel, spare parts and raw materials) were cut back. As the Sudan 
experienced such negative growth, total public expenditure declined and the previous 
plan to raise the GDP at an annual 7.5 % failed. The Sudan, with an average per capita 
income estimated at $320 US, is a member of the UN, League of Arab States and the 
Organisation of African Unity. It is host to about a million African refugees (most of 
them from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Chad). In recent years deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions affected by the drought and famine in Ethiopia, have led 
to increasing problems of social unrest and tension in society. 
0 The Problem: The Sudan Case 
Sudan offers an example of state supported Islamisation of the law in recent history. 
The period between the late '70s and early `80s was a transitional stage in the history 
of Sudan's legal system. In this period a number of changes have affected the status 
and operation of shariy`a as a system of law. In September 1983 the former president, 
Numayri, introduced shariy`a as the sole law to be in force henceforth. In particular 
the criminal component of shariy`a Al hidud wal qisas was to be imposed in its fullest 
extent. 
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Following the announcement of Islamisation of the law in general and application of 
Islamic criminal law in particular, several codes of law were promulgated to introduce 
the new Islamic code to the whole society. With its Islamic features the new penal 
code replaced the previous code of 1974 which was based on the British oriented 
Indian law. The new code included re-definition of already existing crimes and 
provisions for new ones not previously provided for. The legislative changes affected 
three main aspects of the legal machinery: the proper structure of judicial institutions, 
the procedure they should follow, and the most appropriate forms of punishments 
prescribed byshariy`a. The courts of the old regime were abolished - new `emergency' 
courts, later to become `Decisive courts of justice', were established under the new 
system of courts, settlement of cases followed a short procedure to achieve swiftness 
of `effective justice'. 
The full enforcement of the criminal aspect of the shariy`aAl hidud wal qisas allowed 
amputations for proven theft, the death penalty or either amputation and imprison- 
ment for Haraba or armed robbery, floggings or the death penalty for adultery proven 
or admitted, flogging for drinking or for the possession, sale, transport or manufacture 
of alcoholic beverages, and death for apostasy in cases where the apostate was 
engaged in war against the state. 
Since the announcement of the shariy`a as a system of law in the Sudan, the harsh 
components of the Hidud penalties were put into force between September 1983 and 
April 1985 when Alnumayri and his regime were overthrown in a bloodless mass 
revolution. However, in practice, the intensive application of shariy`a extended from 
April 1984 (declaration of the state of emergency) until September 1984 (lifting of 
the state of emergency). 
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The case of the Sudan towards Islamisation of law was an experiment. The Islamis- 
ation agenda has been pursued farther in the Sudan than in any other contemporary 
example of the Islamic states. Some observers have described the political context in 
which the experiment occurred (Esposito 1986), others have expressed more concern 
and worry about the political effect of the state's supported Islamisation in the Sudan 
(Lobban, 1987 and 1990). According to Lobban (1990), Islamisation of the law "using 
the coercive apparatus of the state, must be distinguished from the socio-cultural process 
of conversion to Islam that has been a major part of Sudanese history for the past five 
centuries" (Ibid: 610). It is also believed that, "thestronglypoliticised nature of the North- 
South divide has made dialogue on the subject infrequent and emotionally charged' 
(Ibid). Within the Sudan debates and conflict about the matter involved judgements 
both on the political and public levels. On one hand there are those who believe that 
application of the criminal aspect of shariy`a Al hidud wal gisas deters criminal 
aggression and realises security and stability in society, and on the other hand there 
are those who reject this argument on humanitarian and political bases. However, no 
previous scholarly attempt had been made to examine the shariy`a experiment in the 
Sudan in terms of its instrumental effect on crime and security in the society 
0 Shariy'a and the objective of this thesis 
At the time of writing this thesis shariy`a was back again in operation in the Sudan 
after having been frozen since the transitional rule in 1985. The conflict on the subject 
is still going on, on the same bases of arguments. This thesis is mainly concerned with 
an empirical assessment of the influence of the application of shariy`a criminal policy 
on the society in the Sudan. The current issues of debate and conflict that the Sudan 
raises would rather benefit from more scholarly research and understanding of the 
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problems related to these issues. The objective is to provide more reliable knowledge 
on the issue. It is only through better understanding that we can minimise the gap 
between conflicting ideas and views and hence help to guide public policy. 
0 Hypothesis and Methods of Research 
Insofar as the previous experiment of the imposition of shariy`a in the Sudan is said 
to have been based primarily on deterrence, it rests on a major assumption to be tested 
here. This can be stated as follows: 
" Shariy`a was anticipated to reduce concern and fear of crime and therefore create 
a climate more conducive to public security as follows: 
" shariy`a was anticipated to reduce the concern about the seriousness of crime 
among the public. 
" shariy`a was anticipated to increase the feeling of safety among the public, and 
" shariy`a was anticipated to deter criminality and therefore reduce victimisation in 
the community. 
Hence the previous hypotheses are constructed to measure the concept of `public 
security' in terms of two aspects: (1) the decreasing worry and concern about crime 
and increasing feeling of safety among the public; and (2) the decreasing instances in 
experience of criminal victimisation in society. 
Examination of the previous hypothesis is based on data obtained from the victim 
survey conducted in the Sudan in 1989. Information was obtained from a sample 
which included the three cities of the national capital city: Khartum, Khartum North 
and Omdurman. Sampling was undertaken in two stages: in the first stage two areas 
were chosen at random from each city. In the second stage individual cases were 
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obtained through the segment sampling. A total of 200 cases were obtained from each 
city, giving a total of 600 cases in all for the combined sample for the national capital 
-, city. A random total of 225 cases for each sex was finally selected for the purpose of 
analysis. 
The survey involved a questionnaire designed to obtain data to enable a comparison 
of respondents' perceptions and fear of crime, as well as their actual experiences of 
criminal victimisation, during two reference periods, relating to two periods of 
enforcement of the penal system: (1) the first period from September 1983 to 
September 1984 refers to the shariy`a programme which began with the destruction 
of wine and the release of all prisoners in the Sudan by the former president Numayri. 
This period extended until the end of the Emergency Courts in September 1984 and 
relates to the penal system when shariy`a was in operation; (2) the second period, 
from September 1984 to September 1985, refers to the penal system following the 
abolition of the emergency courts in September 1984 and the termination and 
freezing of hidud punishments following the collapse of Numayri rule. This period 
extends until the first six months of the transitional government of General Siwar al 
dahäb and Dr Aljuzuli Dafa'allah. During this period shariy`a was not in operation. 
The questionnaire included questions to elicit information relating to respondents' 
concern and perceptions of crime, as well as their past experience of criminal 
victimisation, both for the period when shariy`a was in operation and the period when 
it was not in operation. The information mainly involved direct questions and in- 
cluded a set of incidents related to particular types of hidud offences ranging from 
robbery and burglary known as haraba in the Islamic terminology, theft known as 
sarigä, physical assault and injury known as jarayimAl jurh wal'aza. These were chosen 
as examples- of the offences which were typically treated according to the shariy`a 
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system of punishment Al hidud wal qisas. Information about other offences has been 
obtained through indirect questions because of the particular nature of those offences. 
Information was obtained through direct interviews and the fieldworker team in- 
cluded 15 students from the Department of Social Science and Applied Statistics at 
Omdurman Islamic University, to which I also belong as a teaching assistant. The 
nature of the relationship between me and the student team facilitated the arrange- 
ments and administration of the fieldwork from the earlier stage of selection up to 
the final stage of data collection and field supervision. The team included students 
mainly from the third and fourth years whose training mostly covered basic principles 
and rules of social research techniques and methods. Selection was made on personal 
interest and the participating students received a job training course on the survey 
technique related to the research topic. After this comprehensive training course the 
interviewers moved to the field with an authorised letter showing the purpose of their 
job and the institution they represented. 
0 Data Limitations, Plan of Analysis, and Problems of Method 
The scope of the findings of this thesis is restricted to the time, place and method of 
the criminal survey described above (full detailed description of the survey is given 
in chapter 4). 
The plan for measuring the influence of shariy`a is based on a comparison for the 
difference in the responses when shariy`a was/was not in operation. The significance 
of the results is examined using the chi-square statistical test. 
However, an important warning to be noted here is that the result of the analyses is 
subject to three sources of errors involving: 
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s Representativeness of the sample; 
" Recall and time placement of incidents; and 
" The short dominance of the shariy`a programme. 
This suggests that understanding of the findings requires taking this warning into 
consideration. 
0 The Choice of Khartum 
The choice of Khartum - the national capital city of the Sudan - as the geographical 
region to which this study applies involves two main reasons attributed to the multiple 
aspects of its urban setting: 
Firstly, it has been recognised that urban life is commonly characterised by 
population density, spatial mobility, ethnic and class heterogeneity, reduced 
family functions and greater anonymity (Marvin E. Wolfgang and F. Ferracitt, 
1967). Al-Farouk (1991) shows that Khartum is the destination of more than 
one-third of all inter-provincial migration. The process which has been going 
on for centuries showed marked increase during the 1980s. In 1985 the dete- 
riorating socio-economic conditions resulted in the largest migration influx into 
Khartum, particularly from the and western provinces. As a result Khartum has 
shown the most rapid rate of growth during the 1980s. Between 1956 and 1973 
the population of the capital city, including the three towns (Khartum, Khartum 
North and Omdurman) increased from half a million to just over a million. In 
1983 the population was approaching two millions. Al-Farouk considers this is 
a reflection of the accelerated rate of growth (256-8%), well over double in 
recent years. As the country's capital city, Khartum exerts a magnetic attraction 
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for migrants from all other provinces of the Sudan. Hence it represents the most 
heterogeneous urban centre in the country. Due to lack of adequate housing 
the development of overcrowded slums has been one aspect of the economic 
and social changes taking place in the country. 
"The explanations that have been offered for urban areas usually centred 
around having a larger number of criminal opportunities available, a greater 
likelihood of association with those who are already criminals, and in many 
cases, the harsher conditions of slum life around the city. " Barbara, N, (Ed. ) 
(1970). 
The foregoing suggests that Khartum provides the most heterogeneous growing 
urbansetting challenged by the rising anxiety and concern about crime and security. 
Secondly as the main centre of administration of all the different spheres and 
institutions, Khartum includes the most highly qualified personnel, facilities and 
apparatus with respect to the administration of the legal machinery. Conse- 
quently, it provided the most intensive application of the shariy`a programme. 
Therefore, for the reasons given above, Khartum provides the most appropriate 
choice for the application of this study. 
Thesis organisation 
Following this Introduction, the plan of this thesis covers seven chapters as follows: 
Q Chapter 1- The Islamic Penal Legislation: Theoretical Background 
This is intended to provide a detailed explanation of the theoretical aspects of shariy`a 
as a religious system of law, based on deterrence. It is meant to provide a further 
background reference for understanding the assumptions and functions underlying 
this system from which the shariy`a experiment was derived. 
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Q Chapter 2- Literature on Deterrence 
This chapter reviews the literature and research findings on deterrence. Since this 
study cannot simply skip over the existing body of knowledge it is essential to examine 
both the theoretical and empirical assumptions involved in understanding deterrence 
- the purpose is to build this thesis on an adequate base of understanding relevant to 
its subject matter and concern. 
Q Chapter 3- The Islamic Penal Experiment in the Sudan 
Islamisation of the law in the Sudan cannot be understood separate by the factors 
affecting the historical development of the country's legal system. Based on Western 
law, the Sudanese penal code and procedure were re-enacted in 1925,1974 and, more 
recently, in 1983. To understand the influence of the shariy`a experiment this chapter 
is devoted to trace what the Sudanese law has been, and what it tends to become. The 
intention is to show what real change the experiment has brought that might affect 
crime and security in the Sudan. 
Q Chapter 4- Method and Hypothesis of Research 
This chapter offers a detailed description for the objectives, main hypothesis and method 
involved in collecting the required field data. The chapter also deals with some of the 
methodological difficulties of measuring backdated experience of the type required in 
this study, and how it might have a significant effect on the analysis of data. 
Q Chapters 5,6 and 7 
Finally, while chapters 5 and 6 turn to the presentation of the main findings of the 
criminal survey, chapter 7 closes with the final conclusion. At the end, any further 
enquiries and implications for follow-up research in the future will be as important 
as any of the conclusions specified. 
Introduction 15 
Chapter 1 
The Islamic Penal Legislation: Theoretical 
Background 
M Introduction to Islamic Law 
Muslim thinkers view Islam as a well-ordered system -a consistent whole resting on 
a definite set of clear-cut principles (Mawdudi 1939: 5). Within this integrated whole 
a set of sub-systems are established to regulate the various phases of Muslims' 
behaviour and to connect the various aspects of the Islamic society to its basic 
principles. The penal system in Islam can thus be viewed as one of those aspects, 
intended to keep solidarity within the connected whole by regulating the conduct of 
man in his relation to social life. The study of the penal theory in Islam is then 
necessary in understanding the principles and philosophy underlying its objectives 
and ends. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical description of Islamic 
Penal Law and principles as derived from Islamic sources. 
The Islamic penal theory can well be understood on its general foundation basically 
in the divine revelation contained in the Qur'an, holy book of Islam, and the Sunna 
traditions of the prophet Muhammad. But the fact is that both the Qur'an and Sunna 
containvery little, if any theory. They rather contain basic commands and regulations. 
Also there are few specific injunctions and prohibitions which concern a variety of 
subjects. The formulation of theories in Islamic law started later when the major 
schools of Islamic law emerged. 
During the early centuries of Islam four schools of Islamic law crystallised; The Maliki, 
Hanafc, Shafitfe and Hanbali schools, each named after its founder respectively. The 
writings of the four schools include many volumes dealing with the various aspects of 
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rules that are concerned with crime and punishment. All schools of law consider crime 
as an evil that threatens the whole society, and punishment is a necessity to reduce 
the influence of that threat. A theory of criminalisation and punishment in Islam is 
then established. The following provide the bases for understanding the penal theory 
of Islamic legislation: 
" the concept of Shariya in Islam 
" characteristics of the Islamic penal legislation 
" criminalisation and punishment 
t 0 The concept of Shariy`a and aspect of the law 
The genesis of Shariy`a lies within the Islamic religion. The religion of Islam was 
revealed to the prophet to declare to men the concluding words of God's final and 
eternal message. The Qur'an states: 
`Today I have perfected your system of belief and bestowed my favours upon 
you in full, and have chosen submission (al-Islam) as the creed for you. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 3) 
The Qur'an is, the holy book of Islam. Along with the sacred texts of the holy book 
(each called a Sura), the sayings and practices of the prophet Muhammad known as 
Hadith and Sunna provide the sources of the Islamic religion. 
In its origin the term `Islam' means submissions or surrender to God. It is derived 
from the Arabic word Silm or peace, from which the traditional Islamic greeting of 
Al salam`a laykum, `May peace be on you', is taken. According to this concept the 
Muslim is one who submits to the will of God and to the right path as designed in the 
divine sources. All Muslim scholars admit that the shariy`a, literally the road to the 
watering place, the clear path to be followed (see the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1971: 
The Islamic Penal Legislation: Theoretical Background 17 
524), is the key to the understanding of such a way to lead a stable life under Islam. 
As a religious law which is derived from the basic sources of the Qur'an and Sunna, 
it is defined to refer to the collection of 'ahkam, legal provisions divinely revealed to 
the prophet (Basyuni 1982: 128). Such divine provisions provide members of Muslim 
society with a clear standard of behaviour which they should follow. 
Hence, it can be understood that while shariy`a is originally religious, it is mainly 
directed to regulate human life in society. In its fullest meaning the law, the shariy`a, 
is all dealing with rules and matters meant to embody correct Muslim practice in the 
different spheres of human activity, be they spiritual or secular concerns of daily life. 
Aspects of the law have been constructed in many verses of the Qur'an and Sunna to 
regulate Muslim practice from the level of interpersonal relations to that of the family 
and the state. Mawdudi, a famous Islamic thinker, was quoted as saying: 
`Law in Islam is that which answers the following query: what should the 
conduct of man be in'his individual and collective life, in his relationship to 
God, to others, and to himself in a universal community of mankind for the fulfilment of man's dual purpose: life on earth and life in the hereafter. ' (Basyuni 1982: 12) 
According to this statement, it can be noted that unlike other social systems Islam 
regulates the conduct of the individual and society in all phases of life on the basis of 
an inter-relationship of men and of man and his creator, linking both aspects of his 
worldly life on earth and life in the hereafter. 
The potential of Islam in theory as has been explained in the Qur'an and Sunna is to 
achieve and protect the interest of humans on earth and prevent evil and corruption. 
Peace, solidarity, co-operation, and brotherhood are the basis on which the Islamic 
society is founded. Numerous verses of the Qur'an as well as Hadith of the prophet 
are the reflections of these objectives. For example the prophet states: 
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`A Muslim is one from *whose tongue and hands Muslims are safe. ' 
Also, the Qur'an states: 
`But help one another in goodness and piety, and do not assist in crime and 
rebellion, and fear God surely. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 2) 
Realisation of these objectives in Islam are guaranteed through divine restrictions 
placed on personal liberty to secure personal abuse of the rights of others. 
0 Characteristics of the Islamic penal legislation 
Muslim scholars agree that, the Islamic penal legislation is founded on the following 
characteristics: 
" The religious nature 
9 The link with Shariy`a objectives 
" Foundation on moral values 
" Foundation on fundamental principles and objectives 
Q The religious nature 
The Islamic penal theory as part of Islamic law Shariy`a is characterised by its direct 
foundation on divinely inspired principles and regulations. Islamic jurists classify 
Islamic rules of law into three categories according to their subject matter: (i) Rules 
that are concerned with creed, such as belief in God, his characteristics, belief in 
angels, books, prophets, The last day and fate be good or bad. This category forms 
the basis for all legislative phases of the Islamic system and is studied under a special 
science known as `Im al kalam - the, science of speaking, or the science of logic. (ii) 
Rules that deal with individual morality. These provide the model characteristics of 
behaviour which the individual Muslim is strongly encouraged to follow. They include 
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characteristics of behaviour such as loyalty, braveness, forgiveness, generosity, etc. 
The individual Muslim must not act in contradiction with this category. The special 
science that deal with this branch is known as `ilm'al'akhlaq, or the science of morals. 
Finally, the third category includes two types of rules: (a) Those which govern the 
relationship between the individual and his creator are known as 'ahkam al `ibadat 
and regulate acts of worship such as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and charity; and (b) 
Those that regulate the inter-personal actions between individuals, such as sales, gifts, 
marriage, divorce, and the relationship between the individual and the ruler. These 
latter rules also include rules of crime and punishment oral 'ahkam al jina'iya, as well 
as those of rights and obligations. All aspects of the third category are dealt with under 
the special science known as `ilm al fiqh, also known as `ilm al'akham al shariy`a 
al `amaliya or `ilm al mu `amalat. 
" The starting point of the Islamic penal theory 
The religious character of the Islamic rules of law can be verified directly from the 
basic sources of law which include: 
" The Qur'an, or the holy book of Islam. Sources for practical rules can be found in 
various texts, as for example the judgement for theft has been stated as follows: 
As for the thief, whether man or woman, amputate his hands as requital for 
what he has done, an exemplary punishment from God; for God is all mighty 
and all wise. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 38) 
The judgement for adultery is also stated as follows: 
`The adulteress and adulterer should be flogged a hundred lashes each, and 
no pityfor them should deter you from the law of God, if you believe in God 
and the last day; and the punishment should be witnessed by a body of 
believers. ' (ibid: 2) 
Many other rules can also be found in various texts. 
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" The Sunna, or the authentic traditions of the prophet Muhammad. Similar legal 
decisions have been stated or approved by the Sunna of the prophet. A1'awa states 
that: 
`Jurists have recorded approximately 500 Qur'anic verses and 4,000 pro- 
phetic Hadith stipulating similar legal decisions or judgements. ' (Basyuni 
1982: 129) 
" The 'jjma`or the consensus of opinion. 
" The Qiyyas, or judgement upon juristic analogy which could also include al-'ijtihad, 
or independent reasoning. 
The various schools of Islamic jurisprudence tend to rely on the last two sources of 
law where sacred texts were silent. In response a doctrinal and juridicial heritage 
developed which continues to guide the legal reasoning in procedural matters today, 
and to provide a base for Islamic theories in various areas of law. 
The religious nature of Islamic penal rules in both sources is apparent. In the first 
group judgement is directly taken from divinely inspired text, whether it be the Qur'an 
or Sunna, while in the second group 'ijtihad or independent reasoning follows two 
ways: (i). By deducing the judgement from an inconclusive source in which a group 
of scholars have different views in regard to its validity. (ii). By getting evidence for 
a specific judgement by logical means on the basis of analogy to a conclusive 
judgement in an existing text, by preference, by taking the public interest and custom 
into consideration, or by other methods of deduction explained by Islamic jurists. 
Al'awa states: 
`If the basis of a doctrinal decision lies in 'ijtihad's interpretation of a 
purportedly applicable text, then the matter presents no problem, since the 
decision in reality rests upon divine text, and 'ijtihad is merely a tool to 
facilitate the understanding of what is decreed by text. And if the method of 
reaching a doctrinal decision is one of the approved methods of deduction 
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and in the absence of text, then the religious character of judgements reached 
through such methods is also evident, since these methods derive legitimacy 
from their explicit or implicit confirmation by the Quran or Sunna.. ' 
Al'awa refers to the words of Al Shafi`L " (founder of the shafiCL school of juris- 
prudence) as instructive as he states: 
`For every thing that affects the life of a Muslim, there is prescribed in the 
Qur'an a guide to lead him on the right way. ' 
He also said: 
`For everything that befalls a Muslim there is an obligatory (hukm) and a 
guide to lead him on the right way. ' (Basyuni 1982: 130) 
This means that God has assigned specific judgements to be applied to specific 
situations, and he also has established some methods by which the Muslim ruler can 
reach a judgement where an explicitly assigned judgement is absent. It can then be 
concluded that Islamic penal decisions are religious judgements which are taken 
directly from divinely inspired texts, or deduced indirectly through certain methods 
which are prescribed in the divine texts. 
The foundation of the Islamic penal legislation on divinely inspired decisions means 
that sovereignty belongs to God. He alone is the source of law. According to this 
theory no man has the right to pass orders to others on his own wish. As said Mawdudi, 
the prophet himself is subject to God's commands and is not entitled to order laws 
on his own authority. In a famous tradition, the prophet points out that he does not 
follow anything except what is revealed to him. 
It follows that Muslims both individually and collectively should obey the prophet 
who follows not his own, but God's' commands. This constitution forms the basis of 
all legislation of the Islamic state. Whenever the Islamic state comes into existence, 
it is hence obliged to follow what has been ordered by God. Its purpose is to forbid 
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all forms of evil and support all types of virtue and interest as has been divinely 
inspired by God. 
" Consequences of the religious character of the Islamic penal legislation 
The Islamic penal rules provide both for earthly punishment and punishment in the 
hereafter. The principle underlying the decisions is that for every act, be it good or 
evil, there is a specified reward for it. The Qur'an states: 
`whosoever has done even an atom's weight of good will behold it; And 
whosoever has done even an atom's weight of evil will behold that. ' (Al- 
Qur'an, Sura Alzilzila: 7-8) 
According to this principle the individual is responsible for all that he does. There 
can be no act without responsibility and also there can be no act without reward: 
And detain them, for they will be questioned. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al-safa't: 24) 
Conformity to Islamic rules is thus inseparable from faith in God. Many verses of the 
Qur'an and prophetic Hadith reflect the association between faith and abstinence 
from unlawful acts. For example, with regard to usury the Qur'an states: 
`0 believers, fear God and forego the interest that is owing if you really believe. ' (Al Qur'annSura Al bagarah: 278) 
The prophet also says: 
A believer neither steals nor commits adultery. ' 
According to A1'awa: 
`The association between legal decisions and faith on the one hand, and 
between obedience to them on earth and eternal reward or punishment, on 
the otherhand, has always been the motivation to abide by the rules of Islamic 
penal law. ' (Basyuni, 1982: 131) . 
The Qur'an demonstrates this as follows: 
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These are the limits set by God, and those who follow the commandments 
of God and the prophet, will indeed be admitted to gardens with streams of 
water running by where they will for ever abide; and this will be success 
supreme. Those who disobey God and the prophet and exceed the bounds of 
law, will be taken to hell and abide there for ever and shall suffer despicable 
punishment. ' (A} Qur'an Sura, A1 nisa': 13-14) 
From the previous evidence it is clear that the religious element becomes the basic 
aspect of deterrence for those who have strong faith in God. Accordingly, the 
individual can escape punishment and pain by conformity to the rules stated by God. 
On the other hand, for those who disobey the rules temporal punishment is worthy 
to exert control over their conduct. It is meant to be their degradation in the world. 
For example, in the case of adultery God assigns public flogging. Nevertheless, it will 
be explained later why stoning is also recognised for this case. 
`The adulteress and adulterer should be flogged a hundred lashes each, and 
no pityfor them should deter you from the law of God, if you believe in God 
and the last day; and the punishment should be witnessed by a body of believers. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura -Al Nur: 2) 
In the light of that faith, the Islamic penal legislation provides the individual with a 
clear theme of behaviour and puts at his hands a practical measurement by which he 
can choose the type of reward he wishes. This theme of moral choice runs throughout 
the text of the Qur'an and determines the role of man in shaping his personal life as 
well as life in society as awhole. Consequently, by this measurement he can give peace 
and happiness both to himself and to society by not doing harm or evil, or he might 
get pain and punishment if he deviates from the rules. This has best been portrayed 
by `Ali Shawart as follows: 
`From the available evidence in the Qur'an and the traditions of the holy 
prophet one can easily construe that man has been given the power to be the 
architect of his own destiny. At every step of his life he faces the dilemma of 
a critical moral choice. On the one hand he has the choice of obeying the 
commands of the creator, and leading a life of piety, uprightness and purity, 
on the other hand he is at liberty to disobey God's wishes and be condemned 
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eternally. Those who turn away from his will are certain to become wicked, 
mean and beastly. The entire superstructure of Islam's social philosophy is 
built on this choice, and human beings are warned that life is a very serious 
affair and should not be wasted in frivolities. ' ('Ali Shawart 1980: 42-43) 
Nevertheless, with regard to the freedom of choice we might distinguish between 
three categories as follows: (i) The first category includes, those who obey God's 
commands. This category behave in accordance with the right conduct to avoid 
eternal punishment and realise a happy, peaceful life. (ii) The second category 
includes those believers whose faith is not strong enough to keep them in the right 
way without a temporary threat. For this category worldly punishment is the only way 
to force them to conform to the rules. (3) The disobedients who do not care either 
for the earthly punishment or for the later reward in'the hereafter. This group violates 
the rules despite both types of punishment and therefore stand as a deterrent for the 
second group. 
Q The link with Shariy'a objectives 
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the concern of Islam in the first place 
is to regulate human affairs. Muslim jurists claim that behind each rule of the Islamic 
penal legislation there is a purpose relating to the preservation of a specific interest, 
and that Shariy`a objectives relate to one of the following aspects of interest. 
Firstly, preservation of all the basic necessities that mutually affect the individual life 
and lead to disturbance if hurt. These include five basic values of, religion life, reason, 
honour and wealth. 
Secondly, preservation of other needs which are of less importance than the 
necessities, but also produce tension if not satisfied. 
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Thirdly, promotion of the statuses of both the individual and the group in accordance 
with other developments that affects life conditions. 
Nevertheless, Muslim jurists agree that the necessities are the most important objec- 
tive of Islamic legislation, since human life is basically centred around these five 
values of religion, life, reason, honour and wealth. Hence, since these values represent 
the basis of human existence, they should be preserved and protected according to 
the fundamental principles of Islam. 
In explaining the philosophy of the Islamic penal legislation, Muslim jurists hold the 
view that it is mainly intended to secure these five basic aspects of life. According to 
this philosophy they regard the preservation of each of these necessities of primary 
importance on the following grounds. 
In the first place the right of religious faith is considered as critical to the individual 
perception of life and his way of conduct. It is necessary then to have this right 
guaranteed. 
Secondly, the right of personal life guarantees the individual's role in human exist- 
ence. Without this right he cannot realises his message in the earth. This includes 
protection of one's life, hands, legs and all other organs from being subjected to any 
kind of aggression. There is clear evidence from the Qur'an and Sunna to show that 
Islam has attached a special value and sanctity to human life. The Qur'an gives severe 
warnings to those who through violence and disorder harm the life of other people. 
`But you still kill one another, and you turn a section of your people from 
theirhomes assisting one another against them with guilt and oppression. Yet 
when they are brought to you as, captives you ransom them, although forbid- 
den it was to drive them away. Do you then believe a part of the book and 
reject a part? There is no other reward for them who act but disgrace in the 
world, and on the day of judgement the severest of punishment. ' (Al Qur'an, 
Sura Al. bagara: 85) 
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Thirdly, reason is the basic characteristic of humanity. By this tool the individual 
determines whether to do good or bad in the society. Shaykh Abu Zahra points out 
that protection of reason requires that it should not be subjected to any harm or 
damage that makes the individual a source of evil and aggression. He argues that 
protection of reason guarantees that every member of the society is able to provide 
goodness in his community. However the society will lose the goodness of an effective 
agent and be subjected to evil and aggression if the individual's reason is affected by 
any type of damage or harm. This is whether by the act of the individual himself or by 
that of others. For that reason Islam prohibited wine drinking and prescribed punish- 
ment for that offence, because of its bad consequences both on the individual and the 
society. 
Fourthly, protection of honour means protection of human kind. It mainly requires 
organisation of sexual relations under family life. This guarantees that children who 
belong to their actual fathers will have a good care within their families. This is the 
justification for considering illegal sexual intercourse outside the family as a crime 
worthy of punishment. The objective of Islam is to realise an honourable life to the 
children and their families. 
Fifthly, and finally, wealth is considered as a basis of life in its materialistic aspect, 
and a means for satisfaction of various bodily needs such as food, drink, clothes - and 
others. It also represents an economic power necessary for fulfilling the developmen- 
tal needs for the whole nation. In Islam all wealth actually belongs to God. The role 
of man is to distribute and consume wealth in the proper way and protect it from being 
used and taken with no right by others. 
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Scholars of Muslim jurisprudence consider aggression against any of these necessities as 
a crime that deserves punishment, and that serious crimes are those which disturb basic 
necessities. They argue that to the extent that members of Muslim society have all the 
necessities guaranteed, then the whole society will feel safe and secure. Islamic penal law 
has thus formulated specific rules of punishments by which this goal can be achieved. 
All schools of Islamic law distinguish three categories of Islamic criminal rules as 
follows: 
0 Al hidud: This includes offences punished by fixed penalties which either stated 
in the Qur'an or Sunna. 
" Al qisas, wa-al-Diyya: includes offences punished by retribution. 
" A1-ta'az4, r; includes offences punished by penalties left to the discretion of the judge. 
Discussion of each of these categories will follow later in the chapter. 
Q Foundation on moral values 
In Islam there is no dichotomy between the rules governing religious, moral and 
judicial principles. Hence the protection of moral principles by the Islamic penal law 
represents an integral aspect of Islamic law-making. Both the Qur'an and prophetic 
traditions provide evidence to prove that Islamic penal rules are basically designed 
with measures to protect the moral values of the Muslim society. Certain acts are 
prohibited on the basis of their moral consequences. For instance, with regard to 
gambling and wine drinking the Qur'an states: 
`0 believers, this wine and gambling, those idols, and these arrows you use 
for divination, are all acts of Satan; so keep away from them. You may 
happily prosper. Satan only wishes to create among you enmity and hatred 
through wine and gambling, and to divert you from the remembrance of God 
and prayer, will you therefore not desist. ' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 90-91) 
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In the same way adultery is prohibited as being immoral: 
And do not go near fornication as it is immoral and evil way. ' (Al Qur'an, 
Sura Bani'Isra'iyl: 32) 
The prophet has also provided several instructions that regulate the relations of 
Muslims in the community. One of the traditions expresses this as follows: 
`The Muslims in their mutual affection and mercy should be as a single body. 
If one member is affected the other members suffer fever and sleeplessness. ' 
He also states: 
A Muslim is one from whose tongue and hands the Muslims are at peace. ' 
This suggests that in such a community where relations of Muslims to each other entail 
religious and moral obligations, members of the community are expected to reflect 
tolerance, kindness, mercy and affection towards each other. And also they are 
expected to respect the privileges and rights which religion has provided for them as 
members of one community. This is what all Islamic penal legislation is aimed at. `Ali 
Shawart puts it this way: 
`Men have tremendous potentiality for goodness, but at the same time they 
have numerous very destructive traits. An average human being tends to be 
fundamentally ambitious and selfish. He has interminable appetites for 
whose satisfaction he unhesitatingly adopts all kinds of moral and immoral 
means. There is a lot of Machiavellianism in his nature, and unless it is 
bridled with high moral ideal life in a society can be extremely chaotic. He 
can do considerable damage to social equilibrium by his anti-social and 
oppressive behaviour. It is to remedy such a situation that religious and 
ethical philosophies throughout the ages have emphasised unless strict legal 
and moral measures are adopted people will smother each other's rights. In 
spite of these endless efforts, however, the record of human rights is not very 
encouraging. Men continue to discriminate against each other on countless 
trivial and irrational issues, and tyranny and oppression are placarded as 
legitimate instruments of statecrafts. It was in view of these indisputable 
realities of human social organisation that Islam laid down an elaborate 
framework of moral and legal constraints by which certain fundamental 
rights of men could be safeguarded. ' (`Ali Shawart 1980: 68) 
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Accordingly, the Islamic penal law can be described as the law of moral conduct. 
Q Fundamental principles 
All schools of law agree that punishment in Islamic penal law should satisfy three 
basic principles. It must: 
" be consistent with the principle of legality; 
9 be individualised; and 
" apply equally to all persons. 
" The principle of legality 
Islamic jurists agree that the protection of rights in the Islamic penal system depends 
upon the recognition of the principle of legality. Such a principle requires that there 
is no crime and no penalty unless warnings have previously been given. The Qur'an 
states: 
`We never punish till we have sent a messenger. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura 
Bani'Isra'iyl: 15) 
`God has forgiven what has happened in the past, but any one who does so 
again will be punished by God. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 95) 
It is also related to the prophet that he disregarded any blood guilt traced back to the 
time of ignorance. On the basis of these texts jurists have derived two components 
underlying the principle of legality in Islamic criminal law. (1) There is no criminal 
charge before the existence of legislation. (2) All things are presumed permissible. 
Al'awa states: 
`The application of those rules to the criminal law signifies that no punish- 
ment shall be inflicted for conduct which no text has criminalised and that 
punishment for criminalised conduct is restricted to instances where the act 
in question has been committed after the legislation takes effect. ' (Basyuni, 
1982: 134) 
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Muslim scholars point out that the principle of legality is embodied in each of the 
three. categories of crime. It has firmly been applied to Hidud crimes. Since they are 
precisely specified and have their penalties determined in the Qur'an. It also applies 
to gisas crimes and Dia crimes of retribution or compensation. However, in this 
category the nearest of kin has the right to pardon the offender. With regard to 
Ta'aziyr crimes, the principle of legality provides the judge with the right to decide 
the appropriate punishment in response to subsequent changes of circumstances in 
the society. In this category, the personal or independent reasoning of the judge is 
restricted by what is within the best interests of Muslims. 
Hence, it is clear that the principle of legality underlies all penalties under Islamic 
law. It provides that crime and punishment in Islamic law are not based on human 
reason, but rather upon divine decrees. Taymour Kamel says: 
`Islamic law rests upon a principle of legality, but also upon the principle that, 
the community should, must, and will demand right conduct and forbid 
indecency of its members. It balances individual, family, and community 
rights by categories of offences which grant the authority to punish variously 
to the family of the victim, to the community under the specific command of 
God, and to the representatives of the community under general guidelines 
laid down by God. Of these categories, one is based on specified retribution, 
one on explicit legality with minimal discretion for the judge. Individual, 
family, and community are all protected; justice is achieved. ' (Basyuni, 
1982: 169) 
" Individualisation of Punishment 
A fundamental principle under Islamic criminal law is that the criminal alone is 
responsible for his crime. This has been expressed in a number of Qur'anic verses and 
prophetic traditions. For example, the Qur'an says: 
`Every man is bound to what each does. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al Nur: 21) 
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According to this principle when an unlawful act is committed or attempted, the 
individual must undergo a systematic investigation in order to determine his criminal 
responsibility for that behaviour. In the case that the individual is guilty of a certain 
conduct, the judge must impose the appropriate sanction and the individual must be 
punished. 
Islamic jurists agree that the individualisation of punishment must apply equally 
whether to a hadd, qisas or ta`aziyr crimes. Where punishment is not stated in the 
Qur'an, the judge must consider the extent of the seriousness of the crime, the 
personality of the offender, and the amount of social harm. The Diyya by contrast is 
a compensation to be paid to the nearest of kin in cases of murder and injury, if the 
victim or his nearest of kin forgive the offender and claim their right of retribution. 
In some cases the Diyya is exceptional from the rule of individualisation of punish- 
ment. For example, if the offender is poor, his family or his relatives can assume 
collective responsibility for paying compensation. 
" Equality of treatment before the law 
The principle of equality has always been an integral part of Islam's social and legal 
philosophy. Marshall Hodgson states: 
`The Shariy`a law could recognise no hereditary social class structure, for all 
Muslims must be on the same footing before God ... '('Ali Shawart 1980: 49) 
Evidence for this is numerous both from the Qur'an and the Sunna. The prophet said: 
All men are equal like the teeth of a comb. ' 
The Qur'an also states: 
`Verily this your order is one order, and I am your Lord; So worship me. ' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al'anbiyya': 92) 
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According to this principle Islam denies that any individual or class can have any 
special position since all men relate to the same ancestor and share the same nature. 
As slaves of the same God and brothers of each other they all form one group and 
belong to the same origin. No particular group or class has been born for subjection 
while another group for mastery. 
All Muslim jurists admit that the principle of equality of men before the law in Islam 
is expressed in terms of 'insaf or `adala, which means to grant rights or justice. Its 
objective is to assure to others the same right that one claims for oneself. 
In accordance with the principle of equality the prophet warned against discrimina- 
tion in applying hadd punishments as against the common people while excluding the 
nobility. He pointed out that if his own daughter, Fatima, committed theft, her kinship 
ties nasab would not save her the hadd punishment. 
Such principle gives the individual a sense of justice which is necessary to force him 
to respect the rights of others in the same manner as he claims his own rights. 
0 Degrees of obedience to the law in Islam 
In Islam a distinction has been made between lawful acts, known as halal, and unlawful 
or forbidden acts, known as haram. The degrees of obedience to what is halal and 
what is haram is expressed in terms of a compulsory continuum of acceptable to 
non-acceptable acts as follows: 
Q Fard 
That which is commanded by God in the Qur'an, by the prophet in the Hadith, or by 
consensus 'Ijma' of the community of believers. This includes, for example, prayer, 
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fasting during Ramadan, payment of zakat, religious taxation, etc. All things which 
are farad are obligatory unless under certain excuses. 
f 
Q Wajib 
An obligatory act, very close to farad, but less compulsory. 
Q Mandub 
Refers to recommended actions, preferred practice, but omission is not punished. 
Things which are mandub include all Sunna practice or correct behaviour. 
Q Jai i 
Constitutes permissible acts. For example, a great diversity in Muslim practices such 
as differences in dressing, food taste and styles. 
11 Makruh 
That which is regarded as an unworthy act, but which is not punished. For example, 
divorcing a woman while pregnant is unworthy of a Muslim husband. 
Q Haram 
That which is totally forbidden. Forbidden acts include, for instance, murder, theft, 
adultery, etc. All acts which fall under haram are forbidden and punishable under 
Islamic criminal law. 
The forgone suggests when a certain act is criminal and punishable and when it is not. 
0 The bases of criminalisation in Islam 
It has been asserted earlier in this chapter that the Islamic penal legislation is centred 
around basic rtligious values and morality. Under this system both the individual and 
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the community are bound to the public good. The essential task of the Islamic 
community'Umma, then, as has been stated by God, is to enjoin good and prohibit 
evil: 
`Of all the communities raised among men you are the best, enjoining the 
good, forbidding the wrong and believe in God' (Al Qur'an, Sura'al`umran: 
110) 
According to Muslim jurists the good conduct includes maCruf which is known as 
decent or proper, and the wrong conduct includes Munkar, that which is hateful, 
disapproved and blameworthy. To realize this task of enjoining goodness and forbid- 
ding evil and wrong one must consider that man as God's trustee on earth, owes a 
duty of maintenance, prudence, judicious use and exercise of himself and endowed 
faculties. Hence he owes a duty of care and practice of what is good and decent. This 
duty entails the accomplishment of those subjective values which represent the base 
of mankind's interest. 
Unlike other legal systems, Islamic law emphasises duties rather than rights. It 
requires the fulfilment of individual obligations before the individual can claim his 
rights and privileges. The individual is neither apart nor separate from the community, 
and his rights also neither different nor conflicting with those of the whole community. 
As part of the society, the fulfilment of his obligations and those of his fellow members 
in the society constitute the social rights and benefits which are then shared by all. 
The concept of enjoining right conduct and forbidding indecency which binds the 
individual to the public good, also binds him to a principle of personal responsibility. 
Each individual then becomes responsible for his acts, whether they are good Ma`ruf 
or evil Munkar. However one can find no Qur'anic text to provide a complete list of 
what is Ma`ruf or Munkar. Instead, Islam considers all acts that bring disadvantages 
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to society as evil, not to be committed, and those acts that bring advantages to society 
as good, to be recommended. Quite a number of traditions and Qur'anic verses 
provide evidence that the commitment of a certain act, be based on those inherent 
advantages and disadvantages. For example, the alcoholic drinks and narcotic materi- 
als are considered harmful regardless of some of the benefits. The Qur'an states: 
`They ask you of (intoxicants) wine and gambling - Tell them "There is great 
enervation but also benefits in them for men; but their enervation is greater 
than their benefit" : (AlQur'an, Sura Al baqara: 219) 
As it is pointed out by Abu Zahr'a (1979), Bentham has clearly indicated the 
distinction between morals and law. Bentham pointed out that the objective of moral 
science is to regulate human acts so as to achieve the possible degree of happiness. 
According to him this should also be the same objective of law. But the two sciences 
differ with regard to their general and special subject matter. He sees all acts as 
generally coming under the rules of moral science. This however, according to him is 
not possible in the case of law, Bentham claims that in moral science the individual 
ought to do every act that entails public utility. But it is not possible for law to order 
most of these acts. Nevertheless, law is unable to forbid some of the evil acts even if 
they have been forbidden by moral science. In general both law and moral science 
share the same ground, but one is wider in scope than the other. Bentham sees this 
difference as resulting from the following two aspects: 
" Law cannot affect the individual's behaviour directly except by punishment. Of 
course this requires the specification of acts which are punishable. It is also 
recognised that punishment is an evil which should not be decided unless it is 
expected to result in more utility. 
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" Law is always under the fear of affecting an innocent individual instead of an actual 
offender. Such fear is particularly critical where it requires personal 
investigations, as in the case of psychological crimes. 
One can also add a third distinction, that although in moral science the individual is 
required to do every act that entails public utility, however, moral science does not 
possess the power to force the individual to do so or, on the other hand, preventing 
them from doing the opposite. This suggests that law possesses the effective power 
to support the moral system. 
Abu Zahra admits that the moralistic theory agrees with what Muslim jurists have 
decided and that the objectives of moral science are the same as those of religion. He 
claims that Islam has always supported every act which is considered as good accord- 
ing to the judgement of the moralistic measurement. He adds further that if utility 
has been the basis of laws, as Bentham has decided, it can also be said that actual 
utility forms the basis of Islamic legislation, and it is observable in all its goals and 
objectives. The protection of this goal then becomes the basic task of Islamic law. 
While all believers in the Islamic community are required to realize the previously 
mentioned principle of utility, the duty of actualising it falls particularly on those who 
hold the legal power. In doing this, the Islamic penal legislation considers that in every 
society there exist some types of behaviour which do not respond to either of the social 
or moral means of control unless threatened by legal rules. Islam considers the 
individual as under temptation to do evil damage sometimes. This is clearly stated in 
the Qur'an: 
`But I don't wish to absolve myself, for the soul is prone to evil. ' (Al-Qur'an, 
Sura-yusuf: 53) 
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Therefore Islam found it necessary to legislate matters affecting such types of deviant 
behaviour in order to prevent the spread of evil in the community. those who control 
the legal authority are then allowed to criminalise all acts which contradict the 
principle of utility and the public interest. A Muslim scholar, 'Ibn Al qayyim Al jawzi 
is quoted as saying: 
`the law of God is where the public good lies 
'Ibn `akid completed these words by adding: 
`Even if no revelation has been handed down on (the particular) subject and 
if the prophet hasn't said a word about it. ' (Basyuni, 1982: 160) 
According to Islamic jurists, the Legal Authority, is-then required to forbid all those 
acts which are evil. It can only act fairly by warning members of the Islamic community 
of those acts which are against public interest. One may not consider a forbidden act 
as a crime except by virtue of an existing text of the law or the legal authority which 
anticipates the criminalisation of the act, whether legal hadd or a discretion of the 
judge ta`aziyr. 
0 Definition of crime in Islamic penal legislation 
In its Arabic root the term jariyma, crime, comes from the Arabic verb jaram, which 
means gained a hateful or an undesirable act. Hence the term jariyma is used to refer 
to the commitment of any act that contradicts with virtue, justice and the right way. 
Accordingly, the term jariyma in its linguistic origin refers to the commitment of an 
undesirable or a disgusting act, and the criminal, Al mujrim in Arabic, is one who 
commits such an act, both with complete intention and insistence upon doing it. 
Sheikh Abu Zahara pointed out that if all what Shariy`a has commanded is considered 
according to the judgement of God and reason, therefore disobedience of any of these 
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commands will be a crime' since it contradicts both God's will and reason. This 
suggests that crimeAl jariyma is the commitment of what has been prohibited by God, 
or the omission of what he has ordered. 
Accordingly Islamic jurists consider crime as a forbidden act whose commission is 
penalised, or an obligatory act whose omission is also penalised. Jurists distinguish 
between two types of punishment either for omissions or comissions: (i) a worldly 
punishment to be carried out by the legal authority, and (ii) a later punishment to be 
carried out after death in the hereafter. Almost all jurists of Islamic schools hold that 
the omission or commission of an act is not considered as a crime unless it has any of 
the previous types of punishments decided for it. 
But jurists have particularly considered crime from the point of view of juristic power 
with regard to what worldly punishment the legislator has decided. They specify 
crimes as violations that invoke punishment, which is carried out by the legal power. 
In this sense Al Mawardi defines crimes to mean that they are legally prohibited acts 
which God has threatened for either by a hadd or a discretionary ta`aziyr punishment. 
It can be noted here that the definition of crime in this special sense agrees with that 
of secular penal law, where crime is described as a commission or omission of an act 
punishable by text. 
But it might appear that, the legal definition of crime is not applicable in the case of 
ta'aziyr or discretionary punishments which are not specified by text, be it the Qur'an 
or Sunna. Sheikh Abu Zahara argues that this might seem apparent, but actually it is 
not true because all discretionary punishments aim for the prevention of corruption 
and evil, and all this has a base both in the Sunna and the Qur'an. 
And do not withhold from people what belongs to them, and do not corrupt the land. ' (AI-Qur'an, Sura Al shura: 183) 
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The prophet has also pointed out that there is no harm and no causing of harm. 
Accordingly the ruler is required, according to what God has delegated to his 
authority, to legislate from punishments what he sees as deterring to offenders. Also 
considerable evidence from the Qur'an and Sunna refers to similar expressions of 
disobedience, corruption and evil and describes them as violations of the right 
conduct. Jurists consider all of these terms as meeting with the general meaning of 
crime, since they involve evil and violation of God's command. 
On the other hand it is argued that the main element of the legal definition of crime 
as a legally prohibited act punishable by law, involves a distinction between the 
meaning of crime in the legal sense, and evil as has been decided by moral science. 
The reason, as indicated before, is that in moral science whether an act is evil or good, 
the judgement is based on whether it has bad or good consequences on society. This 
is the general principle, according to moral scholars who consider the measurement 
of goodness in society to be the greatest degree of benefit to the greatest possible 
number of people. But benefit is not only materialistic, it also includes spiritual 
matters. Also it is not restricted to temporary benefits, but also latest benefit is 
considered - and protection from evil is one of the benefits. 
In summary, the legal element forms the basis in the definition of crime in its special 
meaning, but this is not the case in moral law. It is pointed out that the difference 
between penal law and moral law is that in the latter evil in society is greater than to 
be punished. It constitutes acts that fall under punishment by legal authority and those 
which do not. This is because for the majority of acts evidence cannot be found. It 
becomes then the responsibility of the penal legislation to deal with types of evil that 
fall under its scope. This is what is meant by criminalisation in Islamic penal legisla- 
tion. 
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Types of-crimes inIslam 
Islamic jurists divide all acts which God has ordered for commission (duties) or 
omission into three categories: (i) The first category includes the absolute right of 
God hagqAllah; and (ii) The second category enjoins both the right of God and that 
of the individual, with the former being predominant; and (iii) The third category 
includes more of that which is the individual's right than God's right. All acts which 
are claimed to be the absolute right of God are those acts whose commission or 
omission is prescribed as against public interest. Those prescriptions, besides cover- 
ing the first category, involve the second category as well, where both the individual 
and divine rights coincide, but the latter predominates. On the other hand, those acts 
which are prohibited as the right of the individual, their justification is based on the 
realisation of further private interests and benefits for the individual. 
It follows that the previous classification of acts is that, legally prohibited acts (crimes) 
according to the classical manual of Islamic criminal law, are classified in terms of the 
degree of aggression they entail, whether against absolute divine, or private interest. 
It was previously pointed out that the term crime or jarayim, originally, involves 
aggression against what Islamic jurists referred to as (considered utility or interest), 
which has been specified by text in the Qur'an, sunna or by means of analogy, or that 
which might result in harm or damage to any of the previously mentioned benefits, 
which is known as Sadd aldharayi` in juristic books. it has also been pointed out that 
considered utility or benefit in Islam involves the protection of the following basic 
values: life, property, wealth, honour, reason, and religion. 
Accordingly all Islamic schools of law recognise five types of criminal aggression 
against public interest and benefits as follows: 
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" aggression against life 
" aggression against honour 
S 
" aggression against wealth and property 
" aggression against reason, and 
" aggression against religion. 
Each of these types of aggression varies in its effect according to the degree of 
aggression it entails against its subject matter. Muslim jurists classify benefits under 
three main categories: 
" First of all, whatever affects the individual personal life is a necessity which should 
be fulfilled. 
" Secondly, whatever helps to preserve the individual life without more tension and 
worry, is a need which is less in importance than the necessities, and 
" Thirdly, whatever helps to preserve a better honourable life for the individual is 
a perfection which is of least importance. 
All Islamic jurists admit that criminal aggression varies according to the degree of 
benefit involved. For example, in the case of crimes against the person, they consider 
aggression against any of the basic necessities of the individual, such as life, of more 
critical importance than any other bodily injury. Also aggression against any other 
aspect of personal life, such as liberty of thought and opinion, is of less importance 
than the first type. Finally, of least importance are those crimes that involve personal 
insult and false accusation to the individual. Consequently crimes against the person 
vary with regard to the degree of aggression and interest in such a way that murder 
becomes more serious than loss of limbs, and loss of limbs becomes greater than 
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hitting a person, and preventing freedom of speech. The first type involves one of the 
basic necessities, while the second involves one of the needs. As for the last type, it 
does not affect the basis of life nor any of its needs, but rather it affects what is 
considered to be an aspect of life perfection. Therefore it can be concluded that the 
hierarchy of crimes varies according to the degree and type of interest lost. Those 
crimes whose subject matter is one of the necessities rank first in terms of seriousness, 
followed by those which involve what is to be a need; and finally rank those involving 
a complementary aspect of the individual's life. 
Based on the previous ranking of benefits, it is agreed that punishment should be 
equivalent to the degree and amount of harm committed. Accordingly, Islamic jurists 
identify three categories of crimes in terms of the legal penalty to be imposed: Hidud, 
Qissas and Ta`aziyr crimes. 
Q Jarayim Al hidud 
It has been recognised that in Islamic law there are two categories of rights and 
obligations. The first category includes the right of God, hagqAllah, and the second 
refers to the right of man, haqq Adami. In its legal sense, the term hidud, plural of 
hadd, is used to refer to those offences that violate the right of God. The term hadd 
means a limit or constraint in the case established by God, to prevent the commission 
of acts which he has forbidden. Islamic jurists define six major offences which have 
fixed penalties prescribed in the Qur'an or the Sunna; Al sariga (theft), Haraba 
(armed robbery), Al zina (illicit sexual intercourse), Al qadhf (slanderous accusation 
of unchastity), and Ridda (apostasy). All of these are considered as violations against 
public interest and therefore have their punishments imposed by virtue of being a 
divine right. 
The Islamic Penal Legislation: Theoretical Background 43 
Q Jarayim Al qisas (sometimes called crimes of retribution & compensation) 
This category is concerned more specifically with crimes against persons. The term 
-- qisas as mentioned in the Qur'an and Sunna, is interpreted by Muslim jurists to refer 
to a penalty equivalent to the injury inflicted on the victim, or it may take the form of 
a pecuniary compensation diyya for the victim's injury, to be imposed only when the 
victim waives his right to claim it: 
`0 believers, ordained for you is retribution for the murdered. ' (Al-Qur'an 
Sura, Al bagara: 178) 
The qisas crimes recognised to Muslim jurists are of two types: (a) fi al nafs or, 
involving the individual's life (homicide); and (b) fi ma dun al nafs i. e. for wounds and 
injuries. 
This category is equivalent to the crimes of assault, battery, mayhem, and other 
infringements of the person and bodily integrity of an individual that do not result in 
death (Basyuni, 1982: 24). Qisas is applied for both according to whether the act is 
deliberate or accidental. This will be explained later in the chapter. 
Q Jarayim Al ta'aziyr (discretionary crimes) 
Muslim jurists consider all violative acts and corresponding penalties outside the 
framework of hidud and gisas crimes as discretionary, correction, rehabilitation or 
chastisement. Ta`aziyr offences are not specified in the Qur'an or the Sunna. The term 
literally means chastisement in its widest possible sense. Legally it refers to a penalty 
which is not fixed, since it is not mentioned in the text. Al Mawardi indicates the 
meaning of ta`aziyr as follows: 
`Punishment inflicted in cases of offences for which the law Shariy`a has not 
enacted written penalties. The rules relating to it differ depending upon who 
is inflicting it and upon whom it is inflicted. It has this point in common with 
written penalties: it, too, is a means of reprieve and reprimand which varies 
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with the nature of the offence, however, it differs from them in other respects. ' 
(Al Mawardi, cited by Basyuni 1982: 212) 
Although ta`azyr crimes are not specified in the Qur'an or Sunna, nevertheless it is 
concluded that both the Qur'an and Sunna provide the principles of this system. 
Al'awa points out that the system of ta`aziyr crimes represents the means through 
which the society protects its social, political, and economic systems and preserves its 
cultural continuity, by deciding punishments for disruption or infringements of the 
system. Thus ta`aziyr crimes provide the ruler or judge with the flexibility to respond 
to societal interest and subsequent changes of circumstances through the 
instrumentality of penal law. Ta`aziyr crimes are numerous in Muslim state, however 
some examples include the following: bribery, bearing false witness, breach of trust, 
gambling, and tampering with weights and measures. 
The previous classification of criminal conduct, resulted in basic consequences that 
distinguish between acts which violate a divine right and those which violate a private 
right of the individual. Muslim scholars point out several consequences in this regard. 
First of all they claim that, when there is a violation against a divine right such as in 
the case of hidud crimes, where there is an injury to the public interest, then the state 
preserves the right to commence criminal action. Secondly, they also argue that a 
penalty inflicted by virtue of being a divine right means that the prescription is 
necessary for the protection of fundamental public interest. Such a penalty may never 
be abrogated either by the ruler 'Imam or by the individual. Nevertheless this is not 
the case in qisas crimes, where a penalty may not be imposed if the victim forgives the 
accused (normally after having substituted the Diyya as compensation). 
By contrast gisas crimes, such as cases of assault against the individual (crimes of 
retribution and ransom), or cases of defamation (where false accusation of unchastity 
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is considered injurious to the person), and ta`aziyr crimes (which are violative of a 
private right), the ruling authority does not have the right to commence a criminal 
action unless the victim claims that right. In ta`azryr crimes, however, the ruler has the 
right to determine in accordance with public interest and changing circumstances 
whether to punish the offender or to forgive him. 
Finally, with regard to rules of evidence, both qisas and hidud offences require at least 
two eye witnesses, and sometimes four are required as in the case of adultery; while 
in Ta`aziyr offences only one eye witness is enough to give evidence. 
The procedural differences described above restrict the judicial authority as to the 
range of possible sanctions. Whether it be a hadd, grsas, or ta`aziyr punishment. This 
will be dealt with in the following. 
Punishment in Islamic criminal law - meaning 
The subject of punishment has been intensively investigated by Muslim jurists, who 
consider penalty as a materialistic reward prescribed by the legislator to prevent and 
deter. The most common definition given by Muslim scholars is that punishment is a 
deterrent before the act and suppression after it (Bahnasi, 1983; Al'alfi, 1982; Al 
Mawardi). In explaining this Bahnasi (1983) points out that the knowledge of punish- 
ment is intended to prevent the commission of the criminal act, and its execution 
thereafter should prevent the criminal from enjoining in similar conduct in the future. 
This definition thus provides the whole justification of penalties in Islam as a means 
of justice intended to regulate human behaviour in accordance with society's benefits. 
Murad puts it this way: 
`Penalties in Islam are more of a functional nature to regulate and deter. God 
has laid down a body of mutual rights and obligations which are the true 
embodiment of justice. He has also laid down certain bounds and limits to 
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be observed and maintained for his verypurpose. If men and nations desire 
to move in peace and safety on the highways of life, they must stick to the 
"traffic lanes" demarcated for them and observe all the (signposts) erected 
along their routes. If they do not, they not only put themselves in danger, but 
endanger others. They therefore naturally make themselves liable to penalties 
- not in vengeful retribution - but to regulate the orderly exchange in man's 
life in accordance with justice. ' (Kurrain Murad 1981: 16-17) 
Al Mawardi also indicated that God has assigned hidud punishments to deter those 
who might under temptation respond very easily to their desires forgetting about their 
rewards in the hereafter. Penalties then serve as a warning for those who are ignorant 
to escape the shame and pain of punishment, by following duties and avoiding 
commitment of what has been prohibited. Al Mawardi points out that in this way Islam 
provides a whole system of rewards that reflect a compassionate urge to avoid and 
eschew. In the Qur'an this is what all the message of Islam is intended for: 
`We have sent you as a benevolence to the creatures of the world. ' (Al-Qur'an, 
Sura-Al-Anbiya: 107) 
meaning saving them from harm by directing them from disobedience and evil and 
guiding them to obedience and fulfilment of duties. Therefore, justice for human 
beings, as for other creatures, lies in obeying God by avoiding what he has laid down 
as (wrong) and doing what he has ordered as right and good: 
`It is only God who can establish the intricate network of interrelationships 
and roles, mutual rights and obligations and consequent rewards and pun- 
ishments on the basis of absolute standards of justice. ' (Murad 1981: 5) 
Punishment in Islam is certainly harsh and threatening, but still more strict are the 
rules of evidence and procedure before one may be convicted. Nobody is punished 
unless his guilt is established. Also no-one can be punished for someone's guilt, and 
all individuals must be equal before the law. The principle underlying it is mainly 
justice as something associated with rewarding people according to how well or badly 
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they (observe) the body of the mutual rights and obligations obtaining in their 
community. 
According to Murad (1981) it is a significant contribution of Islam that these rewards 
are called hidud or boundaries. They are liabilities incurred as a result of transgression 
against crossing the boundary designed by God. A transgression which, according to 
the Qur'an, is the main reason of all the corruption and disorders in the society. 
0 Types of punishments 
It is provided that in Islamic law violative acts are either the reprehensible mal-ruh 
or the forbidden haram. Islamic jurists distinguish three main categories of punish- 
ment according to a complex criterion that combines the gravity of the penalty with 
the nature of the deviation committed. Each category essentially corresponds to a 
specific type of penal sanction. The few penalties known to Islamic jurists as hidud 
are fixed limits established by God to prevent commission of what is haram or 
forbidden, or the omission of prescribed regulation. Apart from gisas, retaliation, 
which is the penalty for homicide and injury, all other offences are punished by ta`aziyr 
or discretionary punishments which are not precisely established by the Shariy`a, but 
however the decision is left for the judge. Penalties for each category vary according 
to the nature of the violation as follows. 
Q Al hidud (Fixed penalties) 
Penalties classified under this category are prescribed in the Qur'an or Sunna of the 
prophet and have been described as limits of God. Unlike qisas and ta`aziyr, punish- 
ment for this category is mandatory and corporal. Jurists consider acts punishable 
under this category of a grave nature because of the great harm they bring to the 
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primary interest of Islamic society. The followings are the main offences punishable 
under this category. There are six such offences of this category recognised to jurists. 
I 
" Al sariqa Al hadiyiah (Theft) 
The hadd prescribed for theft in the Qur'an is to sever the thief's hand: 
As for the thief, whether man or woman, amputate his hand as requital for 
what he has done, an exemplarypunishment from God; for God is all mighty 
and all wise. ' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 38) 
Almost all jurists have defined theft as `Taking someone's property by stealth' (Al`awa 
1982: 3), Also all schools agree that the thief s right hand should be cut off from the 
wrist, and the penalty should be executed in public to serve as an example. Neverthe- 
less, amputation is strictly limited to circumstances where the property reaches a 
minimum value agreed upon at the time of the theft. It should also be taken from the 
proper place of custody where it is normally kept. In case of doubt, if any of these 
conditions is not proved, the offender is not liable to the hadd penalty. In this case, 
and in the event of his committing a subsequent theft, he becomes liable to a ta`aziyr 
punishment. 
" Al haraba (Armed Robbery) 
Three terms are used interchangeably for this crime by Muslim scholars in the basic 
references of Islamic jurisprudence: Al haraba or armed robbery; Al sariga al-kubra, 
or the great theft; and qat'al tariyq, or highway robbery. In the view of some scholars 
the first term Al haraba, or armed robbery exactly expresses the spirit of this crime 
as has been mentioned in the Qur'an: 
`The punishment for those who wage war against God and his prophet, and 
perpetrate disorders in the land, is to kill or crucify them, or have a hand on 
one side and afoot on the other amputates, or banish them from the land. 
Such is their disgrace in the world and in the hereafter their doom shall be 
dreadful. ' (Al-Quran, Sura Al ma'ida: 33) 
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Jurists defined haraba or armed robbery as: 
`Waiting by the way (or highway) to steal a traveller's property by force and 
by this means obstructing travel on this road. ' (Al'awa 1982: 81) 
It appears from this definition that the act of haraba involves theft or taking of 
someone else's property, however it provides a basic distinction between theft and 
armed robbery. As previously mentioned the basic element in theft is the taking of 
someone else's property by stealth, however in haraba it is the intention to take 
property from others by means of force. Accordingly in the case of haraba the offender 
is liable to the penalty even if he failed to bring the intended crime to completion. 
According to jurists haraba involves any of the following situations: (i) The victim is 
only confronted but not robbed, (ii) Property is forcibly taken from the victim, (iii) 
The victim is murdered but not robbed, and (iv) The victim is robbed and murdered. 
The punishment for haraba as prescribed in the previous Qur'anic verse involves 
more than one penalty. Accordingly jurists hold that the imposition of the penalty 
should differ according to the nature of the commitment, and hence the judge has the 
authority to choose the suitable penalty according to the proper situation. Thus if the 
criminal commits murder, he should be sentenced to death; if he robbed the victim, 
he should have his hand and foot cut off alternately; and if he threatens travellers, he 
should be banished. Jurists understood amputation of hands and feet from opposite 
sides to mean the right hand and the left foot. Also, banishment is interpreted to 
involve imprisonment. 
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" Al zina (Illicit sexual relations) 
The Arabic termzina, as used by Muslim jurists, applies both to fornication, i. e. sexual 
- relations between an unmarried man and woman, and adultery (defined as illicit 
sexual relations between two married individuals). The act is defined to mean `sexual 
intercourse between a man and awomanwithout legal right or without the semblance 
of legal right al milk orshibh al milk, (Al'awa 1982: 14). All jurists admit that the basic 
element in this crime is the unlawful intercourse. According to the Qur'an the penalty 
set for zina is flogging with a hundred lashes to be carried out in public: 
`The adulteress and adulterer should be flogged a hundred lashes each, and 
no pityfor them should deter you from the Law of God, if you believe in God 
and the last day; and the punishment should: be witnessed by a body of 
believers. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al -Nur: 2). 
Depending on the previous Qur'anic verse, the punishment for zina is flogging. 
However, in accordance with the Sunna of the prophet, jurists distinguish different 
penalties for zina according to the status of the guilty (Al`awa, 1982). An unmarried 
person known to jurists as ghair muhsan is to be flogged with a hundred lashes and 
may also be banished for a year. As for one who is muhsan, or married, the penalty is 
stoning to death. Jurists justify the distinction between muhsan and ghair muhsan on 
the grounds that a married person has no reason to commit zina since he or she has 
a lawful sexual relations. This opportunity, of course, is not available to the unmarried 
guilty. The term muhsan implies that the legal marriage bond restricts the individual 
only to legal sexual life. This is expected to create more loyalty between couples. In 
addition it prevents other social problems resulting from illegal sexual behaviour 
outside the institution of marriage. 
In practice jurists hold that the imposition of those penalties is restricted by the 
evidentiary requirements. Ahad is applicable only when the act is witnessed by four 
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eye-witnesses known for their honesty, or otherwise confessed to by those who are 
guilty of it who ought to give full details of the commitment. As with other hidud 
penalties, if any doubt might occur the hadd cannot apply. 
" Shurb a/ Khamr (Drinking of wine) 
Wine has been defined as `any drink which gets a person drunk' (Al'awa 1982: 44). 
Wine drinking was a common habit which prevailed among Arab tribesmen before 
Islam. When Islam came it did not declare immediate complete prohibition of this 
habit from the beginning, but the final prohibition was made through gradual legis- 
lations. At the very first stage Muslim believers were forbidden to approach their 
prayer under the influence of intoxication. The Qur, an states: 
`0 you who believe do not pray when you are intoxicated until you are sure 
of what you are saying. ' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al nisa': 45) 
To follow this Qur'anic legislation this means that the individual Muslim should stop wine 
drinking during the five prayers, which extends from dawn time until after sunset. Another 
Qur'anic verse points out that wine has some benefits, but the same verse goes on to point 
out that it is a great sin and that its harm outweighs its apparent benefit: 
`They ask you of (intoxicants) wine and gambling. Tell them: "There is great 
enervation but also benefits in them for men; but their enervation is greater 
than their benefit. "' (Al Qur'an - Sura Al baqara: 219) 
In a later legislation, the Quran became more strict in forbidding wine drinking. In 
this revelation wine drinking is described as an impure thing rijs explained in terms 
of the bad consequences which Satan creates among those who drink: 
`0 believers, this wine and gambling, these idols, and these arrows used for 
divination, are all acts of Satan; so keep away from them. You may happily 
prosper. Satan only wishes to create among you enmity and hatred through 
wine and gambling, and to divert you from the remembrance of God and 
prayer. *Will you therefore not desist. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 90-91) 
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Hence one cannot say that wine drinking involves any aggressive act in itself, but as 
the Qur'anic verse indicates, it is the evil effect of alcohol that led to the classification 
of its drinking as a sin and an impure thing not to be committed. This is supported by 
the fact that the previously mentioned verse was said to have been revealed, and 
alcoholic drinks were classified to be forbidden, when a group of Muslims were 
enraged in a fight among themselves after getting drunk. It has therefore come to be 
that God has considered wine drinking as a deviation against the limits of God, and 
consequently penalties have been prescribed against this sin to safeguard the society 
from its evil and harmful effects. 
The vast majority of jurists, though, have said very little either about the benefits or 
the harmful effects of wine drinking. However, they simply disapprove of it because 
it is classified by God as a sin not to be committed. Their acceptance of this legislation 
reflects their complete adherence to God's will. They consider that the creator, God, 
has the absolute right to prescribe for his creatures what is right and what is wrong, 
or what is lawful halal and what is unlawful haram, since he alone knows what is of 
most benefit and what is of most evil to the individual and society. 
Al'awa refers to different research findings that prove the destructive effects of wine 
drinking both on the individual and society. He points out that doctors, criminologists, 
psychotherapists and sociologists have all found different effects, which range from 
physical and mental health, crime commitment, motor accidents and homicide in 
different western countries. In view of recent Muslim scholars' writings, enough has 
been said about this to justify the legal punishment that is alleged to have been applied 
for it. 
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In summary, it can be said that the principle behind the penalty for alcohol use in Islamic 
legislation is the safeguarding of the society from its unquestionably destructive effects, 
and also its established association with crime. Al'awa (1982) pointed out that most of the 
jurists hold that there is a hadd punishment for this sin, nevertheless this has not been 
prescribed in the Qur'an. On the other hand, it is also pointed out that the prophet during 
his lifetime had imposed and ordered beating as a penalty for drinkers (Ibid). 
" Al qadhf (Slanderous accusation of unchastity) 
Slanderous accusation is known by jurists as an unknown allegation that an individual 
has committed, zina. Clear expression for such allegation should involve only one 
meaning that is derived from the term zina, or anyword of the same meaning. The 
penalty for this offence is classified as the right of God. Therefore once the offence 
is proved, either by testimony or personal confession, the guilty person is liable to a 
hadd punishment stated in the Qur'an as follows: 
`Those who defame chaste women and do not bring four witnesses should be 
punished with eighty lashes, and their testimony should not be accepted 
afterwards, for they are profligates. ' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al-Nur: 4) 
" Al ridda (Apostasy) 
Apostasy is known in Arabic as ridda, which means `turning back'. A person who turns 
back from Islam after once having embraced it, to unbelief or for another religion, is 
known to jurists as a murtadd (apostate). Turning back from Islam in this way can be 
by word, deed, or omission. Turning away from Islam by word is to state the non-ex- 
istence of God, the prophets and the angels; or to deny any part of the Qur'an or its 
principle teachings, such as alms-giving zakat and prayer. Turning away from Islam 
by deed is to act contrary to the teachings of Islam, as for example to intend to commit 
something haram, or unlawful. On the other hand, turning back from Islam by 
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omission is to refrain from doing all that is required by Islam as a religious duty. The 
majority of Muslim jurists hold that turning away from Islam after having once 
embraced it, by any of the ways mentioned, is a crime classified under hidud category. 
No worldly punishment is set for this offence in the Qur'an, but all that is mentioned 
is that the apostate will be punished in the hereafter: 
`But those of you who turn back on their faith and die disbelieving will have 
wasted their deeds in this world and the next. They are inmates of Hell, and 
shall there abide forever. ' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al baqara: 217) 
According to jurists, the strongest evidence that apostasy is punishable by a hacid penalty 
stems from a prophetic hadith narrated by'Ibn `abbas, in which the prophet has pointed 
out that whoever changes his religion is to be killed. 
The consensus of the companions 
also follows this hadith. Jurists point out that the requisite for committing apostasy is to 
intend to do or omit the act while being aware of the penalty. A person who commits 
apostasy as such is normally allowed a certain time to repent. If he fails to do so after this 
period has passed, then the hadd or the death penalty is inflicted. 
More recently it is accepted that the concept of punishing one who displays in any 
way disloyalty to the Islamic state is equivalent to treason or conspiracy in modern 
legal systems (Al`awa, 1987). In the Islamic sense apostasy can be harmful to the 
Islamic society in two ways. Firstly, in the case of the apostate who encourages other 
people to reject Islam in order to weaken the law and order of the Muslim society 
which is based on its religious teachings. Secondly, in the case of the apostate who 
unites or joins hands with enemies in an actual state of war against Islam. It is 
noteworthy to point out here that war against Islam might take different forms, for 
example by delivering talks or writing material to degrade Islam. According to Muslim 
scholars, in both cases punishment is justified to protect the Muslim society from the 
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harm of the apostate's action. However, some scholars see that in other cases, for 
example in the case of the simple change of someone's religion, the punishment 
cannot be imposed. AI'awa says. 
`One can understanä, therefore, the Hanafi school's view of punishing the 
male apostate only, leaving the female apostate unpunishec4 because she is 
not able to fight against the Muslim state, which the male apostate is able to 
do. ' (Ibid: 63) 
In summary, Islam is viewed by Muslim jurists as a complete system of life based on 
religion. Its rules are prescribed to shape and protect the public order in the Muslim 
society. Accordingly, apostasy is regarded as a crime for which a hadd penalty is 
justified. However, the punishment is said to be inflicted only in cases in which the 
apostate is a cause of harm to order in the Muslim society. This is the underlying 
principle for penalising this offence in modern times. 
1 Al gisas Penalties (Retaliation) 
Penalties classified under this category apply to crimes against the person, such as 
murder and the infliction of physical injury. According to jurists these appear to be 
more civil wrongs, rather than a crime in the strict sense, the remedy for which is the 
concern of the victim or his nearest kin, and the public power has no right to intervene 
in this case. The principle `a life for a life' stems both from the Qur'an and Sunna, and 
has radically replaced the pre-Islamic custom of revenge tha'r, which was common 
among Arab tribesmen in cases of injury and homicide before Islam. 
The Qur'an states: 
`0 believers, ordained for you is retribution for the murdered, (whether) a 
free man (is guilty) of (the murder o j) a free man, or a slave of a slave, or a 
woman of a woman. But he who is pardoned some of it by his brother should 
be dealt with equity, and recompense (for blood) paid with a grace. This is 
concession from your Lord and kindness. He who transgresses in spite of it 
shall suffer painful punishment. ' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al baqara: 178) 
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This rule is also provided in Sunna, where it is related to the prophet that he has 
indicated that if a man is murdered, his nearest kin have either to kill the murderer 
, or, if they prefer, to take compensation. 
Following the previous regulations of the Qur'an and the Sunna all schools of law 
agree that the punishment for homicide and the infliction of injury in Islamic law 
could be either qisas (retaliation) or, alternatively, the payment of diyya, or blood 
money for compensation. But the Qur'anic verse clearly indicates a preference for 
the latter, since the forgiver will be rewarded in the hereafter, which for a believer is 
a much greater reward than any other. 
Muslim scholars understood the term qisas as mentioned in the Qur'an and Sunna of 
the prophet to mean `infliction on a culprit an injury exactly equal to the injury he 
inflicted on his victim' (A1'awa, 1982: 69). There the institution of qisas can be 
understood as a two-fold policy of deterrence as follows: 
0 It provides for exact reparation for the loss or harm suffered, to the victim or his 
avenger. This satisfied the tendency of vindictiveness on the part of the victim and 
his kin relatives, while excluding unnecessary harm on the offender. There is 
however an alternative option to resolve the conflict peacefully, by compensation 
to be paid to the victim or his family, if this is preferred. 
Islamic jurists distinguish two categories of qisas penalties: qisas for homicide, known 
in the Islamic terminology as fi al nafs, or involving one's self; and gisas for wounds 
or injuries, known as fi ma dun al nafs, or involving less than one's self. Homicide 
itself is divided into two types - deliberate and accidental - which are both mentioned 
in the Qur'an. As prescribed in the previous verse, the punishment for deliberate 
homicide is the killing of the culprit, or alternatively the payment of blood money. In 
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the case where the nearest kin of the victim do not demand gisas, or in other cases 
where it is not possible to carry out the penalty, or if the crime does not satisfy the 
evidentiary requirements recognised by Islamic schools of law. Nevertheless the 
infliction of gisas for injuries is ruled by the following conditions: (i) the injury must 
be deliberate `amd and not accidental Khata; (ii) the part of the body on which gisas 
maybe inflicted mustbe the same, and in the same condition, as the part of the victim's 
body which was affected; and (iii) qisas must be possible to inflict, i. e. the injury must 
involve cutting off from a joint as, for example, from the wrist. When all these 
conditions are satisfied, qisas must then be inflicted by experts to avoid any possible 
error. 
On the other hand, concerning the punishment for quasi-deliberate shibh al'amd and 
accidental homicide Khata, previously described as ft ma dun al nafs, such as blows 
and wounds inflicted voluntarily without intent to cause death, but without causing 
it, or in cases of the physical injury not resulting in death, the Qur'an states: 
`It is not for a believer to take a believer's life except by mistake; and he who 
kills a believer by mistake should free a slave who is a believer, and pay 
blood-money to the victim's family unless they forego it as an act of charity. 
If he belonged to a community hostile to you but was himself a believer, then 
a slave who is a believer should be freed. In case he belonged to a people who 
are your allies, then give blood-money to his family and free a believing slave. 
But he who has no means (to do so) should fast for a period of two months 
continuously to have his sins forgiven by God, and God is all-knowing and 
all-wise'. (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al nisa': 92) 
Referring to this verse jurists hold that no qisas is prescribed in case of accidental 
homicide, but only the blood money and penance, or Kaffara. But if the criminal 
refuses to pay for compensation according to juristic consensus, he is to be punished 
by qisas or retribution. In this case the offender has to undergo the same harm or loss 
of an organ or a life which he caused to the victim. 
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Jurists disagree by what means the death penalty should be carried out in cases of 
gisas, but according to the late Shaykh Shaltout this should not be a subject of concern, 
since it is related of the prophet that he ordered the believers to improve the method 
of killing, even for the slaughtering of animals. It can therefore be concluded that 
retaliation is the punishment prescribed for deliberate homicide, and it should be 
carried out in the manner that causes the least possible pain. However, the death 
penalty for qisas is owed only if the nearest relatives of the victim insist on carrying it 
out. Otherwise they have the right to claim diyya, or the blood money for compensa- 
tion, or pardon the victim altogether in exchange for God's reward in the hereafter. 
The four Sunna schools have also added that if gisas is demanded, it is the right of the 
victim's relatives to carry out the penalty if they are capable of doing so in the proper 
way. This might have been justified on the old principle of personal revenge or tha'r. 
According to the classical rule, the diyya, or blood money, which is the sole punish- 
ment for injuries and quasi-deliberate homicide, is to be paid in the value of one 
hundred camels. However, recent scholars admit that it can be paid by an equivalent 
value of money, gold, silver, or whatever economic value, there being no camels 
available at a specific place and time. 
Finally, it can be concluded that Islamic law has prescribed qisas for homicide and 
injuries. On one hand it implies the sense of punishment which the wrongdoer has to 
undergo, and on the other hand it implies the sense of a tort which makes the 
wrongdoer liable to pay compensation, from which the affected party may benefit. It 
is the traditional heritage of Pre-Islamic Arabs which has been modified by Islamic 
law to satisfy the needs of individuals and order in society. 
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Q Al taaziyr (Discretionary Punishment) 
Penalties classified under this category are commonly known to jurists as discretion- 
ary punishments. They might involve transgression against God or an individual. By 
definition these do not have either fined punishments or penance Kaffara prescribed 
in the Qur'an or Sunna. It is hence understood to Muslim jurists that where hadd, 
Kaffara or gisas are applied, ta`aziyr cannot intervene or replace any of these. 
The term ta`aziyr as has been used in the Islamic legal writings, was never mentioned 
in the Qur'an or in the Sunna. Nevertheless the Qur'an has established the legal 
principle ruling the treatment of any misdeed in the Muslim society as follows: `The 
recompense of an evil is a like evil' (Al-Qur'an, Surl Al shura: 40). That it cannot be 
treated with anything but a penalty commensurate with the misdeed. According to 
Muslim scholars this provides the base fromwhich the ta`aziyrpunishment is deduced. 
Both the Qur'an and the Sunna refer to some types of deviant acts which have no 
punishment prescribed for them, and it is left to the ruler or the legal authority to 
decide what sort of penalty is suitable to be inflicted. For example, with regard to 
homosexual relations, the Qur'an states: `If two among you are guilty of such acts then 
punish both of them' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al nisa': 16). 
Commentators understood the Qur'anic order `punish them both' as directed to the 
ruler of the community without deciding of what type and amount, or how the penalty 
must be inflicted. It was this authority provided for in the Qur'an which jurists consider 
as the legal origin of the ta`aziyr doctrine in Islam. 
Moreover, the Sunna of the prophet does also show more examples concerning the 
application of ta`aziyr penalties. Al'awa (1982) refers to several cases of ta`aziyr 
penalties applied in the Sunna. In one of the examples it is related of the prophet in 
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a hadith transmitted by Muslim and Abu Da'wud that he deprived a man of his share 
of the spoils of a battle because of a misdeed he committed against the Commander 
of the army. It is also related of the prophet, for example, with regard to the payment 
of zakat that he has pointed out that whoever pays it will get reward from God, and 
that whoever refuses to pay it, it will be taken from him, and he will have one half of 
his wealth taken for the state treasury. Scholars understood this fining of the offender 
as a sort of ta`aziyr penalty. 
Hence it can be concluded that, the previous mentioned examples from the Qur'an 
and Sunna provide the legal base for the ta`aziyr institution. In this way rulers and 
judges are provided with the authority to enable them to protect the interests of the 
community when it is threatened by violations or omissions which fall outside the very 
limited area of the prescribed penalties, whether it be hidud or gisas. Al Mawardi 
clarifies this as follows: 
`Ta`aziyr consists of chastisement for errors unpunishable by "Hidud". The- 
oretically, the crimes of this category are those acts which bring injury to the 
social order as a result of the trouble they cause. Some unquestionably would 
be held by any society or any judge at any time or place to be criminal: False 
witness, corruption, extortion. But the Divine plan left their precise determi- 
nation to the community and its representatives, to allow for changes over 
time in the needs of that community'. (Basyuni, 1982: 167) 
Among the various types of behaviour which are considered in the Qur'an as pro- 
hibited sins, jurists commonly classify the following as examples of ta`aziyr offences: 
usuryAl riba, false testimony sihadat al zur, breach of trust Iociyyana al'amana, insult 
Al sab, and briberyAl rashwa. 
" Examples of ta'aziyr Penalties 
In the Islamic legal sense the term ta`aziyr denotes a penalty aimed at reforming the 
offender while deterring from further deviant acts. It is related to 'Ibn Farhun in his 
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famous book, Tabsyra al hukam, that he describes the aim of ta`aziyr as `Disciplinary, 
reformative, and deterrent punishment' (AI'awa, 1982: 96). This suggests that both 
of the two aspects, deterrence and reformation, are combined in the doctrine of 
ta'aziyr. This is true, since discipline is expected to result in reformation, it is logical 
to admit that the later becomes in fact a means of deterrence. To realise this end 
under the system of ta`aziyr, the judge has given awide variety of options to decide 
the most suitable punishment according to the criminal circumstances, his records, 
and psychological conditions. 
Ta'aziyr thus provides an area of social control where the intervention of the judge is 
critical and his discretionary power is manifest. Particularly this is clear in the case of 
some of the penalties that fall outside the scope of purely penal law but more relate 
to the moral and educational theories of penology. The following provide some of the 
examples aimed at this goal. 
Al wa'z (Admonition) 
This type of treatment is suggested to those offenders who for the first time commit 
minor unlawful acts, provided that the judge sees it is enough to remind the offender, 
if he has forgotten or in case he is unaware, that he has done something wrong, in 
order to reform him and consequently restrain him from future transgression. At the 
most basic level there is simply notice given to the offender in private. Often, however, 
he might be summoned to court in public. It is intended that such proceedings will 
have a psychological impact upon the offender in both situations. 
Al tawbiykh (Reprimand) 
This might be by any statement or act which in the judge's view is sufficient to make 
the offender feel shame at what he has done. 
The Islamic Penal Legislation: Theoretical Background 62 
Al tahdiyd (Threat) 
In some cases the judge might feel that it is necessary to induce the offender to mend 
- his behaviour by means of threatening him with punishment 
if he repeats the offence, 
or by deciding a sentence against him which is suspended until he commits another 
offence (within a specific period of time). 
Al tashhiyr (Public Disclosure) 
Muslim scholars consider this punishment as more suitable for offences which involve 
the trustworthiness of the offender. However, the judge is also free to apply it for any 
other suitable offence. Traditionally disclosure involves taking of the offender to 
different parts of the city and informing the public, that he has been punished for a 
wrong act. As the mass media in the current time have developed enormously, recent 
scholars admit that public disclosure can be done by publishing the court's decisions 
in the daily press, by broadcasting on the radio or television, or by any other media 
which will inform the public about the offender and his offence. 
Al qarama wal musadara (Fines and Seizure of Property) 
Jurists are not in agreement concerning this penalty. On the other hand, 'Ibn Tay- 
miyya and his student 'Ibn Alqayyim argue in support of this punishment, referring 
to evidence related to the practice of the prophet in this regard. 
Al habs (Imprisonment) 
In Islamic criminal law two types of imprisonment are known to jurists: (i) Imprison- 
ment for a limited period can be imposed for simple offences. Jurists suggest a time 
limit ranging from one day to six months, or even a year. The maximum period is left 
to the authorised judge. (ii) Imprisonment for an indefinite term. This is normally 
prescribed for habitual offenders who in the view of the judge cannot be reformed by 
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other punishments. All authorised schools of law agree that this punishment can last 
either until the offender's repentance, or until his death, in the case of serious offenders. 
A/ jald (Flogging) 
Flogging is most commonly recommended as a discretionary punishment by jurists 
because it can be readily inflicted without causing any deprivation of the offender's 
liberty. Normally the penalty is administered by means of beating the criminal with a 
stick or an unknotted whip, avoiding the most serious areas of the body. Jurists are 
not in agreementwith regard to the number of lashes which the offender must receive. 
However, the minimum is three, while the maximum ranges between thirty-nine and 
sixty-five lashes. 
Al ta'aziyr bi a! qat! (The Death Penalty) 
The death penalty is prescribed only for the most serious crimes in Islamic law. 
However, exceptional cases in which ta`aziyr by the death penalty is allowed are to be 
found in the writings of almost all schools of Islamic jurisprudence. However, in 
application it is to be restricted to cases where it is made necessary only by the 
offender's character or by the nature of the offence. 
With regard to the previous examples, it is worth mentioning here that ta`aziyr may 
either be the original punishment for less grave crimes which have no punishment 
prescribed in law, or an additional punishment for offences which normally carry fixed 
penalties but which, for reasons of doubt, or according to the situation of the offender, 
cannot be inflicted. 
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N The Judge's Discretionary Authority in Islam 
As it has been shown above, ta`aziyr penalties range from a simple reprimand to 
imprisonment, and from flogging to the death penalty. Fines and seizure of wealth 
may also be applied. The most common notion about the judge's discretionary power 
is that he is completely authorised to choose the punishment which he sees suitable 
for the offence, the offender's character, and the victim. Al'awa relates to a contem- 
porary Shari' a scholar, that he describes the extensive scope of the ruler's or judge's 
powers outside the fields of hadd or qisas offences as follows: 
`extensive powers at the ruler's disposal, to discipline anyone, for anything, 
with any punishment . (Al'awa, 1982: 111) 
On the other hand, the Qur'an justifies this discretionary power saying: `Obey God, His 
prophet and those in authority (in charge of your affairs)' (Al-Qur'an, Sura Al visa': 59). 
However, jurists hold that this authority must be exercised in accordance with the general 
principles of the Qur'an and Sunna, and mainly with the intention of protecting the basic 
parts of the law which relate to public interest. In this regard Al'awa states: 
"Indeed the legislation passed by the ruler must not contradict the general 
principles laid down by the Qur'an and the Sunna, but when this condition 
is met, the ruler or rather the Umma is completely free to pass whatever 
legislation is needed. This legislative right is known as siyasa shariyya or 
governmental authority. The only condition on which this siyasa or policy 
attains legitimacy is that it does not contradict what is contained in the Qur'an 
or the Sunna. Accordingto'IbnAl-Qyam any means which establishes justice 
and prevents injustice is "legitimate siyasa"'. (Al'awa, 1982: 15) 
It can then be said that this authority provides evidence of the flexibility of the Islamic 
penal law. However, this is not to be understood beyond the bounds of legality. 
Accordingly the judge ought not to decide penalties at his own pleasure, for this is 
considered by jurists asfisuq, or injustice. He must do his best, by means of conscien- 
tious (reasoning) to decide the most suitable penalty that fits the case in question, 
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both with regard to the crime and the personal situation of the offender. As a general 
rule, within the ta`az yr system, a Muslim member realises that he and the authority 
are required to act rightly in accordance with the objectives of the law. The sovereign, 
on the other hand, as a representative of his community, will consider it necessary to 
act on behalf of the community to warn fairly before punishment in order to promote 
public interest. The judge is a delegate of the sovereign, and consequently restricted 
by him, his decrees, the demands of the existing legal policysiyyasa shar`iyya and some 
limitations on the exercise of punishments at his disposal. 
Up to that point, it can be said that within the ta`aziyr system the modern Muslim state 
can formulate other penal codes outside the limited area of hidud and qisas punish- 
ments, to be applied whenever demanded according to the existing legal policy. 
In the end, having established a system of criminalization and punishments and 
imposed certain limitations on individual liberty not to conflict with the public 
interest, Islam has thus built a whole range of principles which is not intended to flog 
and to cut off hands, but rather a compassionate urge to avoid and eschew. If the idea 
of punishment is universal, however, Muslim jurists consider the philosophy under- 
lying it in Islam as an intense one. The chapter now turns to discuss some of the basic 
aspects underlying the philosophy of punishment in the Islamic penal law. 
0 The Philosophy of Punishment in Islam 
A question might be raised as to why Shariy`a wants to punish and not reform. In fact, 
punishment is not the only way of treating crime and achieving social control in the 
Muslim community, but it is the last means of treatment when the other educational 
ways fail to promote the individual's right conduct. As we have seen, the overall 
scheme of the Shariy`a and its various teachings and institutions is basically value- 
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oriented towards the goodness of society. The entire fabric of the Shariy`a thus runs 
through a functional relationship between the individual and the society. On one hand 
the individual lives in a society where he can survive and find satisfaction. Provided 
with a free will, a moral sense and the basic knowledge of right and wrong, he is 
expected to behave in accordance with the goals of the social order. On the other 
hand, the social order and its benefits are not separate from, nor conflicting with, the 
individual's benefits. The society should enable him to realise his goals and achieve 
his potential. His life, personality, freedom, property and honour are all sacred and 
should be protected. No-one is allowed to take any of these values unless acting in 
accordance with the law of God. The interdependent relationship between the 
individual and society is described by Karam Murad as follows: 
`Both should stand together, fused and harmonious, co-operating and assist- 
ing - in the service of their one God. Both are interdependent and in 
equilibrium - Both have their well-defined functions and orbits to follow. 
((Murad, 1982: 8) 
It can hence be said that the balance in the Muslim society is determined by the way 
Islam resolves the tension between the individual and the community, and the crucial 
role it assigns to each of them through the development of high moral qualities and 
social values. The concept of moral reform has always been the cornerstone in Islam's 
total plan of goodness, and the individual's status and achievement can only be based 
on his real moral qualities. Islam has thus made every effort to promote the individual 
morality in order to ensure that inducement to evil is minimal. Reform is therefore 
a pre-crime goal and not a post-crime treatment. As Murad (1982) argues: 
`Once the crime is committed, the best place for reform is in the family and 
in society, where a criminal is to live after punishment, and not in a prison 
where every inmate is a criminal, unless of course a society considers itself to 
be more corrupt and less competent to effect reform than a jail: (Murad, 
1982: 19) 
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Therefore, with regard to the treatment of crime and deviant behaviour, Islam 
basically depends on promoting the moral deterrent before the legal deterrent. 
Before punishment, Islam takes different ways of reform to prevent the individual 
from doing evil. 
Q Three-fold Reform 
According to the Qur'an human actions relate to three sources of states, as follows: 
" The first source represents the natural state. It is described in the Qur'an as Nafs 
AMmarh, or incitement to evil: `For the soul is prone to evil' (Al Qur'an, 
Sura-ysuf: 53). In this state the human self is opposed to the individual attainment 
of perfection and urges a person towards undesirable behaviour and evil ways. 
Unless guided by understanding and reason, the individual can only follow his 
natural bent towards all types of evil and anti-moral behaviour. 
" The second source is described in the Qur'an as the reproving self, Nafs Lawwama: 
`And I call the reprehensive soul to witness' (Al Qur'an, Sura Al qiyyama: 2). It is 
so described as it reproves man from vice, instead of submitting to his natural 
desires, behaving like animals. In this state man develops good morals, and his 
natural desires are regulated by reason. Though it reproves itself from vice, it is 
occasionally dominated by natural desires when it stumbles and falls. 
" In the third state, after the individual defeats his natural condition and reproves 
his desires on vice, he will be filled with spiritual powers and he is closely related 
to his God. At this stage his soul is in complete rest. It undergoes a great 
transformation while in this life, and is bestowed a paradise in the hereafter: 
`O you tranquil soul, return to your lord, well pleased and well pleasing Him. 
Enter then among My votaries, Enter then among My garden. (Al Qur'an, 
Sura Al fajr: 270-30) 
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The true purpose of the teachings of Islam is the promotion of the three states 
described above. Since they are inter-related, reform accordingly follows three stages 
of education. There is no reform which is imposed by compulsion. 
" Al nafs Al'ammarah (Incited to Evil) 
In the first stage of reform man is taught the elementary values related to social 
behaviour. He is raised from his barbaric ways to adopt the behaviour of a civilised 
human being. In this stage there is no much concern with moral qualities. What is 
important is the promotion of good humanistic manners and behaviour. Several 
examples of these elementary teachings have been mentioned in the Qur'an. For 
instance, God states: 
`O you who believe, do not enter other houses except yours without first asking 
permission and saluting inmates. This is better for you, you may happily take 
heed. If you find that no one is in then do not enter unless you have received 
permission. If you are asked to go away, turn back - that is proper for you. 
God is aware of what you do'. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al'a`raf: 31) 
" Al nafs Allawwama (Reproving Self) 
The second stage of reform begins when a person's reason becomes mature enough 
to enable him to distinguish between good and evil. At this stage he is bestowed so 
much reason and understanding, and is conscious of the existence of God to a degree 
that stimulates his true moral qualities. For the first time he reproves himself over a 
wrong done and is anxious to do good. This is the time when he can be taught to 
convert his natural conditions into higher moral qualities, and he can be instructed 
to employ his faculties in their proper places and on their proper occasions. 
Moral qualities designed in the Qur'an fall under two types. The first type is concerned 
with the discarding of evil - and the second with the doing of good. 
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" Discarding of Evil 
This includes those qualities by which the individual is instructed that he should not 
do harm to any of his fellow beings' property, honour, or life, either by his tongue, 
eyes or hands. The Qur'an recognises four moral qualities, as follows: 
The first quality with regard to the discarding of evil is known in Arabic as 'lhsan, or 
chastity. The term relates to the faculty of procreation of men and women. Both men 
and women are known as chaste, who would refrain altogether from illicit sex and all 
of its approaches because of the bad consequences and disgrace it brings to both. 
Nevertheless this moral quality of chastity would only come into play when the 
individual who possesses the capacity for committing this particular act restrains 
himself from doing it. Otherwise, if he is young or impotent, or arrived at an extreme 
old age, in such cases and in such natural conditions he cannot be credited with the 
moral quality of chastity. In this regard the Qur'an assigns the teachings against 
unchastity before prescribing punishment as follows: 
`Tell the believers to lower their eyes, guard their private parts. This is purer 
for them'. (Al Qur'an, Sura al Nur: 31) 
`Tell the believing women to lower their eyes and guard theirprivate parts and 
not display their charms except what is apparent outwardly, and lower their 
bosoms with their veils and not to show their finery except to their husbands 
or their fathers or fathers in law, their sons or step-sons, brothers, or their 
brothers and sisters' sons, or their women attendants or captives, or male 
attendants who do not have any need (for women), or boys not yet conscious 
of sex They should not walk stamping their feet but they make known what 
they hide of their ornaments. 0 believers, turn to God, every one of you, so 
that you may f nd success'. (Al Qur'an, Sura Bani'lsra'iyl: 33) 
`And do notgo near fornication, as it is immoral and an evil way'. (Al Qur'an, 
Sura Bani'Isra'iyl: 33) 
`Those who can not afford to many should abstain from what is unlawful 
until God enriches them by his grace'. (Al Qur'an, Sura al Nur: 34) 
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" Beside providing the previous teachings for achieving the quality of chastity, the 
previous verses furnish certain remedies against unchastity. Both men and women 
are instructed to lower their eyes from those who are outside their prohibited 
degree. They are also instructed to avoid all occasions of incitement that might 
lead towards this vice and to control themselves from sex until they get married. 
It is thus clear that with regard to the quality of chastity, the teachings are that 
human faculties should be regulated in such a manner that they should not be 
confronted with any occasion that would lead to serious tendencies. 
The second quality in the context of discarding of evil is concerned with honesty or 
integrity. In this regard the Qur'an has comprehensively classified all dishonest 
practices in such away that no type of acquiring improper wealth or property has been 
omitted. The following examples are clearly stated in the Qur'an: 
And do not consume each other's wealth in vain, nor offer it to men in 
authority with intent of usurping unlawfully and knowingly a part of the 
wealth of others : (Al Qur'an, Sura Al baqara: 189) 
Another verse states: 
`God conjoins that you render to the owners what is held in trust with you 
(Al Qur'an, Sura Al visa': 59) 
In short, God has not only prescribed punishment for theft, but at the same time he 
has discarded all other means of acquiring illegal property. 
The third moral quality related to the discarding of evil is hasana, or baum, which 
means refraining from doing harm to any one and behaving peacefully towards others. 
This quality, which is essential for humanity, means overlooking trivial matters of 
annoyance that do not cause great harm. Haum becomes a moral quality when a 
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person willingly refrains from doing harm and exercises the quality of peacefulness 
on its proper occasions. The Qur'an provides many examples for this, i. e: 
`But if they are inclined to peace, make peace with them, and have trust in 
God'. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al najm: 61) 
`Good and evil are not alike. Repel evil with what is better. Then you will find 
your erstwhile enemy like a close, affectionate friend. (Al Qur'an, Sura 
Hamim al sajda: 34) 
The fourth moral quality with regard to the discarding of evil is that of courtesy, or 
saying a good word. Examples of divine teachings in this regard are as follows: 
And speak of goodness to men. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al baqarah: 83) 
And 
`0 you who believed, men should not laugh at other men, for it may be they 
are better than them; and women should not laugh at other women, for they 
may perhaps be better than them. Do not slander one another, nor give one 
another nick-names. After believing, it is bad to give (another) a bad name. 
Those who do not repent behave wickedly'. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al hujurat: 12) 
" Doing of Good 
Among the first qualities related to the doing of good are forbearance and forgiveness. 
The Qur'anic teaching in this regard is that one must consider forgiveness on its 
proper occasions. The Qur'an states: 
`Who expend both in joy and tribulation, who suppress their anger and 
pardon their fellow men; and God loves those who are upright and do good 
(Al Qur'an, Sura 'al`umran: 64-134) 
The second, the third and the fourth moral qualities related to the doing of good are 
equity, benevolence, and graciousness, as between kindred. These have been sum- 
marised in the Qur'an as follows: 
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`Verily God has enjoined justice, the doing of good, and the giving of gifts to 
your relatives; and forbidden indecency, impropriety and oppression. (Al 
Qur'an, Sura Al nahl: 91) 
There are also several other teachings in the Qur'an which encourage the doing of 
good. These include, for example, truthfulness, brotherhood, co-operation and sym- 
pathy for mankind. 
" Al nafs Al mutmainna (The Soul at rest) 
The major transformation in this stage is that man is carried from the grade of a moral 
condition to that of a higher spiritual condition. Finding his complete rest in returning 
to God, a person realises that the worship that was assigned to him is in fact the food 
that nurtures his soul and his spiritual life. All of what his reproving self has admin- 
istered to him in his moral stage, is transformed by this urge into further disgust 
against evil desires. This is the development of the soul at rest, when a person begins 
to feel a strengthening breeze begin to blow upon his soul. He looks upon his previous 
weakness with remorse, and consequently his habits exhibit a complete transforma- 
tion and he is drawn far away from his previous condition. Under the condition of the 
reproving self a person repents time after time, and yet falls down and often despairs, 
considering himself beyond remedy. He remains in this state until he develops a 
spiritual condition where God inscribes love of faith upon his heart and makes him 
averse to disbelief, wickedness and disobedience, and drives from his heart all the 
evil ways. As follows, the Qur'an indicates this condition: 
`But god has made faith more desirable to you, and attractive to your hearts, 
and rendered disbelief and sin and disobedience repugnant. They are those 
who are well directed'. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al hujurat: 8) 
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0 The Place of Reformation in Islamic Penal Law 
The belief in the reformative theory of penology seems to have reached its peak in 
the last years. Reform has been equated with cure and the criminal is no longer 
considered as a `bad man'. He is rather a `sick man', perhaps physically, almost 
certainly mentally and psychiatrically. He needs help because something has gone 
wrong with him and led him to react in an anti-social manner. In short, the overall 
theory of reformation can be understood as a mere justification for the criminal 
behaviour. This might be encouraging to the majority of people to behave against the 
social order, since they are going to be considered as sick people who need special 
care. 
As it has been shown, in the Islamic system reform is only a pre-crime objective, where 
the individual is given every effort in the process of moral education to lead him along 
the right way. Once the crime is committed, reformation is not the objective and the 
individual should undergo punishment. Whatever the justification of the reformative 
theory, the sense of equating reform with treatment has no place in the justification 
of punishment in the Islamic penal law. As we will see, the goals of justice, utility and 
deterrence in no way diminish the goal of individual reformation in Islamic penal law. 
As Al'alfi puts it: 
`Crime is not just an event which provides an occasion for rebuilding the 
character of the criminal, but an evil which the criminal intentionally and 
voluntarily inflicted on society. (Basyuni, 1982: 23) 
This is true, because if reforms were the main objective of punishment, it would be 
then unnecessary to prescribe punishment, or even to discuss it. Also, it would create 
the question of what could be done for those who could not be reformed? 
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This being the case, it is therefore necessary for society to react to such criminal acts 
with punitive measures, sufficient to deter the criminal and other potential offenders 
from walking the same path again. Al'alfi also sees this concern for reformation as 
not being a primary goal. This is also evident from the view that the execution of 
punishment seeks to prevent the criminal from returning to crime. 
0 Achieving Justice and Utility in Islamic Penal Law 
Justice is the ruling spirit and the supreme purpose for which God has sent all the 
prophets to guide men to conduct themselves within its framework. 
`We have surely sent apostles with clear signs, sind sent with them the book 
and the Balance, so that men may stand by justice. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al 
hadid: 25) 
This is also the basic purpose around which the Islamic community is set. The Qur'an 
states: 
`O you who believe, stand up as witnesses, and do not let the hatred of a people 
deviate you from justice. Be just. This is the closest to piety, and beware of 
God. Surely God is aware of all you do. (Al Qur'an, Sura Al ma'ida: 8) 
Justice is therefore associated with obedience to God by doing what he has ordered 
as right, and avoiding what he has forbidden as wrong. Hence it is only God who can 
establish the inter-related network of obligations, mutual rights and their consequent 
rewards and punishments on the basis of complete justice. 
Moral scholars assume that duty is the basis of all the good acts man ought to do, and 
that such duty in its real meaning is justice, since every individual considers that what 
he ought to do is a rule which applies to all other people. Islamic penal law and its 
rewards is built on this principle of justice, and therefore punishment can be under- 
stood as a requirement of absolute justice. Since crime is deemed to be a threat to 
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the prevailing value system of the society and a violation of the victim's right, 
punishment on the other hand must seek justice to both of them. Satisfaction for the 
victim and his family is an important part of that goal, which in turn will result in 
further protection for society's values and order. 
It appears, then, that the foundation of punishment on justice is strongly associated 
with the protection of real utility. According to Shaykh Abu Zahra, this association 
can be explained as follows. The social structure is based on an inter-related network 
of benefits, and association of utilities. Some elements of the mixture might overcome 
the others. It would then be a safeguard to have the law to protect the basic utility and 
prevent injustice. Punishment thus achieves this goal. 
`Ali Mansour argues that those who think that punishment in Islamic Law is excess- 
ively harsh must consider the harmful effects on the victim and society. Shaykh Abu 
Zahra on the other hand, gave further examples in support of this argument. He 
argues that if we look on different examples of hidud penalties, we can recognise that 
they are fairly suitable for the crimes for which they are prescribed. For instance, in 
the case of theft, the punishment is the cutting off of the thief's hand. By no means 
can this be understood as exceeding the harm and damage inflicted on the individual 
and society. For theft is not merely a loss of great wealth or of something valuable, 
but most critical is the disturbance and threat to people's security. A thief who breaks 
into a home at night does not only threaten and disturb an individual family, but rather 
spread worry and fear throughout the neighbourhood and the whole community. Not 
only do people in the community live in tension and worry, they also spend a lot of 
money taking the necessary precautions in their homes to avoid further victimisation. 
Hence it can be understood that the loss of property or wealth is not the only reason 
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for punishment, rather it is the loss of the security and the disturbance of order in the 
community which justifies the cutting off of a thief s hand. 
It is thus clear fromwhat has been previously pointed out, that the Shariy`a, or Islamic 
law, within the limits of its basic objectives by which it protects public utility, does not 
contradict the principle of justice. Both justice and utility meet the same goal. Hence, 
it can be understood that the philosophy of punishment in Islam provides the basis 
for a just, ideal state. 
This being the case, realisation of such an ideal society requires the protection of its 
ideals. Shaykh Abu Zahra argues that since the goal is ideal and the mean just, excess 
sympathy for criminals should not lead to forgetting about their crimes, as it prevents 
the infliction of deterrent punishments on them and consequently opens the way for 
more of their evil and exposes the'society to their corruption - and this will be far from 
just. Justice can only be achieved when someone who behaves against the law suffers 
the correct punishment, and all people should be equal in this regard if they have 
committed crimes which require punishment. 
0 Achieving Deterrence Through Retribution 
Islamic penal legislation includes two parts related to crime prevention. Firstly, the 
negative part concerned with criminalisation. It prevents the commission of the act 
at all times. Secondly, the positive part concerned with the infliction of punishment 
when the act is committed. Each preventive rule, therefore, is protected by a punitive 
retribution prescribed by the legislator. As it has been pointed out earlier, the term 
`retribution' is mentioned in many verses of the Qur'an as the sole purpose of 
punishment, referring both to worldly rewards in this life and in the hereafter. 
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With regard to retribution as a purpose of hidud punishments, two features have been 
noted. Firstly, the severity of the punishment and its mandatory infliction when the 
crime is committed in the case of hidud offences. Secondly, the publicity of the 
punishment when the penalty is inflicted. It is thought that the two aspects combine 
together to give the punishment its fullest possible deterrent function. 
Retribution plays a deterrent role in the sense that it serves to prevent the growth of 
a climate favourable to the spread of criminal activity. Being obligatorily inflicted in 
public and causing great physical pain (as in the case of cutting off a hand), hidud 
penalties work through a psychological mechanism to deter potential offenders who 
are always under the temptation to commit crime. The severity of the punishment 
and its public infliction without any mediation warn the public of the consequences 
of committing crime. Those who have a tendency to commit crime will restrain from 
the act lest they suffer its unpleasant consequences. When the opportunities for crime 
decrease under the fear of threat, potential wrongdoers - except those who are 
uneducated, or those who enjoy committing crime as a hobby - will forget altogether 
about crime. Peace and security are preserved, and stability of society is achieved. By 
making penalties corporal and executed in public, Islam also intends that they may 
be morally condemned. This will also contribute to the elimination and suppression 
of criminal activity. 
Hence, according to the deterrence theory, punishment is justified on the grounds 
that it prevents the commission of further offences, both by the criminal and other 
potential offenders. The deterrent effect is thus known to Muslim jurists to have a 
dual impact. There is general deterrence, which refers to the effect of the penal system 
in preventing criminality among the population at large; as well as the specific 
deterrent which means the preventive effect of the punishment on an individual 
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offender. 'Ibn-al Humam, the well-known writer of the Nana, fi school, points out that 
hidud penalties are intended as general deterrents. However, when an offender 
suffers the experience of one of the hadd punishments, the aspect of individual 
deterrence comes into play. The same view is taken by many commentators on the 
Qur'an. General deterrence is achieved by the widest possible publicity when inflict- 
ing actual punishment. On the other hand, individual deterrence is achieved through 
frightening off the offender, making him reluctant to offend again. 
The fact that hidud penalties are of a bodily nature, which are executed for a limited 
time and cause unforgettable pain so that in most cases the offender refrains from 
similar future conduct, makes them of a more reformative nature - in contrast with 
imprisonment, which normally deprives the individual of liberty and makes the 
offender accustomed to prison life after a long sentence. It is argued that imprison- 
ment soon loses its deterrent effect - if it has any - and prisoners return to crime after 
being released from jail. Al'awa pointed out that the most common example shown 
by contemporary Muslim scholars as evidence of the deterrent effect of hidud 
penalties is the enormous drop in crime in Saudi-Arabia since its re-introduction, 
when the Saudis took over the country in the 1920s following the Ottoman adminis- 
tration. 
Although it is the belief of this thesis that Islamic penal legislation does provide a 
strong theory of deterrence, the strong support for the deterrent theory by Muslim 
scholars does not mean that the imposition of hidud punishments will suppress crime 
completely. There is a high probability that such rules will at least diminish criminal 
acts, but some criminals will avoid the light in search of darkness and continue with 
deviant activity. `Ali Mansour has best put it: 
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`There is a critical difference between crime that is rarely committed by weak 
and sick people who are unable to be socially restrained, and crime being 
publicly and openly committed with great frequency . (Basyuni, 1981: 196) 
0 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to analyse and explain the theories underlying Islamic 
penal provisions. It has pointed out that specific rules of the Shariy`a can be well 
understood in the total scheme - its conceptual basis, primary goals and objectives 
and overall framework. Shariy`a, `the way to the watering place', prescribes the right 
way to God, as given by him. Its regulations thus encompass the totality of human life 
in society. Being so secular in its objectives and goals, the final aim of the Shariy`a is 
the protection of life, religion, lineage, property, and personality, which represents 
the basic necessities of man's existence. All the obligations and prohibitions of the 
Shariy'a are set to achieve this basic goal. Thus it provides the best way to justice, 
security and peace. As to the role of punishment within this integrated whole, Murad 
describes it as follows: 
`Most importantly, punishments are only a part of a vastly larger integrated 
whole. They can neither be properly understood, norsuccessfully or justifiably 
implemented in isolation. First, law is not the main, or even major, vehicle 
in the total framework for the reinforcement of morality; it is the individual's 
belief, his God consciousness and taqua - that inherent and innate quality 
which makes him refrain from what displeases God and do what pleases him. 
Second justice is a positive ideal which permeates and dominates the entire 
life, it is not merely an institutionalised means of inflicting punishment. Third 
and consequently, a whole environment is established where to do right is 
encouraged, facilitated and found easy, and to do wrong is discouraged, 
inhibited and found difficult. All men and women are enjoined, as their 
foremost dutyto aid, exhort and commend each otherto do good and to avoid 
evil. (Murad, 1982: 16) 
Thus, as far as this chapter has dealt with the theory of penal law in Islam, it can be 
concluded that Islamic penal law possesses a unique system of penology which is 
concerned very little with the criminal's reform, and concentrates mainly with the 
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protection of the society by preventing the commitment of crime. This is evident 
particularly in the specific legislations of the Islamic penal rules involving hid 
qisas. It can also be said that, although deterrence and retribution are the 
objectives of punishment in Islamic penal law, nevertheless the scope is availabit 
reformation, particularly within the discretionary penalties known as ta`aziyr. To wi 
extent this theory adapts to reality needs to be understood in its real context. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature on the Deterrent Effect of Legal 
Threats 
This chapter reviews and highlights the existing body of knowledge about deterrence 
as a legal issue. It formulates the general theoretical orientation which guides the 
assessment of this thesis. Traditionally, the practice of judicial punishment has been 
justified on the base of three main theories: Retribution, deterrence and rehabilita- 
tion. 
As to the idea of retribution, this was based on the, classical principle `an eye for an 
eye and a tooth for a tooth'. This principle constitutes the view that, by harming 
someone, the offender is disturbing the natural order, and hence it becomes necessary 
to inflict upon him the same degree of harm that he inflicted upon his victim, in order 
to restore the balance. According to this theory, the offender deserves the punishment 
just as the fair cost he has to pay in return for his evil and aggressive behaviour. 
However, the idea of `deterrence' is that the goal of punishments is not to redress 
some sort of aggression or violation that was committed in the past, but rather to 
prevent possible similar aggressions or violations in the future. The assumption in this 
case is that the potential offender expects what terrible consequences he will suffer 
for his planned aggression, and will be deterred from committing it. 
Finally, the rehabilitation theory assumes that the offender is someone who deviates 
or commits aggressive behaviour because of misguidance, not because of the evil 
inside him. In this case, any punishment should involve treatment of the offender in 
such a way that renders subsequent offending less likely, by revealing to him the 
erroneous way of his behaviour. 
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Naturally, each of the three theories has its supporters, as well as its opponents. 
For the purpose of this thesis, `deterrence' was the basic rationale for the imposition 
of shariy`a in the area of criminal law in the Sudan. 
0 The concept of deterrence 
In the literature on criminal law, the term `deterrence' has been used to refer to two 
distinct effects of legal threats - Johannes Andeneas (1960: 494) has pointed out this 
distinction as follows: 
`In continental theories of criminal law, a basic distinction is made between 
the effects of punishment on the man beingpunished - individual prevention 
or special; and the effects of punishment upon the members of society in 
general - general prevention. The characteristics of special prevention are 
termed "deterrence", "reformation" and "incapacitation"... General preven- 
tion, on the other hand, may be described as the restraining influences 
emanating from the criminal law and the legal machinery'. 
A brief survey of the literature in the deterrence issue involves discussions dealing 
with both types of general and special prevention. There has been heated debate 
around what type of legal reaction to crime is the most appropriate. On the one hand, 
the positive school of justice, while being skeptical of the deterrent efficacy of 
punishment, recommends the rehabilitation of offenders through the individualisa- 
tion of legal treatment. On the other hand, members of the classical school of justice 
favours the opposite. They recommend a uniform legal punishment of all offenders 
who commit the same crime. Since this will deter the majority of potential offenders. 
Sociologists have also long been involved in the debate. Many of them have ques- 
tioned the deterrent effect of legal punitive reaction to crime. Their views have 
similarly conflicted between the classical and positive school of thought. 
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The existence of the two conflicting types of argument and evidence suggests that the 
debate over the issue has often taken a polarity form. On the one hand arguments 
and evidence are given in support of an irrefutable theory of deterrence. On the other 
hand evidence is adduced in support of `an equally incontrovertible but antithetical 
theory of non-deterrence' (Zimiring & Hawkins 1973: 11). 
0 The non-deterrence theory 
The hypothesis that the legal threat of sanctions does not deter the individual reflects 
the ideological orientation which dominated the field after World War II. The 
literature suggests that many sociologists have tended to be skeptical of the hypothesis 
that negative threat of punishment significantly affects conformity to the law. In 
response, a non-deterrence theory of punishment has developed. The blanket rejec- 
tion of deterrence has been expressed by many scholars. As G. Sykes, for example, 
put it: 
`Indeed said one writer, by 1950 it became evident that there had been a 
revolution in the way people regarded crime, the criminal, and methods of 
handling the offender. The "rehabilitation ideal' ruled the field, in words at 
least, if not in deeds. And it was not only criminologists, penologists, psychia- 
trists and enlightened judges who had embraced the idea of reforming the 
wrong-doer rather than making him suffer' (G. Sykes, 1978: 459). 
According to Jerome Hall, legal punishment for deviance is not only irrelevant, but 
rather a useless relic of barbarism. 
`The prevalent academic attitude - it is hardly more - is that punishment is a 
useless relic of barbarism, a main symbol of man's lust for vengeance, hence 
lacking in any rational support' (Jerome Hall, cited by Sykes, 1978: 45). 
According to other scholars the legal. threat is assumed to bring more of the behaviour 
it is intended to suppress: 
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`Deterrence is belied by'both history and logier At best the criminal is merely 
epiphenomenal a dependent variable shaped by current mores and prevailing 
norms At worst the threat of punishment is likely to provoke more of the 
' behaviour it is intended to control orsuppmm' (Zimiring & Hawkins 1973: 5). 
More recently an increasing number of criminologists have also asserted that the 
deterrent effect is unknown. According to Sykes (1978), this viewpoint persists and 
continues to influence much of the research on deterrence and criminology, as well 
as the formation of public policy. In general, as Roy Watson (1986: 293) points out: 
`Social scientists have long been sceptical of the power of the threat of legal 
sanctions, as evoked by enacted laws, to control behaviour'. 
A great deal of empirical research to support this argument has grown impressively 
after World War II. The following reviews some of the evidence shown in support of 
that postulation. 
Empirical evidence demonstrating the ineffectiveness of 
deterrence 
The bulk of the empirical work in line with this hypothesis has grown after World War 
II. Most of the literature refers in particular to the United States of America, Great 
Britain, and some European countries. The findings suggest that anti-deterrence 
researchers have continued to show the absence of deterrence effect. For example, a 
number of researchers conclude that, for many offenders, probation is likely to be at 
least as effective in preventing recidivism as an institutional sentence, i. e. Williams 
(1958), Babst and Mannering (1965), Martin (1960) and Hammond (1969). For some 
researchers, imprisonment has often failed to prevent further criminal behaviour 
(Tittle, 1969). 
According to Sykes (1978), prison terms do little more than delay the recommitment 
of crime for 'more than half of the prisoners: 
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"Similar arguments were commonly presented concerning the alleged failure 
of imprisonment. Police chiefs, fudges, wardens, professors of criminology 
alb noted Daniel Glaser, were frequently to be found claiming that 60-70 per 
cent of those who have been imprisoned commit new crimes after their 
release. Again, said the critics of deterrence, it was clear that State-inflicted 
penalties were of little use in controlling crime. Punishment in reality, was 
not more than vengeance". (Ibd: 485) 
It is even argued that while the prison term isolates the offender from society, at the 
same time it gives him the opportunity to learn from his inmates better techniques 
for escaping future punishment. According to Tittle (1969), some researchers found 
that corporal punishment was ineffective in preventing further recidivism. 
In general the literature does provide a body of theoretical and empirical arguments 
which points to the ineffectiveness of sanctions on recidivism. 
This seems to have affected the penal reform, as Andenaes (1974: 3) stated: 
`The trend in penal reform in the past two generations has pointed in the 
direction of wider scope for individual prevention (specific prevention). As 
a result, the prosecuting authorities and the courts have, through the years, 
had an ever wider choice of sanctions put at their disposal, adapted to the 
personality of the offender'. 
Such developments suggest that it is the criminal but not the crime that is to be treated. 
The absence of deterrence effect is also reported by many other studies. The U. S. 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Task 
Force Report, Narcotics and Drug Abuse (1967), reported that despite the applica- 
tion of increasing severe sanctions to marijuana, `the use and traffic in that drug appear 
to be increasing'. Also Beyleveld (1980: 314), in his attempt to summarise and assess 
empirical research to test the `deterrence' theory, concludes that `other studies have 
provided evidence forthe absence of such effects'. More recent studies on the effect of 
legal sanctions on drunk drivers have also indicated a minimal relationship between 
sanctions and outcome. For example Gerald R. Wheeler and Rodney V. Hassing 
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(1988: 29: 42), based on a three-year follow-up study on the effect of sanctions on 
offenders in Houston Texas, showed no significant differences in outcome among 
sanctions. Other studies such as those by Holdens (1983), and an earlier study by 
Krenck (1979) are cited as having similar results. Even more striking, in a study by 
Zalzberg and Pailsrude (1983) it is reported that individuals convicted under Wash- 
ington State 1980 mandatory jailing law had higher accident rates and drunk driving 
recidivism than those convicted under the previous law. 
Numerous researchers have also continued to investigate correlations between crime 
rate and different measures of law enforcement. For instance, some researchers 
found no relationship between the severity of punishment and differences in some 
crime rates. In that respect the literature involves reference to the opponents of 
capital punishment who pointed to statistics which showed that availability or non- 
availability of the death penalty was not associated with differences in homicide rates 
(Walker, 1987: 84-85). 
Similarly, some researchers have focused on the relationship between certainty of 
arrest and subsequent crime rates. For exemple, David F. Greenberg, Ronald Kessler 
and Charles H. Logan (1979), in a penal model of crime rates and arrest rates, utilised 
data to examine the relationship between the two variables for a sample of U. S. cities 
for the years 1964- 1970. They suggested no meaningful relationship between arrest 
rates and crime rates. This study even suggests that crime rates may indeed affect 
enforcement capabilities more than enforcement affect level of crime. This has been 
explained in terms of `the saturation effect', `which will tend to reduce enforcement 
efficiency as crime increases" (ibid: 843). According to this, 
"The impact of crime on enforcement practices can come about in at least 
two ways. (1) Higher crime rates could tend to saturate crime control 
capabilities that are fixed in the short run. Thus when crime rates increase, 
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police resources may be stretched thin, reducing the probability of an arrest 
following an offence. When the number of arrests increases, prosecuters and 
judges faced with larger case loads may dismiss more cases and accept plea 
bargains more favourable to the defendant. If the number of commitments 
to prison leads to over crowded prisons, parole authorities may release 
prisoners earlier than usual reducing the average length of sentence served 
in prison. (2) Crime rates could influence enforcement through their effect 
on attitudes towards crime. It is possible that high crime rates create habitu- 
ation to crime and hence tower penalties, on the other hand, high crime rates 
might tend to increase public fear of crime and thus lead to more punitive 
enforcement measures" (ibid). 
In the latter case, however it is argued that 
"This effect will not be felt immediately but will lag behind crime rate, both 
because public recognition generally lags behind `objective' indicators of 
social problems, and because it usually takes time for public concern to be 
translated into enforcement policy" (ibid). 
In a similar study, Henry N. Pontell, 1978, Theory versus practices, attempted to 
examine the idea that the rate of crime may indeed affect the capacity of the legal 
machinery to administer the negative santions more than the opposite. The study 
involved tests of two conflicting hypotheses simultaneously: (1) Certainty of punish- 
ment is prior to and inversely correlated with crime rate (the deterrence model), and 
(2) Crime is prior to and inversely correlated with the certainty of punishment (the 
system capacity model) (ibid: 14- 15. It is concluded that: 
"overall, the system capacity model does produce as strong, if not stronger, 
results than the deterrence model" (ibid: 19). 
The foregoing involved some of the Anti deterrence arguments and research findings. 
Nevertheless, there is no dearth of both theoretical and empirical literature dealing 
with the deterrent effect of legal sanctions. 
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M Effect of general prevention -a theory of deterrence 
Traditionally, general prevention has played a substantial part in the philosophy of the 
criminal law. It is mentioned in Greek philosophy and its basis in the classic writings of 
Beccaria and Bentham, as well as writings of scholars such as Morris', Impediments to 
Penal Reform, (1966), and Kenny, Outlines of criminal law, (1929). Kenny cited as 
authorities the most pioneerwriters, as, for example, Beccaria, Blackstone, Romilly, Paley 
and Feuerbach. He considers deterrence as the mere effect of criminal law. This can 
happen by associating the idea of a deterrent with a sense of terror, that, whenever an 
offender has actually committed a criminal act, he shall incur punishment. 
It followed that criminal deterrence has had a major influence on thought about 
criminal law and policy ever since. Richard D. Schwartz and Sonya Orleans (1967) 
for example, state that: 
`Sanctions are officially imposed punishments aimed at enforcement of legal 
obligations. They are said to constitute the core, if not the defining charac- 
teristics of the legal order. Inadequate sanctions are blamed for the failures 
of legal control in such divergent areas as international laws, domestic crime, 
and civil rights' (274). 
Also Tittle (1969), later states that: 
"The effect of punishment on the amount and kind of deviance that occurs 
continues to be a topic of concern to both laymen and intellectuals. Many 
legislators and jurists continue to place confidence in official punishments as 
deterrents, and entire legal codes are based on thepremise that negative sanctions 
are instrumental in inducing conformity to norms" (Tittle, 1969: 409). 
Suggestion was also made that many legislators as well as penologists believe that the 
application of punishments discourage potential imitators (Walker, 1987). 
In some, the literature suggest that the idea of deterrence has become the only sound 
justification for punishment. 
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Q The mechanism of deterrence 
R. Tittle (1969), suggests that sociologists at least take the idea of deterrence 
seriously, and at least three theories have provided the rationale for making legal 
sanctions, theoretically meaningful to conformity - deviance on a societal level. These 
include: (1) The labelling theory; (2) The exchange theory and; (3) The social learning 
theory. 
Labelling theory, from the beginning, has focused on the impact of reaction to 
rule-breaking on the life patterns of individuals. According to this theory, the inflic- 
tion of sanctions while resulting in offending identities on the part of the rule breakers, 
it also affect the conduct of those not so labelled. Though labelling a rule- breaker 
may lead to greater rule-breaking on his own part, I would add it may also lead to less 
rule-breaking by those observing his unpleasant stigmatised experiences. 
With exchange theory, deterrence is explained in terms of the costs and rewards 
involved in social interaction. The application of this theory on a macroscopic level 
would, theoretically, require specification of typical rewards and costs. The outcome, 
however complex might be, was thought to add more sophistication to the pleasure- 
pain principle adopted by the classical criminologists. Hence the deterrent effect of 
legal sanctions, according to this perspective, seems theoretically cogent. 
Thirdly, the two previous theories, as well as the deterrence idea, might be understood 
in terms of social learing theory. Within this theoretical frame work, legal sanctions 
could be viewed as negative reinforcement for law-abiding behaviour. Tittle indicates 
this as follows: 
"The application of reinforcement principles on a macroscopic level would 
require extensive application of concept of vicarious reinforcement. To 
account for rates of deviance in a population, one would have to think of 
reinforcement as taking place continuously and over a lifetime for most 
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individuals, as they imagine themselves engaging in various behaviours and 
experiencing the potential reaction, or as they identify with models who have 
been punished or rewarded" (Tittle, 1969: 421). 
Tittle, though, believes that specification of reinforcement contingencies for this kind 
of problem would be most complex, but it was thought as well worth the effort. The 
literature, however, has not developed without evidence to demonstrate the effec- 
tiveness of legal deterrence as a means of enforcing compliance in different circum- 
stance of threats. 
Empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of 
deterrence 
More recently, social researchers have compiled more empirical evidence on the 
question about whether legal threats of sanctions do have impact on producing 
conformity to norm. It has been pointed out that actual progress on empirical 
evidence has continued since Nagin's review (Donald E. Lewis, 1986). 
Among the correlations suggested to have much effect on the degree of deterrence, 
some researchers consider certainty of arrest (i. e. making potential offenders feel 
they are more likely to get caught) to be of more importance. In this case the 
hypothesis is, that the more the likelihood that individuals will be caught, the more 
likely that they will be deterred. The opposite happens in the case where individuals 
feel that it is less likely that they will be caught. Other researchers, however, believe 
that frightening off potential offenders by severity of punishment is more likely to 
deter (severity is perceived by how bad penalties are expected tobe). In this case more 
severity will result in more deterrence. 
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Q Evidence on certainty of arrest 
An example of deterrence by certainty of arrest was the sudden increase of some types 
of crime rates as a result of some accidental change in the likelihood of detection 
when police forces were put out of action for seven months in Nazi-occupied Den- 
mark. It is reported that "during these seven months without police, robbery and larceny 
in Copenhagen apparently increased tenfold' (Schwartz & Orleans 1967: 277). Simi- 
larly on other occasions on which other police forces have been on strike, similar 
increases have been noticed. Examples of this can be shown in the official report 
made on lawlessness during the 1919 police strike, during which nearly half of the 
Liverpool policemen were out of service: 
"In this district the strike was accompanied by threats, violence and intimid- 
ation on the pan of the lawless persons. Many assaults on the constables who 
remained on duty were committed. Owing to the sudden nature of the strike 
the authorities were afforded no opportunity to make adequate provision to 
cope with the position. Looting of shops commenced about 10 p. m. on 
August 1st and continued for some days. In all about 400 shops were looted. 
Military were requisitioned, special constables sworn in and police brought 
from other centres" (Andenaes, 1966: 961-62). 
There are many similar reports involving conditions of disorganisation following 
revolutions, or instances as an indicator of how lawlessness flourishes when the 
probability of detection, apprehension and conviction is low. 
Evidence of the opposite is also shown. For example, a decline in bank robberies and 
kidnapping in the United States is reported to have followed the enactment of federal 
legislation which increased the likelihood of punishment. It has also been pointed 
out that the introduction of breath testing in Britain in 1967 was followed by a marked 
drop in serious road accidents, especially on weekend evenings when most heavy 
drinking takes place (Walker 1987: 86). Many other studies carried out in different 
countries have reported, although this might seem different, that the imposition of 
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speed limits has, in general, the effects of reducing speed and accidents (Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research Laboratory 1963: 155-63). An example of this is shown 
by Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon H. Hawkins (1973) who cited Munden (1966) with 
reference to an experiment conducted in Great Britainbythe Ministry ofTransport Road 
Research Laboratory. It demonstrated that the police enforcement of a 30 m. p. h. speed 
limit has not only reduced speed on experimental roads, but also that injury accidents 
were reduced by 25 per cent, and driver and passenger casualties were cut in half. 
A similar result is found in a study conducted by Professor `ali `abd al Rahman and 
Dr. Hussein Abu Salih ('The Brain and Nerves Surgery Unit, School of Medicine, 
University of Khartum, Sudan, 1987). The researchers found that following the 
imposition of the new Road Traffic Act of 1983 in Sudan, there was a considerable 
decline in serious head injuries among road users. The new Road Traffic Act of 1983 
requires that a driver either pay a Diya or blood money, in case of death or injury, or 
to be imprisoned if he failed to do so. 
A number of earlier works (Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Clark, 1969; Jensen, 1969; 
Logan, 1971 and 1972; Ross et al, 1970; Tittle, 1969; Tittle and Rowe, 1973; Waldo 
and Chiricos, 1972), have been cited to have suggested that "theprobabilityorperceived 
probability of punishment for non conformity is a key determinant of behaviour". (Tittle 
and Alan R. Rowe, 1974: 456). In their own attempt to further testing of hypothesis, 
Tittle and Rowe, 1974, examined the relationship between certainty of arrest and 
crime rates. They report that their results are consistent with other findings recently 
reported as providing some support for deterrent hypothesis. 
"The findings in this study suggest that certainty of punishment is an import- 
ant influence on the degree of conformity that can be expected in apolitical 
unit, but that this influence does not show noticeable results until certainty 
has reached at least moderate levels" (ibid: 459). 
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The researchers, hence, suggest that the deterrence theory needs to specify at what level 
of enforcement sanctions become operationally effective on behaviour, as well as the 
circumstances under which sanctions might have more or less effect on behaviour. 
Other research findings by Gibbs, (1968); Tittle, (1969); Chiricos and Waldo, (1970); 
Logan, (1972); Bailey and Smith, (1972); are cited to have found that certainty is more 
instrumental than severity in deterring criminal behaviour (Henry N. Pontell, 1988). 
Q Evidence on Severity of Punishment 
On the other hand, some of the research on deterrence has paid more attention to 
whether severity of punishment deters. Several researchers claim to have found an 
inverse relationship between severity of punishment and crime rates. 
Among the attempts made to assess the deterrent effect of enforcing severe penalties, 
Ehrlich, 1975, examined the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Ehrlich is critical 
of the previous investigations denying the existence of the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment. He considers "The multi faced opposition to capital punishment relies 
partly upon ethical and aesthetic considerations" (ibid: 397). His shortcomings mainly 
involve those investigations by Sellin, 1959. Ehrlich attempted a systematic analysis 
to examine the hypothesis that "offenders respond to incentives and in particular that 
punishment and law enforcement deter the commission of specific crimes" (ibid: 397). 
The analysis was based on recent application of economic theory, mainly to examine 
the relationship between capital punishment and the crime of murder. Contrary to 
earlier investigations, his attempt "does indicate the existence of pure deterrent effect of 
capital punishment" (ibid: 398). However, like most deterrence researchers Ehrlich 
has been much critized for his statistical method (see William J. Bowers and Glenn 
L. Pierce, 1975). 
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In a later attempt Donald E. Lewis, (1986), has reviewed some of the recently 
published studies. His survey incorporated mainly those studies which attempted to 
assess empirically, the magnitude of the deterrent effect of longer sentences. The 
studies refer to a variety of databases, representing different countries, different time 
periods and holding constant other variables which may possibly affect crime rates. 
Donald came to the conclusion that, 
"Taken as a whole, the studies reviewed constitute a substantial body of 
evidence which is largely consistent with the existence of a deterrent effect 
from longer sentences..., in general, criminals do respond to incentives and 
that longer sentences do deter crime" (ibid: 60). 
Similarly, N. Pontell, 1978, reviewed research on deterrence and cited some re- 
searchers (Logan, 1972) who found that "severity of punishment was of greater conse- 
quence in reducing crime than earlier studies had indicated' (Pontell, 1978: 6). 
A number of studies, however, suggest that both severity and certainty of punishment 
are instrumental in deterring potential offenders. According to N. Pontell, certainty 
does have more effect than severity. 
Some systematic investigations of parking violations on a mid university campus have 
found a significant decline in violations following an increase in both severity and 
certainty of penalties (Tittle, Charles R., 1969). This suggests that both severity of 
punishment and certainty of arrest might have a more deterrent effect when they are 
simultaneously operated. 
In 1980, Beyleveld reviewed and summarised findings of research that have attempted 
empirical testing of deterrence correlations. Among his findings are the following: 
" Recorded felony rates vary inversely with recorded rates of arrest, 
conviction and imprisonment in cross jurisdiction and ordinary time. 
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" Some studies find . 
inverse relations between police expenditure, police 
manpower and crime, and direct relations between police variables and 
.' certainty of arrest, but others do not. 
" Crime control programmes which increase certainties of arrest, etc., are 
generally followed by reduced crime rates, whereas programmes which 
increase the severity of penalties are less systematically followed by 
declining crime rates. 
" Subjective severity of penalties, when increased by how bad perceived 
penalties are expected to be `in general' or for `oneself generally varies 
I 
inversely with crime index. Experiments generally indicate that 
non-violations can be controlled by sanctions threats, and that the efficacy 
of threats varies directly with the certainty and severity of sanctions. 
0 Summary of the Deterrence Literature 
This chapter has so far attempted to review some of the enormous literature on legal 
deterrence. An explosion of scholarly literature in that field has grown impressively 
in recent years. Because there is no available work relevant to Sudan or other 
countries of similar legal systems, most of the literature refers to England and the 
United States. 
While some of the theoretical arguments accept the existence of deterrence, still 
others do not. Empirical assessment involve two aspects of deterrence: (1) Individual 
deterrence (preventing those who have been punished from offending again) and (2) 
General prevention (frightening off potential offenders from offending). Research 
examined two aspects of general prevention: (A) deterring potential offenders by 
Literature on the Deterrent Effect of Legal Threats 96 
severity of punishment (i. e. more severity leads to more deterrence) and (B) fright- 
ening off potential offenders by making them feel that they are likely to be caught or 
detected. 
In all, the literature provides both conflicting arguments and evidence, some to deny 
the effectiveness of legal threats, as well as to support the methods of enforcing 
compliance in different circumstances. Though this might seems contradictory, such 
contradiction needs to be clarified in the light of what might be inferred from the 
existing state of knowledge. 
Discussion of the current state of knowledge 
On the basis of the foregoing, it can be seen that the current state of knowledge cannot 
provide conclusive evidence for or against the existence of a deterrent effect of 
punishment. 
A brief survey of available information provides the scattered and sometimes inade- 
quate nature of available evidence. It also reflects the need for better understanding 
of the issue. Although some studies have provided evidence against the deterrence 
effect, equally others have pointed to evidence in support of deterrence theory. This 
might seem contradictory from the beginning, but the seemingly apparent contradic- 
tions can simply disappear if we try to understand these results in a different way. 
Instead of accepting as a general rule that deterrence works universally for all 
individuals or the opposite, it would be more realistic to infer from the available 
evidence that, although under certain conditions some people can be deterred by 
threats of sanctions, the opposite might sometimes happen. If this is so, it will then 
be the role of sociologists, penologists, and criminologists to try to specify the 
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conditions, the time, the people, and the nature of sanctions under which deterrence 
a 
sometimes works and sometimes does not. 
The empirical evidence, whether in support of the deterrence hypothesis, or in 
opposition, is not conclusive. Critics involve both types of evidence. 
M Critics of anti-deterrence research 
Opponents of the deterrence hypothesis have mainly focused on two types of evi- 
dence. The first involves the relationships between capital punishment and homicide 
rates. However, the finding that the presence or absence of the death penalty has no 
relationship to predict the occurrence of homicide can not be broadly generalised to 
all types of punishment. Evidence on the anti-deterrent effect of capital punishment 
neglected the certainty with which the penalty is administered, other various degrees 
of punishment affecting other types of deviance, as well as other etiological circum- 
stances that may have an effect on homicide rates. On the basis of these consider- 
ations, it is argued that research findings about the anti-deterrent effect of capital 
punishment, which might provide a reasonable rationale for abolition of that penalty, 
of course cannot provide a strong ground for questioning the general deterrent effect 
of all other official negative sanctions (Tittle, Charles, 1969). 
The second body of evidence involves the effect of punishment on the recidivism of 
punished offenders. For example, evidence previously cited as providing support to 
the effect of probation on recidivism (Mannering, 1965; Martin, 1960; and Hammond, 
1969); also, research cited as showing the failure of imprisonment on preventing 
recidivism (Sykes, 1978; Tittle, 1969); evidence involving the negative effect of 
sanctions on drunk drivers (the U. S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, 1967; Gerald R. Wheeler, 1988; Holdens, 1983; 
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Krenck, 1979; and Z. alzberg-and Pailsrude, 1983); also the negative effect of corporal 
punishment on recidivism (Tittle, 1969). 
Likewise, Anti-deterrent findings on the effect of sanctions on recidivism are handi- 
capped by illustrative material showing instances where sanctions failed to prevent 
future recidivism. Even if such evidence can be taken as conclusive, it would still be 
invalid to reject the deterrent effect of punishment on potential offenders who have 
not yet been punished or caught in a criminal act. Hence the argument that deterrence 
has never worked because some research suggests so, is based on weak rather than 
hard evidence. 
Q The weak evidence against deterrence 
First, the failure of deterrence cannot only be attributed to the inefficiency of legal 
sanction, but rather one would think of other factors which might significantly affect 
the efficiency of legal threats. For example efficiency of deterrence might vary with 
variations in the following: 
" Personality type 
It is noted that citizens are not equally receptive to the general preventive effects of 
the penal law. However, such noted `undeteribility' can not only be attributed to the 
failure of deterrence, but many other factors in personality type might be involved. 
This has been explained as follows: 
`We needed to be reminded not only ... that different kinds of offences are 
committed in very different states of mind, with or without planning, impul- 
sively or compulsively, and from a wide variety of motives ... but also that 
some people are restrained from yielding to impulsion or motives not by fear 
of law enforcement but what psychologists call "internal restraints") meaning 
usually the thought of the guilt orshame which they would feel if they yielded, 
and also that some people are "undeterrable" so far as some kinds of offence 
are concerned so that even a very high subjective probability of detection does 
not restrain them. ' (Walker, 1987: 88) 
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This suggests that so far as undeterribility is concerned, the citizens could be classified 
into three groups: 
" The law-abiding citizenwho does not require the legal threat to keep him within 
the law. An example of this type is the religious believer who avoids commiting 
evil or hurting others in anyway because it is against God's regulations. 
" The potential criminal who would violate the rules unless they involved 
threats of punishment. 
" The criminal who violates the law despite the threat of punishment. 
It is within the second group, the potential offender, that deterrence is at work. The 
statistics that show high recidivism rates can not only be used to demonstrate the 
absence of deterrence, but they can also be used to mean that some people - according 
to their personality - cannot be deterred. An example of such a type is the professional 
criminal who usually commits crime to enjoy making criminal plans in such a way that 
he can escape conviction. Another example is the aggressive or sadistic personality 
who just enjoys hurting others. For such types, threats are unlikely to affect deter- 
rence. 
" The type of offence 
Theories of criminal law distinguish between acts which are immoral in their own 
right and those which are illegal because they are prohibited by the law. With regard 
to the first group, the legal threat function is a supplementary factor to support the 
social mores. If the legal threats were abolished, the social pressure would still remain 
as a powerful crime control mechanism. Nonetheless, in the case of the second group 
the legal threat stands alone to keep conformity. 
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" Society type 
Effectiveness of the criminal laws varies according to the society they serve. For instance, 
{ in a small community which is based on homogeneity, social control functions as power- 
fully as legal threats, while in a heterogenous, expanding society legal threats assume a far 
more basic mechanism in controlling conflicting interests of potential individuals. 
" Law obedience in law enforcement agencies 
The effect of legal machinery in controlling or deterring crime varies from country to 
country according to the degree of corruption, neglect of duty, and law obedience 
within the police, courts, and different agencies of the system. For example, in 
countries where the police can accept bribes, or judges and lawyers are out of duty 
most of the time, the legal machinery is expected to lose more of its effect. 
" Enforcement of the legal machinery 
The efficiency of the legal threat can also be affected by the degree of enforcement within 
the whole system. For example, by intensifying the efforts of the police so as to increase 
the probability of detection. Few people would violate the law if there is a policeman on 
every doorstep. The same would happen if we increase both the certainty and severity of 
punishment. The efficacy of the system thus is affected by the variations in enforcement 
of the different aspects of the legal machinery. More deterrent effect can be expected in 
a system that fully enforces all of its legal machinery. Moreover, despite the above, other 
problematic areas might yet be undiscovered. 
In the second place, it is a fallacy to infer from statistics that deterrence is ineffective 
because sanctions do not seem to reduce recidivism rates. It is argued that this would 
be a very difficult thing to demonstrate. Nigel Walker (1987: 85), for example, points 
out that: 
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`To deter someone from doing something is to influence him by a threat or 
threats so that he refrains from doing it, does it somewhere the, gets someone 
else to do it, or f: ndr some other way of achieving his desire. To demonstrate 
bystatistics that the use of a deterrent is not having any of these results would 
obviously be very difficult'. 
Thirdly, it can be noted that most of the discussions have concentrated mainly on one 
aspect of deterrence, the prevention of recidivism among criminals having actual 
experience with the courts - individual prevention (with however the exception of the 
research on capital punishment. ) The fact that the legal threats might have failed to 
deter such committed offenders does not mean that it failed with all the rest of 
potential offenders and the law-abiding public. Andenaes (1974: 41-42) has the 
following example to indicate this: 
'If a man commits a crime, we can only conclude that general prevention has 
not worked in his case. If I interview a thousand prisoners, I collect informa- 
tion about a thousand men in whose cases general prevention has failed. But 
I cannot infer from this data that general prevention is ineffective in the cases 
of all those who have not committed crimes. General prevention is more 
concerned with the psychology of those obedient to the law than with the 
psychology of criminals'. 
Many scholars today argue on the same basis. We punish X not only because we 
believe that we can change the probable course of his future conduct, but by doing so 
we can force others to obey the rules. 
Fourthly, from a methodological point of view, studies on recidivism have mainly 
focused on the offender's conduct during a specific time, often his experience of 
punishment. The effect is then considered to have succeeded if the offenders have 
not committed further offences, and to have failed if they do. However, a number of 
questions could be raised at once about what length of follow-up period is appropriate 
to judge for failure or success? In the case of failure, what guarantee can be made to 
show that different treatment would prevent convicted offenders from recidivism for 
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the rest of their lives? It 'could also be argued that with two different types of 
treatment, different results might be expected. It is argued (Hood & Sparks 1970: 
192) that: 
`Thus, even if all offenders could be allocated to the kinds of treatment most 
effective for them, the "success rate" of the present system as a whole would 
be very unlikely to reach 100%. ' 
Moreover, the high recidivism rates might be due to the weakness of the existing 
system. It is possible that new forms of legal enforcement might reduce recidivism 
still further. But for the maintenance of the social order and security, the prevention 
of recidivism is not and can never be the only objective of the legal policy. 
As to the legal policy, the allocation of specific sentences to a particular type of 
offender is necessarily limited by many considerations of which general, and the 
well-being of the whole society are the most important, for which the reformation of 
the individual is not of basic concern. Other institutions within society, such as 
educational, religious, social welfare, etc., can function to undertake programmes of 
social policy directed both to the reformation and well-being of the individual. 
0 Critics of deterrence research 
Like anti-deterrent researchers, supporters of deterrence, as well, are restricted to 
illustrative material, mainly concerned with understanding how punishment affects 
crime rates. According to Henry N. Pontell, 1978, deterrence researchers have relied 
on an extremely simple bivariate research design. Specifically, they have claimed an 
inverse relationship between different aspects of legal threat levels and subsequent 
rates of crime. For example, some of the evidence suggests that the existence of some 
kind of legal punishment does deter (if nothing happens at all when people commit 
Literature on the Deterrent Effect of Legal Threats 103 
crimes, the incidence will increase) i. e. the case of Nazi Denmark, Liverpool police 
strikes, or, as in other instances where active police surveillance led to reduction in 
crime, or where introduction of technical innovations (breath test) resulted in a 
dramatic decline in drunk drivers. In addition, some of the evidence suggests that 
increasing both the severity and certainty of punishment led to reduction in violations 
in a University campus, and that higher apprehension and longer imprisonment 
lowered homicide rates. 
Thus deterrence researchers, on the basis of such results, have precisely come to 
justify the conclusion that sanctions deter crime. Yet their interpretation is question- 
able (Pontell, 1978). A notable limitation of deterrence research is that researchers 
have mainly directed their concern to one way causation, that is, to the possible effect 
of legal sanctions on crime rates. Hence, researchers have neglected to account for 
other causal factors which may possibly affect the relationship between sanctions and 
crime in the opposite way (i. e. the system capacity model). As this model suggests, 
the rate of crime might possibly over-burden the capacity of the legal machinery to 
enforce sanctions more than the opposite. 
Thus the system capacity model seriously questions deterrence research findings 
supporting the effect of penal threat on crime. Hence deterrence researchers may 
need to examine further the opposite correlation between crime and legal sanctions. 
It is possible that the application of such a model might yield better understanding of 
when legal sanctions affect crime rates, as well as when crime rates over-burden the 
effect of legal sanctions. 
Taking the literature as a whole the thrust of the foregoing is not that punitive 
measures deter crime or not, but rather that the literature does not provide a 
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conclusive answer to the question. While some studies provide evidence against the 
effect of general prevention, others point to more evidence of the effectiveness of 
such effect. However, to be more realistic, this should not be taken as conflicting. 
What can be inferred as a general rule is that while under certain conditions legal 
threats can exert deterrent effect, sometimes they don't. 
While there is a place for questioning assumptions, The job that remains is to 
elaborate empirical knowledge concerning when legal sanctions are of more or less 
deterrent effect. According to Gibbs even under the best circumstances, the results 
are likely to be inconclusive. 
O What guidance can be inferred for the current thesis? 
It might seem unprofitable to build this thesis on the base of research findings 
referring to other countries of different legal systems. Nevertheless it is necessary, if 
only to understand the shortcomings and limitations inherent in previous research on 
deterrence alone in other countries with a more established research history. 
In the first place, for the purpose of any generalisations, the literature should be 
treated with great care since the research material is limited in scope to the places, 
the time, and the systems and circumstances to which results refer. However, such 
findings are useful for the purpose of comparison with research to be conducted in 
different countries and under different systems. 
Secondly, previous research has mainly attempted to answer whether legal threats 
deter crime or not. However, part of the issue involves questions such as to what 
degree, and under what conditions, can deterrence best work? For the most part 
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these seem to have been left without answers. To build an adequate theory of legal 
compliance current research must focus on the neglected issue. 
Thirdly, the concept of general deterrence as opposed to individual prevention is what 
hidud philosophy is all about. Islamic jurists consider punishment as a deterrent before 
the act and suppression after it. Thus, knowledge of punishment is intended to prevent 
the commission of the criminal act. Accordingly Basywni (1982: 23) states: 
`The deterrent function of punishment serves as a warning to the public not 
to commit crimes, to forbid them imitating the criminal lest they suffer his 
fate, and to guarantee the safety of those who refrain from crime'. 
In Islam, however, the deterrent function of hidud penalties represent the limits 
ordained by God; and individuals are warned not to violate them. The Qur'an states: 
`These are the limits ordained by God'. 
Where in another verse it states: 
`And any who transgress the limits of God, does verily wrong his own Soul'. 
It is obviously clear that the basic objective of Shariy`a criminal law is to maintain 
peace, security and stability in society through a general theory of deterrence. Thus 
the rationale for enforcing hidud penalities for the more serious crimes is to prevent 
the recurrence of similar conduct and hence create a climate preferable for communal 
security. 
It follows that, for the purpose of this study, the literature provides a general 
theoretical base of assessment. 
"Both sociologists and jurists have often claimed that penal sanctions have a 
general preventive effect in reinforcing social values and strengthening what 
Durkeim called `the common conscience' as well as alleviating fear and 
providing a sense of communal security. It is surely important to know how 
far this is true" (Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, 1970: 172-73) 
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Despite the inconclusive evidence in support of deterrence, further proof has been 
inferred in the same direction of this thesis. 
0 The proof of deterrence 
Some scholars argue, on the basis of common sense, that perhaps it might require 
greater imagination to develop alternatives to threat measures. It might be interesting 
to imagine what would happen if the whole legal system in the society is abolished in 
favour of a lawless society. According to the Marxist theory, this state will be fulfilled 
when the Communist society will be established. In this stage there will be no need 
for punishment because people will perform their duties willingly, and consequently 
the state authority will wither away. But it is argued that the current situation in all 
Communist countries still contradicts the theory. Neither legal threats have been 
abolished, as it has been assumed in theory, nor the state is withering away. Andenaes 
(1974: 62) states that: 
`Nearly half a century after the Russian Revolution, we find capital punish- 
ment used in the Soviet Union, not only for treason, but for economic crimes 
as well 
This suggests that no society will experiment in such a matter as abolishing its legal 
system in favour of a lawless society. On the other hand, a lawless society is perhaps 
one which could best be imagined as has been described by Hobbes, as one in which 
man is engaged in a state of war against his fellow man. 
Similarly it has been considered to be too imaginary to think of a purely treatment 
system. As Andenaes (1974: 62) points out: 
`We know as yet very little about what kinds of treatment are most suitable 
for what kind of criminals and even less about how, or whether the rate of 
success varies according to the duration and intensity. 
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A final point is that, in all societies, it has been noted that more people tend to obey 
the laws than those who tend to violate them. To assume that a deterrent is ineffective, 
the opposite should have happened. 
The hypothesis that legal threats of punishment do have a general deterrent function 
still remains a viable one that will be tested here. This has been the main justification 
behind the Sudan experiment of Shariy`a application. 
The attempt is hoped to be a further contribution in understanding some of the 
necessary knowledge required for building an adequate theory of legal deterrence. 
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Chapter 3 
The Islamic Penal Experiment in The Sudan 
M What Has Been Changed in the Sudan's Legal System 
What happened in the Sudan since 1983, has been described as "nothing less than a 
revolution in changing its legal system to one based primarily on Islamic law. " (N. Cary 
Gordon, 1985: 794). In the attempt to assess the influence of the so described 
revolution orshariy`a experiment, it is perhaps necessary to understand how this came 
about. 
The following chapter reviews the evolution of the Sudan's legal system and describes 
certain aspects of radical change recently affected the penal system (mainly the 
introduction of Shariy`a as a penal system of Law). 
The Sudan's Legal and Political Heritage 
Historians agree that there was contact between the Sudan and Arabia before Islam. 
With the rise of Islam, Muslim immigrants including religious preachers, and in 
particular, Sufi, mystic Brotherhoods or Turuq, orders, from the Arabian East became 
the dominant social groups in the Northern part of the Sudan. As the Sudanese 
continued to embrace Islam, the Arabic language and Islamic values were assimilated. 
A process of Arabisation and Islamisation was then started. According to historians, 
this was responsible for the gradual absorption of the Northern part of the country 
into the Arab-Islamic traditions. By the early sixteenth century, an Islamic society had 
emerged, giving rise to the first Islamic kingdom and withdrawal of the previous 
Christian kingdoms of the North. 
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Religious Teachers fugaha', associated with Sufi orders were engaged in a variety of 
activities. Some focused on the spread of Sufism through preaching and initiation into 
an order. Others fulfilled the more traditional role of leadership generally associated 
with the `ulama' (learned men, particularly in religion) teaching and administering 
the shariy`a. In addition they served as advisers to tribal chiefs as well as intermedia- 
ters between the people and their rulers. (John Esposito, 1986: 181-82). 
Following their own Sufi orders, the Sudanese have later established the dominant 
social structures and institutions in the society giving rise to the religious nature of 
the Sudanese politics. 
Q Administration of Justice Prior to the Introduction of the Code 
According to Madani (1970), the administration of justice in the Sudan was under no 
single unified authority or system of administration. Riyad (1987) suggests that until 
the fifth century A. H. - like all other primary simple societies - the Sudanese 
Communities, followed the norms and the main rules of conduct which they had 
inherited from their ancestors. Hence the norm was the main source of the rules 
regulating the group affairs in this period. There was no evidence that the ruler or the 
chief of the tribe had followed any type of coded rules that the natives had to obey. 
The history of the Sudan's criminal justice before the Law was codified refers back 
to the development of the first Islamic states in the sixteenth century. Under the 
influence of Islamic teachings put on by the wide spread of religious scholarsfuqaha' 
on these states, the shariy`a had full dominance in all aspects of life. For the first time 
justice was under the authority of selected religious scholars, knowledgeable both of 
the Qur'an and the Sunna of the prophet. Three systems of rule trace the evolution 
of the penal-system before the introduction of the code, (1) The Funj Saltana state, 
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(2) the formal Islamic policy of Muhammad `Ali during Ottoman Egyptian rule, and, 
(3) the Mahdist Islamic state. 
" The Funj Saltana (1504-1820) 
The majority of historians accept that, the first dominance of Islam refers back to the 
evolution of the Funj state at about the beginning of the sixteenth century. During 
this period Sufi orders flourished and the Funj succeeded in putting to an end the 
Christian kingdoms of Swba and Dungla prevailing before that period. 
Historians hold that the Funj rulers though did not order any form of written rules of 
circulars to be followed by the natives; justice was carried out in accordance with the 
regulations of the shariy`a. The courts, hence, were following the shariy`a in settling 
all matters whether they were religious, civil, or criminal. The ruler though was 
authorised to order rules but he ought not to prescribe rules contradicting with the 
Qur'an and the Sunna or traditions of the prophet. The Islamic character of the Funj 
state was strongly supported by the Sufi orders. However as a result of internal 
disintegration and the invasion by Muhammad `Ali, the Funj kingdom came to an end 
in the nineteenth century, opening the way to the Ottoman Egyptian rule. 
" Ottoman Egyptian Rule - (1820-1881) 
Following the conquest of the Sudan by the Egyptians, the Sudan was under the 
control of Muhammad `Ali Pasha. Attempting to establish a more centralised gov- 
ernment, the aim of the new rule was to weaken the authority of the local religious 
leaders. One of the basic changes brought about by Muhammad `Ali was the intro- 
duction of modem westernising reforms for the first time in the Sudan. The new 
reforms resulted in the application of recent Ottoman law in all civil and penal 
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matters. The Islamic Law, however, was restricted to governing questions of marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance. Hill is quoted describing this period in the following: 
"Before the coming of the Egyptian the Muslim people of the Sudan knew 
only Islamic Law, and they knew that vaguely. Codes of civil and military law 
were Egyptian importations inspired by western practice and administered 
fitfully with uncertain skill and heavy-handed interpretation. The law at the 
beginning of the Egyptian rule was the law applying to the personnel of the 
government. In the large correspondence concerning criminal investigations 
and trials there is scarcely any mention of the Sudanese except occasionally 
as petitioners and witnesses against alleged injustice. " 
(Al Azmeh, A. 1988: 232-33). 
The Sufi orders responded to the change differently. Some like the Khatmiyya 
co-operated with the Egyptian rule, while others such as the Sammaniyya opposed it. 
By the 1800s, dissent continued, and the Ottoman Egyptian rule was challenged by 
the growing popular uprisings. The most effective revolution was led by Muhammad 
Ahmed Almahdi, who withdrew the Ottoman authority and established an Islamic 
state in 1885. 
" The Mahdist State (1885-1899) 
Muhammad Ahmed Almahdi, a member of the Sufi order, blamed the Ottoman 
Egyptian rules for the socio-moral decline of the society. Professing a revival of an 
Islamic tradition based on the Qur'an and the Sunna of the prophet, he declared 
himself Almahdi, (The Guided One). Hence he called upon people to strive jihad 
against the mal-administration, corruption, and foreign non-Islamic practices 
adopted by the Ottoma-Egyptians' rule. In 1885 Almahdi's movement successfully 
conquered the Ottoma-Egyptian rule and created an Islamic state. The new state 
erected on the ruins of the old one aimed to be a theocracy in which the society and 
the government would be ruled by religion. 
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Being the Supreme Spiritual and secular ruler, Almahdi was the first religious 
authority of legislation in the country. The shariy`a was the main source of the law in 
the Mahdist state. Almahdi, hence declared that every learned man `al'im should be 
a judge and pronounce his decrees in accordance with the rules of the shariy`a 
contained in the Qur'an and the Sunna. Also every 'amryr (ruler) should be an 
executive of these decrees. 
Almahdi's most significant contribution on legislation is reflected in his letters and 
circulars known as manshurat Almahdi. These were mainly directive to all the 
provincial judges and rulers drawing their attention to the theological and juris- 
prudential aspects of the shariy`a. Almahdi applied the shariy`a to all aspects of 
criminal and civil disputes. In one of his most important circulars, he pointed out that 
he was a slave who had been ordered to display the Book the Qur'an and the Sunna 
of the prophet until they are followed. 
Being in power for fourteen years, the Mahdist state was finally conquered by the 
Anglo-Egyptian army in 1891. It left a legacy of religious ideology, leadership, and 
identification associated with the state which continued to influence Sudanese politics 
as well as the legal system. 
The shariy`a rules though continued to apply strictly under the ruling authority of the 
Mahdyia state, but without any form of code to be followed until the rise of the 
condominium rule. 
" The Condominium Rule (1898) 
In September 1898 the Sudan was reconquered by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, who 
defeated the Mahdi's army at the Battle of Omdurman. A condominium status was 
then established between Britain and Egypt who jointly took the right as the ruling 
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authority in the country. Immediately the question was raised about what type of law 
should be applied to the country. 
The new administration decided from the beginning that the shariy`a rules should no 
longer apply to civil and criminal matters. However, as the need for a civil as well as 
a penal or a criminal procedure code became manifest, the main steps taken by the 
new authority were to establish a code of civil procedure, and a code of penal and 
criminal procedure. The new penal code and the code of criminal procedure were 
enacted and applied to Sudan in 1899. The Penal Code of 1899 which was copied with 
minor modifications and simplifications from the Indian Penal Code, was in turn an 
adaption of the English Law to the needs of British India (see Madani, 1970). 
The shariy`a, however, was given a very limited scope in the judicial system of the 
condominium. The Sudan Muhammadan Law Court's ordinance of 1902 had em- 
powered the shariy`a courts only to regulate matters affecting personal Muslims' 
affairs, e. g. marriage, divorce, guardianship, gifts etc. 
Meanwhile both COdes of the Criminal Procedure and the Penal Law continued in 
effect until the post independence period. 
Post Independence and the Process of Reforming the Legal 
System in the Sudan (1965-1970s) 
The development of the Sudan's legal system has passed through different stages of 
political conflict. The Sudan regained its independence in January 1956. During the 
early years of independence, the Sufi orders developed into modern political parties. 
Among the new parties, theAnsar, Almahdi followers, and the Khatmiyya - followers 
of Al Sayyid `ali Almirqani (leader of a Sufi order) were the dominant parties. The 
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Khatmyya wing known asAshiga constituted what would later become the National 
Union Party (N. U. P) supported and led by Isma'iyl Al 'azhari. 
TheAnsar and the Khatm yya continued to struggle for power, however they failed to 
win the support of the majority in the first national elections. The first civilian 
government was led by Isma`iyl Al 'azhari, Leader of the National Union Party 
(N. U. P. ). The new government though issued a demand for reforming the laws, had 
to apply a temporary constitution approved by the Parliament, until the establishment 
of the new constitution for the country. Hence the judges and courts being trained in 
the common law system, continued to apply both the principles and status of the 
English law. 
In 1966, the process of reforming the law started with the formation of the first 
National Commission for the Constitution. 
Q The Sudan National Constitutional Commission 
Following independence it was at once realised that the independence of the country 
required the establishment of new legislation different from those adopted by the 
occupiers. The political parties, however, held different views as to what type of laws 
should be applied. One view advocated the application of the Islamic law. A second 
view advocated the application of English law. A third view, however, advocated the 
application of Egyptian law. 
In 1966 the dispute between the political parties was settled by the formation of the 
National Commission for the first time. The new commission had to undertake the 
responsibility of drafting a permanent constitutional project for the country. In 
January 1957, the Commission finished drafting the general outline for the Sudan's 
constitution; and the first report was published in April 1958. The discussion of the 
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proposed constitution, however, was terminated by the abrupt end of civilian rule, 
after `Aboud's military take-over in November 1958. After a long struggle the military 
rule was overthrown by the civilian revolution of October 1964. 
The October Revolution 1964 revived with even more vigour all the ideas which had 
emerged post independence. Article 109 of the Sudan Transitional Constitution of 
1964 modified Article 113 of the Transitional Constitution of 1956. Three provisions 
were added to the National Charter concerning the judicial and legal system of the 
country (S. H. Amin, 1985). However the process of reforming the legal system, was 
affected by the emergence of new ideologies following the civilian revolution of 
October 1964. 
Q Emergence of New Ideologies At Work Following the October Revolution 
In addition to the traditional parties, the revolution of 1964 brought new parties into 
action. Among the non-Sufi parties which appeared later were the leftist (The 
Communist and the Arab Nationalist), and the Muslim Brotherhood (M. B. ) (Islamic 
Front Charter). Being so concerned with the growing activity of the leftists, the M. B. 
and the traditional political parties asserted their political efforts and dominated the 
national elections in 1965-1968. Banning the activity of the Communist Party (C. P. ), 
the constituent assembly passed a new draft of an Islamic constitution in 1968. 
However in May 1969, a group of Army officers (known as The Free Officers), 
succeeded in seizing power in a military coup d'etat, led by Colonel Ja'far Muhammad 
Numayri. Hence work was discontinued on the Islamic constitution project. 
The Free Officers' revolution in the Sudan was but one of a series of radical socialist 
movements all around the Arab countries during the 1960s in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and 
Egypt. Alnumayri introduced a new ideological stage in the drift of May revolution 
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towards a secular nation, namely Arab Socialism. Hence he was strongly supported 
by the leftists, mainly the C. P. and the Arab Nationalists (A. N). 
Three main ideological forces were at work in the Sudan during 1969-1970 - Islam, 
Communism, and Arab Socialism. The presence of the communists and their strong 
support and co-operation with Numayri regime, led the traditional elites and parties 
to join against their influence on the government's policy. Moreover, Alnumayri's 
exclusion of the traditional elites and parties, and his aggressive attack against the 
Ansar in Aba, gave purpose to the formation of an opposition coalition, the National 
Front. This included Shariyf Al hindi and the Democratic Unionist (D. U. ), Khat- 
mryya, Sadiq Almahdi and the UmmaAnsar, and Hasan Alturabi, of the M. B. 
A series of political events followed. This had progressively limited, Alnumayri's 
political options following the 1970s. This was the starting of his appeal to Islam. 
Q Beginning of The Appeal to Islam 
Esposito (1986) suggests that both political and personal factors seemed to have in- 
fluenced Alnumayri's espousal of an Islamic direction in his personal and political life. 
Since 1971, the relations between Alnumayri and the Communists began to decline. 
This started when the leader of the C. P. was exiled, and three of its members were 
withdrawn from the Revolutionary Command Council, because of their opposition 
to the membership of the Islamists in the Sudan Social Union (S. S. U. ). In July 1971, 
the Communists succeeded to overthrow Alnumayri from power in an attempt to 
transform the May revolution into a "true proletariat" revolution. However with 
assistance from some Arab leaders, Alnumayri toppled the three day coup d'etat and 
executed its Communist leaders. Eventually, he moved in a series of political, econ- 
omic and foreign policy changes. He radically reversed his pro-Soviet position, purged 
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the C. P., and executed its members. Henceforth he would remain extremely anti- 
Communist following an Islamic direction both in his personal and political life. 
As Esposito, indicates this as follows: 
"During the 1970s Alnumayri had become increasingly more religiously 
observant, abstaining from alcohol, gambling and carousing. He began to 
frequent Sufi celebrations and seek the private counsel of local Sufi shykhs 
or pirs (leaders). At the same time Alnumayri continued to assert a holistic 
understanding of Islam in his public statements. " 
(Esposito, 1986: 191). 
"This shift away from Sudan's more secularpost-independence political path 
could be seen in Alnumayri's new concerns about Islamic Law and the 
greater use of Islam in public statements and political rhetoric. " 
(ibid: 189). 
Henceforth, the force of religion in political and legal reform was clearly evident. 
0 The Turning Point Towards The Sudan's Legal Reform 
In August 1970 Alnumayri took the first step to reform the legal system to conform 
with the Sudan's traditions. A legal commission was then formed to fulfil that goal. 
Including members of the Sudanese and Egyptian legislature, the Commission was 
headed by Mr Babikr `awad Allah (Vice Revolutionary Council President). In his 
letter to the commission in the first meeting (August 1970), Alnumayri asserted that 
the new laws should be based on the teachings of Islam. According to the honourable 
`awad Aljiyd Muhammad Ahmed, the commission however had intentionally copied 
the Egyptian jurisprudential experience of the 1948 civil code. The civil code which 
came into force in 1971, was soon rejected in 1973 and courts returned again to follow 
the previous status of the English law. In 1973, the Permanent Constitution was 
drafted and passed by the Peoples' Assembly (P. A. ). Principle 9 of the Constitution 
states that the Islamic rules and custom shall be the main sources of legislation. 
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In 1974 a further step was taken by the promulgation and issuing of six Arabic Acts 
which included the Penal Code 1974 (translated from the 1925 code), the Penal 
Procedure Act, the Civil Act, the Contract, Agency, and Sales Act. (These were all 
codified on the base of English law. ) 
Q Influence of the National Reconciliation (1977) 
Despite his appeal to Islam, Alnumayri, however, continued at odds with the National 
Front (N. F), which included the Islamic organisations and defunct political parties. 
Its leaders Shariyf Alhindie and Sadiq Almahdi were in exile in England, and Hasan 
Alturabi of the Brotherhood was imprisoned in the Sudan. 
The real turning point in the Sudan's path of Islamisätion came following an abortive 
coup d'etat in 1976, led by Sadiq Almahdi and the members of the N. F. Despite his 
military action to put it down, the N. F. remained an important challenge to Numayri's 
staying power. Following a series of meetings to resolve the conflict between Alnu- 
mayri and the N. F., a formal agreement was finally concluded in July 1977 between 
Numayri, and the leader of the N. F. The National Committee of 1977 included a 
political reform agreement, required the right of political participation to traditional 
leaders and forces in exchange for the dissolution of the N. F., and most important 
more intensification of Islam's role in the Sudan. 
Hence, the general Amnesty Act of August 1977, allowed Sadiq Almahdi to return 
from exile. Hundreds of political prisoners were also freed. The Ansar, D. U., and 
M. B., competed in the national election and won significant numbers of seats in the 
P. A. Sadiq Almahdi, Hasan Alturabie, Ahmed'ali Almirqani and other members of 
the coalition were invited to the Sudan Socialist Union's central committee and 
political bureau. 
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In May 1977 Alnumayri had appointed a new commission for the revival of Islamic 
law. The commission included a number of shariy`a and legislative scholars from the 
Sudan and other Arab states. In his letter to the members Alnumayri pointed out that 
he wanted the commission to review the Sudan's legislation so as to conform with 
Islamic law and to be freed from following western jurisprudence. 
As it is known, Hasan Alturabi of the M. B., who supervised the commission is an 
expert both in Islamic and western law, and an author of many draft laws. The 
commission started by drafting several laws to replace those contradicting with 
shariy'a. Also additional laws were drafted to include those aspects of shariy`a that 
were not in action before. Nevertheless, the new law drafts remained unacted upon. 
Since the Reconciliation in 1977, the M. B. became closely associated with Numayri. From 
its foundation the Brotherhood advocated the establishment of an Islamic political and 
social order by the introduction of an Islamic law based on the Qur'an and Sunna. 
Alnumayn's return to Islam and his increasing critiques to westernising the Sudanese 
culture and society, besides advocating a greater role for Islam both in social and political 
life, had thus coincided with the very programme and agenda of the Brotherhood. 
Hence, from the beginning the Brotherhood accepted the fruits of the National 
Reconciliation - greater political involvement. Alturabi, leader of the Brotherhood, 
after finishing supervising the Law Commission for the revival of Islamic law, was 
later appointed Attorney General. Alnumayri also appointed other members of the 
Brotherhood in the cabinet and government ministries (Religious Affairs, Educa- 
tion). Some of them, however, secured senior appointments in the judiciary and in 
the Sudan Socialist Union (S. S. U. ). Later in 1980 the Brotherhood won considerable 
numbers of seats in the elections for the new P. A. 
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Q The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Trend during the 1980s 
By the early 1980s, an Islamic trend was accelerating throughout the country. Islamic 
issues dominated both student and government elections, and the Brotherhood's 
candidates proved the most successful. With the exception of Juba University in the 
south, the student brotherhood controlled students' unions in all the other univer- 
sities and educational institutions in the north. Demonstrations dominated by Islami- 
cally oriented students expressed strong support for Alnumayri's increasing criticism 
of westernisation of culture and society, and his condemnation of secularism, and 
assertion of the need for Islamising both the society and politics. Influence of the M. B. 
extended even further to affect the economic system. For the first time the M. B. 
dominated a growing system of Islamic banks and insurance companies. In a word, 
during the early 1980's the Sudan had shifted ideologically from an extremely leftist 
to an extremely Islamic ideology. 
By the beginning of 1983, Alnumayri was much concerned about the growing 
influence of the Brotherhood in Sudanese politics. In July 1983 he requested the 
honourable Al nayyal Abu quruwn (Judge and the son of a Sufi leader) to co-operate 
with any of his trusted colleagues for the purpose of building a new judicial system 
based on right and justice. Alnumayri expressed his keen interest in declaring the 
Islamic laws, but claimed that this was hampered by the reluctance of the legal 
consultants working with him. (This information is based on a personal interview with 
the honourable Advocate `awad Aljiyd Muhammad Ahmed at his office in 1989. ) 
Later a commission of three members carried the task of drafting the new laws. The 
commission included: Honourable Al nayyal Abu quruwn (Judicial Attache), Badryia 
Sulayman `abaas (Head of Legislation Department at the Presidential Palace) and 
`awad Aljiyd Muhammad Ahmed (Advocate). A series of laws and assorted 
The Islamic Penal Experiment in The Sudan 121 
regulations and policies were-formulated. The changes to the Sudanese legislative system 
affected both substantive and procedural laws, as well as civil and criminal legislations. 
T, 
Introduction of Islamic Laws 
In August 1983, Alnumayri proclaimed an "Islamic revolution" which would have an 
impact on politics, law, and society. He announced that the Sudan would be an Islamic 
republic and issued an official decree for the application of shariy`a for the first time 
in the Sudan. The presidential order was ratified and made constitutional by the P. A. 
of the S. S. U., the only legal political body in the country. A major change then 
followed in the Sudan's legal system resulting in the repeal of several laws including 
the Civil Procedure Act, the Penal Code, the Criminal Act, the Sales Act, the Agency 
Act, all of 1974, and the promulgation of new laws of Islamic features. 
The new laws include five categories of legislation. The largest category is composed 
of status mainly regulating the court's operation and included (1) The Civil Procedure 
Act, 1983; (2) The Evidence Act, 1983; (3) The Criminal Procedure Act, 1983; (4) 
The Judgements Basic Rules Act, 1983; and (5) The Supreme Council Judiciary Act, 
1983. The second category involves three acts regulating the courts and legal person- 
nel. These include: (1) The Judiciary Act, 1983 and 1984; (2) The Advocates Act, 
1983; and (3) The Attorney General Act, 1983. The third category involves three acts 
regulating zakat, excise duty and customs; and the fourth category is composed of a 
number of important substantive laws including (1) The Road Traffic Act, 1983; (2) 
The Penal Code, 1983; and (3) The Khartum Province Act, 1983. The fifth and final 
category, however, involve a statute concerning a purely religious duty, entitled `The 
order of Macrouf good and prohibition of Munkar bad Act 1983. 
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The new Islamic orientation of the Sudan's legal systemwas based on the Judgements 
(Basic Rules Act), which shows that Islamic law and the Arabic language were to 
replace English law and the English language as the main source of legislations and 
the medium for legal transactions. 
U Reasons Behind the Implementation of shariy`a 
Implementation of shariy`a in the Sudan was justified in terms of returning to the 
nation's roots and ridding the state's legal system of colonial influence. (See Alnu- 
mayri's address at the opening session of the International Conference on the 
Implementation of shariy`a in the Sudan, reproduced in English in Al'ayam; Khartum, 
Supplementary Issue, Sept 26,1984). The Honourable Dr Dafa'allah al hag yusuf, 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during shariy`a programme also men- 
tioned the same points (see Sudan Now, October 1984). According to the Honourable 
Hafiz at shaykh at zaki (former Attorney General during the shariy`a, the argument 
is that the application of Islamic law shariy`a involves realisation of societal benefits, 
and that the laws are made to protect the rights and benefits of the people. He believes 
that shariy`a had mainly come to, preserve the rights of the individual as well as the 
benefits of the group in justice, equality, freedom, security and stability. It puts the 
benefits for society in order: (1) the necessities, (2) the needy, and (3) those of 
improvement. Then it legislated the rules and morals that ensure their preservation 
and made the violation of those whole benefits and the basic rights as violation of the 
right of God that requires their prescribed penalties Al hidud wal gisas. "Indeed the 
new laws must be seen as a whole, as a concerted effort to re- organise and improve the 
legal system and the principles it applies with a view to achieving the declared ambition 
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of instantaneous justice and the security of all the people's rights and property. " (Sudan 
Now, 1983, Nov. 9, quoting the President in his address to the nation on Republic Day. ) 
The Islamisation programme of the criminal justice system brought about both 
substantial and procedural legislation. The legislation affected two main areas: The 
Penal Code and The Judiciary. 
Q The Penal Code of 1983 
Following the announcement of shariy`a the Penal Code 1983, with its Islamic features 
replaced the Penal Code 1974. The new code includes definitions of already existing 
crimes and provisions for new ones not previously provided for, together with new 
sanctions hidud and qisas as based on the basic sources of the Islamic legislation: the 
Qur'an, the Sunna and the'ijma`. Offences which do not have their penalties specified 
in the code are left to the authority of the judge. However, it is required that the judge 
should not make his judgements in contradiction with the spirit and bases of shariy`a. 
These are known as ta`aziyr. The code elaborates on the definitions of each of the 
three categories and their adaptation to Islamic jurisprudence. 
Jarayim Al hidud (Hidud offences) 
For the first time the Sudan Penal Code 1983 included definitions of the offences 
known as hidud offences as adapted to Islamic jurisprudence. In fact this category 
with its specific sanctions, involves few offences which bring with them their own strict 
rules of evidence. 
The following offences which are included in the new code are the typical offences 
described as being the limits of God hidud Allah, and hence their sanctions are 
prescribed in the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence the Qur'an and Sunna. This 
category includes: Theft Sariga haddiyya, Adultery zina, Burglary and Highway 
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Robbery haraba, Apostasy ridda, and Drinking of alcohol shurb al Khamr. Of these 
only the latter was introduced for the first time. The change however is in the way the 
new code handles the rest of the other offences. 
Al sariqa al haddiyya (Theft) 
Section (2) of Article 320 introduces for the first time what is known according to 
Islamic schools of jurisprudence as Al sariqa al haddiyya or theft qualified for hadd 
punishment, distinguishing it from ordinary theft. The code indicates that this applies 
to anyone who intentionally takes someone else's property by stealth, on condition 
that the stolen property is not less than the minimum value. The code prescribed the 
amputation of the thief's hand for such a proven theft. 
Al zina (Adultery) 
The definition of adultery is modified in the new code to include any act of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, including sodomy and rape. According to Section 318 the sanction 
for the adulterer is either by execution or whipping (not more than 80 lashes), 
depending on whether the offender is married or unmarried. In the case of the 
unmarried male adulterer, the code added fine or imprisonment for at least one year. 
However a non-Muslim adulterer is not subject to these penalties. Section 318 in an 
adaptation to the Basic Rules Act states: 
A male unmarried offendershall be sentenced to imprisonment and exile for one 
year in addition to whipping. Provided that the penalty specified in sub-sections 
(1) and (2) aboveshall not be imposed upon anyperson whose heavenlyReligion 
provides an alternative penaltyfor fornication. In such cases the offender shall 
be punished by the alternative penaltyprovided by his religion. In cases where no 
alternative penalty is provided, the offender shall be punished by whipping (not 
more than eighty strikes), and fine orimprisonment forat least oneyear. However 
the EvidenceAct 1983 made the infliction of thepenaltysubject to verystrict rules 
of evidence. It is either bypregnancy in the case of unmarried women orotherwise, 
the code requires the testimony of four reliable and respectable eye witnesses 
in order to secure a conviction. 
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Al haraba (Highway or Armed Robbery) 
The term haraba means waging of war. Hence, the definition of Highway or Armed 
Robbery, haraba, in the new code expresses the spirit of the offence as described in 
the relevant text of the Qur'an. What distinguishes haraba from theft according to the 
code is the intention to take the property of others by force or under threat. The code 
also considers it to be a case of haraba or war whether this offence is committed in a 
public area (that is to say with disregard to the public order and the security of the 
community) or at some isolated areas on the traveller's way where help cannot be 
found. Articles 393 to 399 involve all cases of burglary and aggression against places. 
The commission of this grave crime is prevented by. the threat of an unusual punish- 
ment of which details are given in Article 332 and the following. The penalty 
prescribed for this offence ranges between death by hanging or otherwise amputation 
of the right hand and the left foot alternately or imprisonment. However, it is left to 
the judge to make his decision depending on whether murder was committed during 
the course of the robbery. The explanatory memorandum for the code considered the 
infliction of this punishment is to fulfil both the rights of God and the people's in the 
community. 
Shurb al Khamr wal sukr (Drinking of Wine and Intoxication) 
Article 443 of the code (and the following articles) prohibit drinking of alcohol for 
Muslims. The code prohibits both drinking and dealing with wine beverages, as well 
as intoxication by all'means other than wine. Some other sorts of immoral practices 
are also included in the code, such as public disturbance and gambling - among others. 
Public lashing is prescribed for the drinking of alcohol and intoxication (40 lashes in 
public for Muslims). Non-Muslims, however, are subject to fine or imprisonment in 
case of repetition of the offence. The explanatory memorandum of the code required 
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that the legal whipping should be moderate, by a moderate tool. Neither during 
intoxication nor severe cold, not during illness, in public and in presence of a judge. 
Al ridda (Apostasy) 
The explanatory memorandum indicates that Apostasy involves violation of the 
leader and declaring war against the order of the state. The text of this offence is 
included in Section 9 of the new code. The definition for Apostasy involves all 
activities against the state. The violations mentioned in this section fall under what 
has been considered as corruption on the land. The code considered that if someone 
who turned back from Islam is engaged in any activity against the Islamic state (i. e. 
objecting to the main teachings and rules of the book Qur'an, which regulate the 
state), this means that he is declaring war against the existing social order. Apostasy 
is treated in the code as a hadd punishment. Hence Article 458 (Section 3) provides 
the court with the right to inflict a hadd punishment for this offence. According to the 
code the punishment ranges from death to imprisonment (either a long life term or 
less). A famous case of Apostasy during the shariy`a in the Sudanwas that of Mahmoud 
Muhammad Taha. (A leader and the founder of a religious group known as 'The 
Republican Brotherhoods", who rejected reliance on the Basicshariy`a rules conside- 
ring it as incapable of resolving the current problems of the twentieth century). He 
published books, circulars and delivered talks, organising a wide activity all over the 
country to gain supporters for his new understanding of Islam. Later during the 
shariy'a he intensified his activity further so that he was convicted of Apostasy and 
was executed. 
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Al qadhf (False Accusation of Unchastity) 
Article 433 of the code defines False Accusation of Unchastity as: the allegation that 
someone has committed Adultery zina. The definition is derived from that given by 
Islamic jurists. The code prescribes (80 lashes) for such unproved accusation. Also, 
the code prohibits false accusation of other immoral practices less than adultery, and 
discretionary punishment is due in such cases (Qanuwn al`Ugwbat, 183). 
" Jarayiem Al qisas (Crimes of Retaliation) 
In conformity with Islamic jurisprudence, the code included for the first time two 
types of qisas offences or retribution: qisas for homicide ft al nafs, according to the 
Islamic terminology - and qisas for wounds and injury fi ma dun al nafs or Al jurh 
wal'aza. The code distinguishes three categories of behaviour under such types of 
offences: (1) deliberate, (2) semi-deliberate, and, (3) accidental for both homicide 
and injury. The code prescribes qisas or retaliation both for deliberate homicide and 
injury. qisas for deliberate homicide in the code meant taking the life of the culprit 
for the life he has taken. In the case of deliberate injury the code however requires 
the infliction of the same injury the offender had inflicted on his victim. The code 
considers that, in the case that, qisas is not demanded by the victim's relative(s) in 
case of homicide, or the victim in the case of injury diyya or (blood money) is owed 
instead. The code, however, prescribed no gisas in cases of accidental homicide and 
injury, but the diyya, or blood money, is owed in such cases. The code considers the 
complete diyyc as equivalent to the value of 100 camels. This is only due in the case 
of deliberate homicide. 
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" Jaraylem Al ta`aziyr (Discretionary Offences) 
The definition of this category in the code excludes all the cases which fulfil the 
requirements for either hadd or qisas penalty. In such cases the code provides the 
judge the authority to meet the needs of the society and protect it against any kind of 
similar transgression. Examples and cases of ta`aziyr in the code include: Prohibited 
Sexual Actions (less than adultery), Theft not Equivalent to hadd, Usury (Al riba), 
False Testimony (Sihadat al zur), Break of trust (Khiyyana al'amana), Insult (Al sab), 
Bribery (Al rashwa) etc. The explanatory memorandum recommends whipping for 
the purpose of deterrence and the judge has the right to inflict the penalty when 
necessary. 
As it is required by the Basic Rules Act 1983, all of the previous offences and their 
sanctions can be traced in the main sources of Islamic Law. Dr Ahmad `ali `abdu'alla 
(a contemporary Sudanese jurist) pointed out that the new laws included judgements 
drawn directly from the Qur'an and Sunna, and that in the absence of text the rules 
did not contradict the general principles of the shariy`a. The honourable Al Kabashi 
(1986), also explained how the legal text of the Penal Code 1983 relates to Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
Q The Judiciary 
Three items of legislation have been issued in this area to bring the new Penal Code 
into reality: (1) the Judgements Basic Rules Act, (2) the Criminal Procedure Act, and 
(3) the Evidence Act, all of 1983. 
9 The Judgements (B. R. A) 
Perhaps this is the most important piece of legislation for the purpose of Islamisation 
of the law. It relates the code to the Arabic language as well as the basic sources of 
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Islamic jurisprudence Qur'an, Sunna, and Qiyyas. Section 2 of this act indicates the 
methods for the interpretation of unclear legislative texts as well as the judgements 
in the absence of a text. This section reads as follows: 
In the interpretation of legislative provisions, and unless the text is legislatively 
defined or categorical in its implication: 
" The judge shall presume that the legislative does not intend to contravene 
shariy'a by negating a positive duty permitting a clear prohibition, and 
shall also presume that the legislative respects shariy'a guidelines with 
regard to desirable and undesirable conduct. 
" The judge shall interpret all generalised and discretionary expression in 
accordance with the principles, rules and general spirit of shariy`a. 
" The judge shall interpret the term and the technical expressions in the light 
of the cardinal rules and linguistic principles of Islamic jurisprudence. 
However Section 3 of the same act requires that in the absence of any text before the 
court, the judge shall apply the shariy`a, exercising his own discretion or judgement. 
The code, nonetheless, provides certain principles and rules to govern this authority 
of the judge. 
" The Criminal Procedure and Court Structure Act of 1983 
Provisions of this act brought about substantial reorganisation of the court structure, 
as well as the procedural matters associated with that structure. 
"Beginning at the bottom, there has been a significant upgrading of the 
magistrates' courts which have up to now handled some 70% of all the cases. 
Whereas under the old system these were presided over by three justices of the 
peace, none of whom had legal training, now, although there are still three 
members of the bench, one of them has to have at least five years experience 
in the legal profession" (Sudan Now, Nov, 1983: 9). 
Another change which affected the courts is described as follows: 
"The previously existing `Major Courts' have now been abolished. This has 
the additional advantage of streamlining the legal system and quickening the 
progress of cases through the courts. The time and resource consuming stage 
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of the Magistrate's Enquiry has now been removed as well, so that the lower 
courts now eithertry cases as a court of first instance, if they come within their 
jurisdiction, or simply refer them to a higher court if they don't, ... Speeding 
up the legal process has become a major concern in the light of the multifari- 
ous delays to which cases have customarily been subject. Procedural bottle- 
necks have been ironed out to allow the same courts to apply civil, criminal 
and shariya principles to cases which come before them, so that one court 
can reach a full settlement of the matters at stake, thus avoiding a long- 
winded process of constant referrals" (Ibid: 9-10). 
The Honourable `awad Aljiud Muhammad Ahmed (member of the law's drafting 
commission to whom reference was made earlier), told me that, the main goal of the 
re-organisation of the judiciary and court structure was to ensure a more effective and 
just settlement of individual disputes, as well as protecting the society's interest. 
. The Evidence Act of 1983 
Section 458 of the code requires strict conditions to fulfil conviction of the previously 
provided for hidud and gisas offences. This has been made in accordance with shariy`a 
principles. The text of the code also showed when either ahad or gisas punishment 
should be excluded. Section 485 reads: 
"If the `Hadd' (certain specified offences where the shariy`a strictly defines 
the offence and prescribes the penalty to be imposed), is excluded by doubt 
the court may in its discretion impose any sentence it deems appropriate even 
if no such sentence is expressly provided for in the penal code. " 
N Taking Steps to Bring Shariy`a into Reality 
Following the announcement of the shariy`a implementation in the Sudan, President 
Alnumayri took several steps to enhance his new role as an Islamic political leader. 
In September 1983, he started with a decree for the release of all the prisoners in the 
Sudan. On this occasion Alnumayri warned the prisoners that their release was to give 
them a second chance to abide by the law under a new penal system. Alnumayrr 
assumed that the new system of penal law would be more strict in controlling criminal 
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aggression and maintaining justice and security in the society. Moreover, Alnumayri 
threatened the prisoners whom he freed that, "If you return [meaning to crime], we 
will be returning. " In a public demonstration and a big media event, he also supervised 
the destruction of alcohol estimated tobe worth eleven million dollars (Sudan Now, 1983). 
Nevertheless, the attempt to reform the legal system did not stop at the structure, but 
involved reforming the personnel as well. "The high judiciary council now becomes a 
body enjoying supervisory control overall the judges being empowered not only to appoint 
but to dismiss as well. Both theAttorney General and the President of the BarAssociation 
become members of the Council' (Ibid: 10). Alnumayri blamed the existing magistrates 
of corruption, drunkenness and inefficiency when he fired a number of judges. Some 
protested while others resigned, and the three months strike by judges paralysed the 
legal system. Alnumayri responded by the announcement of a state of emergency as 
well as by establishing a new system of courts - Decisive Justice Courts - both to 
provide swift adjudications and justice in criminal cases. This was followed by the 
appointment of a new Chief Justice, who immediately issued a series of judiciary 
circulars (Manshurat) intended to explain and simplify the text of the new code to 
help the judges to apply the new laws. A decree - involving an explanatory memoran- 
dum for the Penal Code was also issued for the same purpose. 
Hence, since September 1983 shariy`a was the law put in force, and the three types of 
Islamic penal punishments: hidud, qisas, and ta`aziyr had been applied. The abstract 
rules, however, had been practically carried out and further intensified within a 
special programme, involving the establishment of emergency state regulations. 
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U The State of Emergency 
Pursuant to Article III of the constitution, President Numayri issued a presidential 
decree (No 258) declaring a State of Emergency in all parts of the Sudan. The decree 
of Emergency stated to be valid from the date of issue on April 29,1984, suspended 
certain constitutional rights and promulgated new regulations to keep order in the 
country. 
The text of the Emergency Order named, "Delegation of Power" granted to the 
military soldiers a police role and responsibility to keep order and security in the 
Sudan. (See the Appendix for the complete translation of the text. ) By way of example, 
soldiers of the armed forces were awarded the right to arrest any individual if, on the 
basis of reasonable doubt, it appeared that he/she has planned to commit a crime or 
in any way was a source of danger to public security as well as waging war against the 
state and the Emergency regulations. 
Alnumayri justified the announcement of the Emergency State on the basis of 
subversion both from within and outside the country. Speaking on this occasion he 
accused various categories, including some judiciary members of hindering the 
development of shariy`a. He pointed out that the basic goal of the Emergency 
regulation was to apply the law in a more efficient and strict way that realises justice 
and order. It was his realisation that this can only happen by means of more efficient 
courts, operated by qualified judiciary who have the will to apply the new laws, that 
led Alnumayri to establish a special system of courts: 'The Emergency Courts" and 
'The Decisive Courts of Justice". Both were said to provide swift adjudication and 
justice in settlement of criminal cases. 
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Q The "Emergency State and Decisive Courts of Justice" 
Immediately following the announcement of the Emergency State, special courts 
'The Emergency Courts", and the "Decisive Courts of Justice" had been set up by a 
separate decree. These had to hear and speed along the settlement of cases involving 
violations of the Emergency regulations, as well as provisions of the Islamic law 
contained in the new code. 
After the new courts became operational, criminals were sentenced to various 
sanctions prescribed in the code - the Sudanese media reported nearly every day a 
great volume of cases, the majority of which involved offences such as theft, adultery, 
possession or dealing in alcoholic beverages or drugs, embezzlement, as well as 
violations of price controls. Where an accused was found guilty he was typically 
subject to multiple sanctions ranging from fines, to imprisonment. In certain cases 
public lashing, amputations, death by hanging, had largely drawn public attention. 
According to official sources (The Prisons Department), the total of amputations 
applied in the Sudan had been 88 for those sentenced to hand amputation only, and 
21 for those sentenced to amputation on alternate limbs. 
The concept of "Decisive Justice" as associated with the State of Emergency meant 
to ensure that the individual's right injustice should not be delayed. The Honourable 
`awad Aljiyd agrees with the famous legal principle that (justice delayed if justice 
denied). According to him, this was the underlying philosophy behind the shariy`a 
experiment in the Sudan. Initially the new system of courts provided no right of appeal 
from the judgements given by the Emergency and Decisive courts. Decisions of the 
trial court were hence final and the penalties had at once to be carried out. However 
where the death sentence was imposed the approval of the President is required to 
inflict the penalty. A bit later a Decisive Justice Court of Appeal, was established "to 
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look into appeals, objections and pleas for clemency" (N. Carey Gordon, 1985: 805, 
quoting Suwna). President Alnumayri later stated "By setting up emergency courts we 
aim at establishing justice and acting in compliance with what God has revealed and 
with what the prophet Muhammad has done and said, " (Ibid, quoting Saudi Gazette). 
The State of Emergency continued until September 29,1984, when the President 
ordered his decree for lifting the Emergency State. (The text of the decree is shown 
in the Appendix. ) The "Decisive Courts of Justice", however, continued in action after 
the lifting of the Emergency State. New laws were also enacted to regulate work in 
the judiciary and a State Minister for Criminal Affairs was appointed at the Attorney 
General's chamber. The new State Minister was given the following functions: 
" The power of inquiry and investigation stated for in the Attorney General 
Act 1983 
" Conducting criminal prosecutions before criminal courts, and 
" Giving advice to state departments in criminal matters. 
Attitudes in Reaction to Shariy'a Programme in the Sudan 
Reactive attitudes in response to the shariy`a programme were of two types: (1) 
Attitudes of the common public (those not involved in politics) and (2) Attitudes of 
the political forces. 
Thus shariy`a as an experiment, came about in response to certain political pressures 
during the course of Alnumayri's rule, was not without social consequences. Initially, 
it proved popular in the North. Reporting on current events, Sudan Now states, "A 
degree of popular enthusiasm was manifested in a variety of demonstrations, debates, 
telegrams, and so on. " (Sudan Now, November 1983: 9). According to my own 
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observations, a wide strong belief was also prevalent among the public that corruption 
and crime declined during the time when the shariy`a was in effect. Whether this was 
f true or not in reality, it reflects for the first time the public's concern with how the 
law could affect their life in the society. The support was particularly evident during 
the public amputations and floggings. These attracted large supportive crowds who 
throughout the "Emergency and Decisive Courts" system kept watch, punishing those 
who were thought to be disturbing their sleep at night and threatening their peace as 
well (a man interviewee commented). 
Politically, the most significant voice of support raised from the M. B. In September 
1984, a mass demonstration organised and led by the Brotherhood, marched before 
hundreds of Islamic leaders and thinkers invited to attend the first international 
Conference for the Implementation of Shariy`a in Sudan. Hasan Alturabi, leader of 
the Brotherhood, though critical of some aspects of the experiment, considered it as 
having several positive consequences. (This is based on a personal interview which I 
took with Dr Hasan Alturabi in his office at the Islamic National Front, Khartum, 
during the fieldwork in 1989. ) 
According to him it was the first time that the public had responded to certain 
evolutions in legal matters which previously had been the concern of the professional 
specialists 'ahl al mihna. He considers this as resulting from their belief and respect 
for the values represented in these laws. According to him it also reflects their 
understanding of the legal judgements, since it became familiar to the common 
people to deal with the judgements from a juristic point of view. 
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In contrast the experiment had also caused strong opposition and criticism. This 
ranged from objections shown within the country, to those hostile attitudes expressed 
outside the country. 
Within the Sudan, the primary attack came both from the secularists and the non- 
Muslim minorities and the Christian churches. The churches and non-Muslims, 
particularly those in the South claimed that "The new laws will be detrimental to the 
interests of the Christian communities and would tend to undermine the principle of 
equality before the law. " (Sudan Now, Nov: 1983: 9). Beside the non-Muslim mi- 
norities, the extremely secular leftists (mainly the Communist and the Arab Nation- 
alist) condemned what they described as the arbitrary way in which shariy`a was 
interpreted and implemented in the Sudan. Some of the criticisms were that the laws 
were not equally applied, and that the sanctions were imposed against common 
people but not the wealthy or those who were in power. Part of the attack also included 
criticism of the announcement of the judgements through the media on humanitarian 
basis. The Honourable Dr Al Mikashfi Taha was the most famous judge whose name 
is associated with the Decisive Courts of Justice during the shariy`a experiment in the 
Sudan. He made the decisions for the famous cases during the programme and later 
wrote his book "The Shariy`a Application in The Sudan, Between Reality and Excite- 
ment". The book involves explanations, classifications and necessary defending points 
against some of the critics and hostile attitudes. The Honourable Al Mikashfi Taha, 
1986, made the following points, in defending the previous critiques. Firstly the 
judgements were not restricted to the poor, but extended to include the sons of the 
members of the cabinet, and relatives of the President's staff, as well as some leaders 
of the regime. In the book he showed examples of such cases. Secondly the an- 
The Islamic Penal Experiment in The Sudan 137 
nouncement of the judgements through the media was made in response to God's 
order. For example in the case of zina the Qur'an states: 
.p 
'And the punishment should be witnessed by a body of believers, " 
(Al Qur'an, Sura Al nur: 2). 
Hence the reason behind publicising the judgements was to provide warnings, aware- 
ness, and lessons meant to deter and suppress other people by informing them about 
the consequences of any similar behaviour. Dr Al Mikasfi referred to some of the 
cases brought under his trial, and showed how these deserved the sanctions inflicted 
on them, for the serious consequences they left on the community. 
The critiques from the other traditional parties the N. U. and D. U., however does not 
involve direct hostility to Islam, but members of these parties claimed different 
shortcomings of the laws. Sadiq Almahdi (leader of the Umma Party), avoiding to 
attack the laws on the name of shariy`a preferred to call them the "September Laws". 
He summarised his critique in one statement that these laws did not deserve the cost 
of the ink with which they had been written. 
The primary attack against the implementation of shariy`a from outside the Sudan 
came from the West. The international church in particular questioned the rights of 
the Christians in the Sudan. The imposition of shariy`a in the Sudan was an event of 
basic concern to Amnesty International. Since September 1983 (declaration of sha- 
riy`a in the Sudan), (A. 1 .j continued to express its humanitarian concern as well as 
condemnation of the new legal transformation in the Sudan (see the special reports 
on Sudan by A. I., sep 1983 - 1985). Also, since the start of the "Decisive Courts of 
Justice" there had been an increased media campaign against the public amputation 
and floggings. Even Saudi Arabia, though a conservative Muslim state became so 
concerned as the international criticism increased against the new Islamic experiment 
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in the Sudan. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt showed their concern about the strong 
influence of "Islamic fundamentalists" in the government. Esposito (1986), considers 
their fears "as a reaction to the Iranian Revolution (1974), the Seizure of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca (1974), and the Assassination of Anwar al-Sadat (1982)" (Esposito, 
1986: 199). However, as to the United States, it was pointed out that: "reports 
circulated in Khartum and throughout the Middle East thatBush reiterated Washington's 
concern about Islamisation. " (Ibid). 
R Uprising Pressure and Relaxation of shariy`a 
Throughout the last part of 1984, Alnumayri appeared to show greater awareness of 
the growing pressure and critiques of shariy`a. The country was also under frustrating 
economic conditions. Fuel shortages and electricity blackouts led to the closing of 
schools. In addition to the drought, the effect of the famine in Ethiopia, added to the 
problem. Thousands of refugees drifted into the Sudan which was already suffering. 
Arab oil countries diminished their economic aid. Esposito (1986: 198), reports that 
"Even Saudi Arabia, declined to afford unconditional support to the Sudanese ap- 
proach. " It is also pointed out that two of the four conditions Bush required for lifting 
the freeze on American economic aid to the Sudan were: (1) Discontinuation of 
implementing Islamic penaltiesAl hidud and (2) Dismissal of Islamic fundamentalists 
from the cabinet and governmental institutions. 
Alnumayri's response was to moderate his push towards shariy`a by taking a series of 
further steps. On September 29,1984, he cancelled the State of Emergency which had 
been in effect since the previous April (see the Presidential Decree in the Appendix). 
Later he stopped the previous announcements of the imposition or infliction of 
amputation punishments. Most important, he gave assurances that shariy`a would not 
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be implemented in the South: "The Sudan does not impose religion on its people, and 
will not force anyone to abandon his religion. " (Ibid: 188, quoting David B Ottawa on 
Muslim Law Threatens Sudan Unity, Guardian weekly, September 30). Later on 
March 10,1985, several prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
arrested (see Amnesty International, 25 March, 1985: 5). As Esposito (1985) puts it: 
"Thus the stage was set forthe Brotherhood to take the blame forall the Sudan's religious, 
political and economic ills. Making it the scapegoat of his regime's failure, Alnumayri 
accused the Brotherhood of exploiting religion, comparing them to the Communists, he 
denounced them as fanatics, a diabolical group which thought to undermine national 
power, and create anotherlran. The fact that Bush ended his visit with an announcement 
of the resumption of United States aid and that a team from the World Bank left for the 
Sudan the following day appeared to confirm the United States' responsibility for 
Alnumayri's new initiatives". (Ibid: 200). Responding to further pressure, the govern- 
ment lifted subsidies upon fuel and bread. This gave way to the immediate collapse 
of Alnumayri and his regime. 
M Collapse of Alnumayri's Regime 
The lifting of subsidies on fuel and bread provided Alnumayri's opponents with a base 
to enable them to unite, despite their political interests. A National Alliance for the 
Country's Salvation was immediately formed. This consisted of some forty-five 
professionals, unions, organisations and political parties (Umma Party, the Khat- 
miyya, the Brotherhood, and on the left, the Communists), who all united demanding 
Alnumayri's resignation. They were supported by a group of senior military leaders 
who expressed dissatisfaction over the conditions of the armed forces and the war in 
the South. 
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On March 27, Alnumayri left the Sudan for Washington to meet Reagan, the former 
President of the United States. Soon after, food riots and demonstrations broke out 
in the streets of Khartum. `Umar Muhammad Al-Tayib (President's Assistant) moved 
quickly to contain the situation. However, demonstrations continued to spread all 
over the country. Itwas estimated that over twenty thousand demonstrators marched 
through the streets of Khartum chanting both against Alnumayri and the United 
States. A short while later a general strike paralysed the country. On April 5, the 
political conflict reached its peak, when General `Abd al Rahman Siwar al Dahab (a 
senior military leader) seized power over the country. 
Immediately after the withdrawal of Alnumayri and his regime, a transitional military 
council (T. M. C. ) was formed. This had to take the responsibility for the rule, until a 
new government was elected. A period of one year was given as a deadline for the 
T. M. C. to be in power. 
0 The Transitional Military Rule and the shariy'a Question 
In the foregoing it has been pointed out how shariy`a was one of the causes behind the 
1985 March/April uprising. Though members of the National Alliance for Salvation 
united during the last stage, disputes soon arose when some of them announced the need 
to repeat what they called "September Laws" (referring to the introduction of shariy`a 
since September 1983). In fact the laws continued in effect but no further sanctions were 
inflicted. Despite the complicated economic tensions, the Transitional government, at 
once had to deal with the question of shariy`a as the main issue on the political agenda. 
Since April 6,1984, the debate has continued between those who claimed the 
continuation of the existing laws shah` a laws and those who completely demanded 
their repeal. As Safia Safwat pointed, in particular "The Shariy`a has presented a 
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stumbling block to negotiations with the Sudan's People's Liberation Army (S. P. L. A. ), 
for ending the civil war in the South. " (Al-Azmeh, A 1988: 246). 
tF 
In August 1985 the National Salvation Alliance, now including the Communist Party, 
the Umma Party, and the National Union for Professions and Organisations, in 
addition to the Alliance of Southern Parties, had delivered a memorandum to the 
Government. (The complete text was published in Al'ayam, Khartum, November 8. ) 
The memorandum claimed the abolition of "September laws", mainly; the Sudan 
Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Act, Judgements and Basic Rules Act, all of 
1983, and the Business Act (no year mentioned). However, two parties, the M. B. and 
the D. U. didn't sign the memorandum. Both at once withdrew from the National 
Salvation Alliance because of shariy`a. Hence the pressure upon the transitional 
government continued from both of the two conflicting sides. 
0 Freezing of the Shariy'a 
The transitional government responded with a project of a new Penal Code assumed 
to amend the previous one. The Honourable `Umar `Abd Al`Ati (former Attorney 
General during the transitional rule, who I interviewed at his office in 1989), believes 
that the previous code included some shortcomings and needed to be modified. 
Particularly he expressed his concern about the right of appeal for certain laws, as 
well as other procedural matters. He also pointed out that he had personally opposed 
the infliction of all the judgements made in accordance with the previous code. As he 
claimed, it is his consent that it is not fair to inflict a judgement based on a law that 
needs to be modified or amended. According to official information (refers to the 
Prisons Department), the total of unfulfilled judgements during the transitional 
period rule had been: 70 cases (confirmed) and 187 (not yet confirmed). 
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As a result of the equivalent force both in opposition and in support, it appears that 
the outcome of the conflict was the freezing of shariy`a. The decisions was finally made 
to postpone the matter of the Penal Code to the constitutional assembly after the 
general election. However, it was made necessary that the shariy`a would be the core 
of the election campaign. 
The transitional government didn't abolish the Islamic laws, but at the same time 
didn't continue to inflict the punishments based on them. 
The former Attorney General `Umar `Abd Al'Ati considers that the law was more 
likely not existing. during this period. Also the Honourable Al Mikashfi Taha Al- 
Kabashi, 1986, suggests that in such case the legal situation can be described as both 
Islamic and non-Islamic. Islamic in the sense that the Islamic laws introduced in 
September 1983 were still in existence; and non-Islamic because there was no more 
infliction of the sanctions issued in accordance with these laws. He assumes that in 
such a legal situation it is normal for all types of crimes to spread. 
0 Summary and Conclusion 
Imposition of shariy`a in the Sudan was an experiment. It came about through a long 
process of political conflict. Explaining this required an assessment of Sudan's Islamic 
heritage as well as the political realities of the 1970s. I believe that the efficiency of 
any legal system cannot be understood in isolation from the socio- cultural and 
political aspects of the society. 
"The shariy`a in Sudan evolved with the Islamic state itself, dating from the 
sixteen century Furji kingdom, and its history is inseparable from successive 
governments which have ruled the country, whether indigenous or foreign, 
secular or theocratic. " (Lobban, Carolyn, 1987: 227). 
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However the recent development of shariy`a as a Muslim set of laws has been affected 
by further political events following Independence. 
Since 1956 (when the Sudan gained its independence) and throughout the 1970s, 
attempts of Islamisation of the law continued with the National Committee, to 
establish a constitution recommending that the laws of the Sudan should be derived 
from the principles and spirit of Islam, and that the shariy`a should be the source of 
all legislation. But it was not until September 1983 that President Alnumayri brought 
this to a reality. In response to personal and political events to maintain his power, 
Alnumayri was the first leader to announce the application of shariy`a in the Sudan. 
In fact the Sudan's Islamization experiment of the law by Numayri, must be seen as 
a response to the broader political context. All other options had failed or proven 
inadequate - for example Arab or Sudance Nationalism/socialism had not been 
particularly successful in attracting popular support. At the same time the Muslim 
Sudan, like other Islamic States experienced a revival of religion observable in the 
committment of students, young professionals, and some influential leaders and 
thinkers. 
Though shariy`a was put into force in September 1983, nonetheless in its fullest 
operation shariy`a was in effect from April 1984 (beginning of the Emergency and 
Decisive Courts system) until September 1984 (lifting of the Emergency and Decisive 
Courts System). From September 1984 throughout the transitional rule it had been 
frozen. 
The full application of shariy`a introduced to the Sudan a whole range of criminal 
sanctions all based in the Islamic penal jurisprudence. This included the three main 
categories of Islamic punishments; Al hidud, Al qisas, and ta`aziyr. 
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Throughout the period when shariy`a was in operation, the hadd punishments had 
been carried out publicly: amputation for qualified theft; flogging for adultery and 
for drinking, possession, sale, transport or manufacture of alcoholic beverages; death 
penalty or amputation of limbs for burglary and armed robbery. Dia or blood money 
was also fulfilled in compensation for injury or homicide. Floggings were most 
common in cases of ta`aziyr or discretionary punishment less than hidud and qisas. 
In theory the application of shariy`a was assumed to achieve justice and to preserve 
the rights of the individual and the society injustice, security, and stability. However, 
the experiment resulted in popular arguments for and against the issue. Whatever the 
reasons behind the difference of opinion, what seems certain to this thesis, is that the 
conflict concerning the application of shariy`a in the Sudan will continue for some 
time yet. At present the amount of empirical evidence to support or refute any 
particular argument is insufficient. 
I believe that the efficiency and reality of any system of law to achieve its goals can 
be judged through the assessment of empirical observations for the community 
reaction to that system. The implementation of shariy`a in the Sudan might provide 
a test case for the achievement of that objective. 
In this chapter, having considered how shariy`a in the Sudan came about, and 
operated, the next chapter turns to deal with how the attempt has been made to assess 
whether the Sudan's experiment succeeded in achieving its theoretical goals. 
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Chapter4 
Hypotheses and Methods of Research 
Before turning to discuss the substantial data relating to this study, this chapter 
provides a general framework for the main concepts, hypotheses and methodology 
necessary for understanding the main findings of this thesis. 
Shariy'a and the assessment of this thesis 
The term shariy`a as used in the title of this thesis refers to the Sudan experiment of 
hidud applied from September 1983 to December 1984 under the rule of the former 
President Numayri. This period involved the establishment of specific Islamic penal 
rules and punishments applied within a new judicial system known as the `decisive 
justice system'. The whole experiment, which has been described earlier in this thesis, 
is the focus of this study. 
$ Public security 
For the purpose of this study the term `public security' is meant to involve a reflection 
of an increasing feeling of safety, and decreasing worry and concern about crime 
among the public, associated with decreasing fear of criminal victimization. 
0 Research hypotheses 
On the basis of the previous definitions of shariy`a and public security and the 
theoretical objectives assumed to justify the experiment, this study examines the 
following hypotheses: 
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" shariy'a was anticipated to deter concern about and fear of crime and therefore 
creates a climate more conducive to public security as follows: 
" shariy`a was anticipated to reduce the concern about the seriousness of crime 
among the public; 
" shariy`a was anticipated to increase the feeling of safety among the public, 
and 
" under shariy`a it was felt that less protective measures were needed to avoid 
victimization. 
" shariy'a was anticipated to deter criminality and therefore reduce victimization 
in the community. 
M Research Technique: an overview of the victim survey 
In my attempt to assess the Sudan's experiment concerning the influence of Shariy`a 
on crime and public security, I conducted the victim survey to be described in this 
chapter in 1989. This recent research technique has been recommended by several 
researchers. 
According to Maguire and Pointing, criminal victimization studies are useful research 
instruments to deal with the problem of inadequate statistics and to pinpoint more 
accurately problems within society. Commencing on a large scale in the United States 
in the 1960s, they reached Britain by the late seventies. A series of British crime 
surveys then followed. For a while it seemed that the problem of the dark figure 
offences which are not included in official records because they are not reported to 
the police would be tackled. Richard Sparks and his associates, in the introduction to 
their pioneering British victimization study, summarised the decade of American 
research prior to their own in the following: 
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`Within a decade some of the oldest problems of criminology have come at 
last within reach of a solution'. (Maguire & Pointing, 1988: 90) 
In this regard Sparks states: 
`By using this technique to ask samples of the general public directly about 
their experiences as victims of crimes, researchers in a number of countries 
are now obtaining a wealth of information about crime and society's reaction 
to crime, of a kind which could not be obtained in any other way. In 
particular, they are learning much, for the first time, about the so-called "dark 
figure" of crime. Those offences which are not reported to the police and not 
recorded in official criminal statistics'. (Sparks et al., 1977, : 5) 
Among those criminologists who have questioned the validity of official statistics as 
a means of measuring crime, reference has been made to Beattie, (1955,1960); 
Cressey, (1957); and Robinson, (1966) (Fox, 1981).. 
The use of victim surveys has thus provided an alternative method to compensate for 
the limitation of official statistics. The first techniques of this type were first carried 
out in the United States for the president's commission on law enforcement and 
administration of justice, in 1966. 
Following wide expenditure on this technique, an abundance of data has been made 
available which concerns victimization, the general public's perception of the crime 
problem, the public attitude and beliefs concerning the social order, and the system 
of social control. Therefore it was hoped that this technique might make an important 
contribution to the understanding of crime and consequently to the development of 
criminological theories. But although it provides an alternative picture to the nature 
and amount of crime that emerges from the official statistics, the victim survey 
technique is not without its limitations. In the view of current scholarship the accuracy 
of this technique as a method for measuring crime is not assured in certain crucial 
respects. (See Richard Sparks et al, 1977, in their pioneering study to investigate the 
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feasibility of the victim survey technique as a means of measuring crime). However, 
despite these limitations it is the most useful method to hand at the present time. 
Q Application of The Survey 
Using the victim survey as a basic technique for this research was a pioneering attempt 
insofar as it was applied for the first time to Sudan. It was hoped that useful empirical 
data on the amount and type of victimization would be obtained by asking people 
about their actual experiences as victims over a given period of time. A random 
sample of people was taken to provide information relating to their experiences of 
victimization before and after shariy`a application. The period covered by this study 
involves two phases: the first phase refers to the period-from September 1983 to 
September 1984 (when shariy`a was in operation); the second phase refers to the 
period from September 1984 to September 1985 (whenshariy`a was not in operation). 
The substantive data refers to urban regions taken randomly from the 1986 election 
list consisting of the basic circles (zones) representing the main geographic regions 
of the national capital city of the Sudan, Khartum. Khartum comprises the three towns 
Khartum, Khartum North, and Omdurman. The regions are distributed as follows: 
" Khartum City includes 
Khartum the second geographical circle (zone). This includes: Al Sagana Coun- 
cil, Khartum North Council, Al Khartum janoub (3), Railway residential area, 
Paris residential area, and Al-Khartum West. 
Khartum the seventh geographical circle (zone). This includes Al Sahafa Coun- 
cil (Al sa "hafa and gabra). 
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" Khartum North (Bahrie city) includes 
Bahrie first geographical circle (zone). This consists of: Al-Khatmia, Al Sababie, 
Hilat Hamad and Khojalie; Al Danagla North, Al Danagla South and Al-Shabia 
South, Al-Amlak, and Al-Diyoum. 
Khartum Bahrte the second circle (zone). This includes Shambat North, Sham- 
bat extension, Shambat al-Aradie, Al Shaabia North, Al-mazad North, Al-Safia, 
Shambat-al Ziraa'a, Al-Higrha, and Shambat South. 
" Omdurman City includes 
Omdurman, the third geographical circle (zone). This includes wad Nobawie 
and Beit al Mal Council. 
Omdurman, the fourth geographical circle (zone). This includes Almahdi City 
Council which includes the residential area known as Al harat, extending from 
hara number one to hara number eight, and the Nile city. 
Having selected six areas to be surveyed within the three towns which form the capital 
city Khartum, and having the final forms of the questionnaire completed, the field- 
work started in mid-February 1989. A team of interviewers was selected from the 
third and fourth-year students of the Department of Sociology and Applied Statistics 
of the Islamic University of Omdurman in the Sudan. Information was collected 
through direct interviews, over a period of approximately two and a half months. A 
total of six hundred interviews was completed. The completed questionnaires were 
checked and finally a random sample consisted of four hundred and fifty question- 
naire was drawn from the total (original sample) for the final analysis. 
The influence of the shariy`a experiment on public security has been examined on the 
basis of the questionnaire to be described in the following. 
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The Questionnaire 
The questionnarie was designed to obtain data to enable a comparison to be made of 
I 
respondents' experiences of criminal victimization, perceptions and fear of crime 
during two reference periods relating to two levels of enforcement in the penal 
system: 
" The first period from September 1983 to September 1984 refers to the 
shariy'a programme involving the implementation of the Islamic penal 
sanctions described in the previous chapter. This programme started by 
destruction of wine and the announcement of hidud application, and was 
followed by the release of prisoners in the Sudan by the former President 
Numayri in September 1983. The period finished with the end of the 
emergency courts in September 1984. This period thus relates to the 
criminal justice system when shariy`a, was in operation. 
" The second period, from September 1984 to September 1985, refers to the 
criminal justice system following the end of emergency courts in September 
1984; and the termination of the Islamic punishments following the collapse 
of Numayri's rule, until the first six months of the transitional government 
of General Siwar al dahab and Dr. Aljuzuli Dafa'allah. During this period 
shariy`a, was not in operation. 
After the necessary revision of the first draft a pilot study of the questionnaire was 
made with a sample of Sudanese students and their families attending Durham 
University, to assess its validity. This was thought necessary in order to test whether 
the data relating to individuals' previous experience of victimization could or would 
be accurately recalled and reported to the interviewers. The only available group was 
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of highly educated individuals who can easily recall and locate events with chrono- 
logical accuracy. It was found that with such respondents the questionnaire could 
provide good information of the type needed for the objectives of this research. 
Consequently, on the basis of some of the comments obtained from this pre-test, the 
final revision of the questionnaire was made and approved in preparation for its 
administration in Sudan. 
Q Content of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire, which included 36 questions, falls into two main sections. 
" The first section consisted of basic demographic (personal) data relating to 
such characteristics as sex, age, education, residence, works and 
socio-economic status. The purpose was to assess the relations between the 
respondents' personal characteristics and previous experience of criminal 
victimization. 
" The second section of the questionnaire was designed to elicit information 
relating to respondents' concern about, and past experience of, criminal 
victimization, both while shariy`a was in operation and for the following 
period when it was terminated. 
Because it was felt important that the information in this section be accurate in terms 
of recall of previous events, some time was allowed at the beginning of this section to 
help respondents to recall the intended periods by a series of descriptions of import- 
ant events both at the beginning and at the end of each period (see Appendix on survey 
of criminal victimization). Following this memory prompt a set of questions was asked 
repeatedly to measure the experiences of respondents for each period as objectively 
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specified and described in the questionnaire (see Appendix). Information was cate- 
gorised as follows. 
" Concern about crime 
This category involves information to measure fear of crime in three ways: 
" Feeling of safety 
" Seriousness of Crime 
" Defensive behaviour undertaken to avoid expected victimisation 
" Experience of past victimization 
At the beginning of this category, respondents were also allowed enough time to 
permit them to recall particular incidents of victimization during the two periods 
specified. The information obtained involves two types of victimization. 
Personal experience of victimization 
Following this memory prompt a list including descriptions of particular victimization 
incidents was given. Each respondent was then asked to check from the list if any of 
these typical incidents fitted the description of any case that might have happened to 
him/her during that time. The list included a description of incidents related to 
particular types of hidud offences, mainly ranging from robbery and burglary known 
as haraba in the Islamic terminology), theft known as Sariga, and physical assault 
known as adha in the Islamic sense. These were chosen as examples of those which 
were treated under hidud punishments during the criminal justice system when 
shariy'a, was in full operation in the Sudan. The rest of the offences, such as ridda or 
apostasy, illicit sexual relations zina, -slanderous accusation qadhf, and drinking of 
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alcohol shurb al Khamr, were not included in the list, since no-one was expected to 
give information if directly asked about these offences. 
In the first place apostasy ridda is of rare occurrence and normally the influence of 
this offence affects the community rather than the individual. Secondly, with illicit 
sexual relations zina and slanderous accusation qadhf. They both involve shame to 
the extent that no-one not even a victim willgive information about these. Even asking 
someone directly if he or she has been a victim of either of these offences is seen to 
question their personal honour. And, finally, the drinking of alcohol can only be 
examined by its influence on other crime incidents, because it does not involve 
harming others in a direct way. 
The next question asked respondents to report whether anything else had happened 
to them and which was not included in the previous list. They were allowed to describe 
a maximum of three such incidents. The purpose was to gather information on other 
minor offences that might fall into the category of discretionary punishments ta`aziyr, 
and if possible other hidud offences not included in the list. 
Victimization against other people (community victimization) 
In order to cover all possible previous incidents of victimization, the questionnaire 
then seeks information on community victimization. Respondents were asked to 
report whether anyone else they know of was similarly affected by any of the previous 
incidents of victimization. The previous list was repeated and respondents were asked 
to choose from the list those typical incidents which might have happened to anyone 
of their acquaintance at any time during the two reference periods. 
The final question was intended to obtain information about respondents' political 
orientation. The purpose is to examine whether respondents' political orientation in 
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any way reflected a bias with regard to their willingness to report incidents of 
victimization and with regard to their feelings about the existing criminal justice 
system. 
The questionnaire closed by asking each interviewer to thank each respondent for 
his/her cooperation at the end of each interview. The interviewers were then in- 
structed to fill out the respondent's assessment form attached to the questionnaire 
before moving on to the next one. 
$ The sample 
The sample, which consisted of six hundred cases, was obtained on the basis of the 
following criteria. 
The original intention was to take random cases from the registration list, which 
includes the names of voters of the 1986 presidential election for the Sudan's national 
capital city Khartum, Omdurman, and Khartum North. However, this plan proved to 
be impossible due to the difficulty of locating individual cases. It was then felt 
necessary to use some form of area sampling instead. Accordingly the 1986 geographi- 
cal list, representing the main geographical urban areas in the three cities of the 
national capital, was found to be the most readily available suitable sampling frame. 
As shown at the beginning of the chapter, two areas were then picked (at random 
from the list of names including the main areas for each city) from each city, giving a 
total of six areas for the three towns of the captial city. Initally therefore, a sample of 
areas was obtained. It is important to note that this initial area sampling included 
mainly inner urban areas of the national capital city consisting of different socio-econ- 
omic levels. No adequate sampling frame was found for the areas obtained. It was 
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then felt useful to divide each area into sub-divisions containing residential areas 
Ahya'. Information on the location and boundaries of each area was obtained from 
the local council offices. Each council sub- division in the six surveyed areas was then 
identified according to its boundaries and further divided into smaller segments. 
Individual cases were obtained through two stages of systematic sampling. First, 
within each segment streets were systematically selected according to their ordering 
numbers. Within each street dwellings were randomly obtained. An adult member 
was taken from each dwelling by knocking at the door. Fieldworkers were instructed 
to interview the first personwho came to open the door. If there was no response then 
the next dwelling was to be selected. A sample of one hundred cases was covered in 
each area, giving a total of six hundred cases for the combined sample for the national 
capital city. A randomised total of four hundred and fifty cases, weighed for two 
hundred and twenty five cases for each sex, was finally selected for the purpose of 
analysis. 
This method of segment samplingwas found more manageable with regard to locating 
dwellings than selecting from a big (and inadequate) list of dwellings, which proved 
to be impossible. It also ensures that segments provide a more complete coverage of 
dwellings which are located next to each other rather than being spread around a vast 
area, which would be the case if choosing from a large list of the population. One 
problem of this process, however, is that the interviewers clearly did not contact a 
random sample and this means that some sources of sampling bias are possible. 
It can confidently be said that the overall response rate of the survey was one hundred 
per cent, since not one of the interviewers team was refused entry to any of the houses 
he targetted during the fieldwork. This is not surprising in a society where individual 
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members consider themselves obliged to show the best welcome and hospitality to 
any visitor regardless of the purpose of the visit. All of the interviewers reported that 
they were strongly welcomed and all were shown great hospitality and generousity by 
all the respondents. None of the respondents refused explicitly to provide information 
and in each case the questionnaire was completely filled. Despite this full acceptance 
of our interviewers and the great concern shown by all the respondents about the 
matter of crime and security, there was a slight variation in the degree of cooperation 
observed by some interviewers, as reported in the interviewer's assessment form 
attached at the end of the questionnaire. 
Interviewer's Assessment of Respondent's Cooperation 
Degree of Cooperation % Response 
Very cooperative 78.4 
Somewhat cooperative 20.4 
Not cooperative 1.1 
Interviewers' selection, training, and task 
The fieldworkers team consisted of fifteen students, whose training was mainly in 
social science and applied statistics at Omdurman Islamic University, to which I also 
belongs as a teaching assistant. The nature of the relationship with my University 
student's team facilitated the arrangements and administration of the fieldwork from 
the earlier stage of selection up to the final stage of data collection and field 
supervision. The team included students mainly from the third and fourth years, 
whose training mostly covered basic principles and rules of social research techniques 
and methods. Selection was based on personal interest and the participating students 
received a job training course on the survey technique related to the research topic. 
Hypotheses and Methods of Research 157 
They were also motivated by financial award (payment), as well as a certificate of 
fieldwork experience in data collection from the University department. 
The training programme lasted for twenty hours and started with an introductory 
meeting about the general plan of the survey, why it was being done, by whom, and 
how the results were to be used. The role they should play and what was expected 
from them was also clearly explained. 
This was followed by the fieldwork instructions and briefing. In this stage explanation 
of the interviewer's task included such things as where to locate and select sample 
members; how to open the interview, ask the questions and record the answers as 
instructed. Most important, the questionnaire instructions specified the allowable 
extent of recalls and probing, and how to deal with different types of non-response. 
The training programme ended with the trainees performing a few experimental 
interviews with some of their fellows under my direct supervision, I also performed 
the first few examples. After this comprehensive training course the interviewers 
moved to the field, with an authorised letter showing the purpose of their job and the 
institution they represented. Throughout the fieldwork, the data collection was 
directed under my direct supervision. The fieldwork check was done at the end of 
each working day, to test whether the interviewers were asking the right questions, 
and recording the answers in accordance with the instructions. To control this job 
each interviewer was requested to put his name on all the questionnaires he filled 
out. 
Despite all these efforts to secure the accuracy of the data, some limitations and 
problems of method should be considered. 
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$ Data limitations and problems of method 
The scope of the findings in this study is limited by the survey of criminal victimization 
described above. Although every effort was made to ensure the reliability and 
accuracy of information, it should be noted here that the analysis has been affected 
by the following limitations of the data and some unavoidable problems of method. 
Q Representativeness of the sample 
Perfect estimation of victimization incidents can only be drawn from a large-scale 
survey including all the population. In practice, this was of course beyond the limited 
resources and available facilities of an individual researcher. This being the case, the 
data was inevitably subject to some errors as well as other sources of unknown bias 
resulting from imperfect randomness of selection. Such errors might lead to a 
different estimation of victimization events with a one hundred per cent repre- 
sentative sample, if it were possible to select all the members of the population who 
had actual experience as victims of specific types of crimes at a specific period of time. 
Q Recall and telescoping of incidences 
Two sources of error and inaccuracy are recongized by expert researchers in the field 
of victims survey technique (Richard F. Sparks et al., 1977). In the first type, the 
respondent may completely fail to remember the incidents in question or, if he/she 
does correctly remember them, he/she might not wish to release that information. 
The second type of error is related to telescoping of events. This occurs when an 
individual remembers and reports an incident but fails to specify exactly at what time 
it occurred. According to expert researchers the incident is placed either earlier or 
(more usually) later than when in fact it did occur (Sparks et. al, 1977: 35). The net 
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effect in both of these cases is that some events are completely lost so far as the 
statistical estimation of previous victimization is concerned. 
Victims studies usually refers to the previous year and are still acknowledged to have 
recall problems. In this study, however the respondents were asked to recall and 
locate events going back to six years of time. Hence it must be noted that (so far as 
Telescoping and recall of previous incidents is concerned) there are bound to be some 
errors affecting the data. The two sources of errors previously mentioned are both 
inevitable. Firstly, some of the incidents might not be exactly located vis-a-vis the 
shariy'a period. This error might lead to the confusion of some of the incidents, to the 
extent that it was not clear to which of the two periods some of the incidents could 
related. Still some events might completely be lost either because of memory failure 
or because of the unwillingness of the respondents to release some of the information. 
Q The short dominance of the shariy'a programme 
An important factor to be taken into account is that, the survey involved a full year 
term for shariy`a (from Sept 1983 - to Sept. 1984), however during this term the 
intensified program involved actually five months extending from April 1984 to 
September 1984 
Despite the previous cautionary remarks and the limitations of method, the informa- 
tion obtained for this study cannot be obtained, at least at the present time, by any 
other method. With regard to Sudan particularly, the application of this technique 
provides for the first time valuable information on criminal victimization. This is in 
strong contrast with official statistics, which concentrate on figures relating to rising 
or falling rates of crime, rather than on providing explanatory information about such 
incidents. Reliable information of the kind provided by the victim survey may be of 
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great importance to public policy, since it provides a better understanding of criminal 
victimization and public concern about crime and security. This was in itself seen as 
an important and worthwhile contribution which, it is hoped, this study may achieve. 
In the judgement of some recent researchers in the field there are, in fact, at least 
three distinct ways in which victim surveys may contribute to explanatory research in 
the field of criminology: 
" by providing a more accurate measure of crime rates; 
" by providing data on victimization; and 
" by throwing light on the nature of social reaction to crime and the working 
of part of the criminal justice system. 
The method has different strengths and limitations in each of these three areas, 
however. With reference to Skogan, 1986, it has been pointed out that, despite the 
evident achievements of victim surveys, there remain technical and theoretical diffi- 
culties involved in the 'measurement' of crime which mean that some survey findings 
must be interpreted cautiously (Maguire et. al., 1988: 90). The following plan of 
analysis for this study was made with these warnings in mind. 
Method of Analysis 
For the purpose of this study the influence of shariy`a, is measured by comparing the 
difference in the responses when shariy`a, was and was not in operation. The validity 
of the significance is examined using the chi-square statistical test. 
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Chapter 5 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
The Shariy'a Experiment and Fear of Crime 
The victim survey described previously included three sets of questions aimed to 
examine whether the shariy`a experiment in the Sudan had deterred fear of crime in 
the society. In this chapter the findings related to this issue will be presented, analysed 
and discussed under the major hypothesis that, the shariy`a was anticipated to deter 
fear of crime in the Society. Fear of crime was examined in connection with three 
indicators of concern about crime; Concern about the seriousness of crime; Concern 
about Safety; and Defensive behaviour undertaken to avoid victimisation. In the 
following data related to each of the three aspects of fear of crime will be presented, 
analysed and discussed. 
0 Concern about the Seriousness of Crime 
This section examines whether the shariy`a experiment in the Sudan had any influence 
on concern about the seriousness of crime in the society. 
Table 5.1 presents the responses to the question about how serious crime was thought 
to be when shariy`a was/was not in operation. It shows that the respondents, looking 
back at the period whenshariy`a was in operation, thought that they had felt that crime 
was a less serious problem during that time. Well over a half 57% thought that they 
had considered it to be "not at all serious" during the shariy`a experiment, while only 
about a third 33% thought that they had felt the same when shariy`a was not in 
operation. These differences are statistically significant (see Table). The conclusion 
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hence is that; looking back at the period when shariy`a was in operation significantly 
more respondents felt that crime was not at all a serious problem. 
Table 5.1 
Concern about the Seriousness of Crime when shariy`a 
was/was not in Operation. 
All respondents 
shay v'a was in operation shariy`a was not in operation 
How serious was 
crime 
% No. % No. 
Serious 24 106 37 167 
Quite serious 19 87 30 136 
Not at all serious 57 257 33 147 
Total 100 450 100 450 
* calculated chi s quare for `not at all serious' 
D. F. 
Critical level 
Critical value 
= 29.9 
=1 
= 0.001 
= 10.82 
Sub Group Characteristics and Concern About the 
Seriousness of Crime 
Prior Research (Western) suggests that, there are some personal and demographic 
characteristics associated with fear of crime. (Hindelang 1979, Hindelang and col- 
leagues 1978, R. 1. Mawby 1988, Garofalo 1978, Stauko 1988, Walklate 1989, and 
Balkin 1979). Ever since there has been much attention given to the understanding 
of the influence of gender, age, employment, economic status, and education (among 
other social variables) on fear of crime. The following analysis examines whether the 
findings of this study are similarly affected by any sub group characteristics or 
variables other thanshariy`a in the Sudan. 
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Q Gender and Concern About The Seriousness of Crime 
Table 5.2 
Concern about the Seriousness of Crime When shariy`a was/was not in Operation 
All Respondents by Gender 
Persons who thought crime was `not at all serious' No. of 
When sharfy`a was in operation When shariy`a was not in 
operation 
Respondents 
Sex % No. % No. 
Female 56 126 32 71 225 
Male 58 131 34 76 225 
Total 57 257 33 147 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 1 
Table 5.2 shows that there is no significant difference between males and females 
respondents on this variable. The two sexes revealed the same difference in the 
proportion concerned about the seriousness of crime in the two periods. The table 
thus suggests that Gender is not related to shariy`a in terms of respondents concern 
about the seriousness of crime. This result is opposite to western research findings 
where reports showed that females generally had much higher levels of fear than men 
did (Warr 1984 and 1985, Manfield 1984, Hough and Mayhew 1983, and 1985, 
Chambers and Tombs 1984, and Smith 1987). However, the fact is that in the Sudan 
according to their life style role modelling women are expected to be less mobile and 
consequently have less exposure to actual risk of victimization than men do. Conse- 
quently their awareness of actual risk might be much less than that of men. This may 
explain why they display the same views as men about the seriousness of crime. 
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Q Age, Economic Status and Concern About The Seriousness of Crime 
Tables 5.3 to 5.5 examine the differences in concern about the seriousness of crime 
t 
for age, economic status and employment. For each of the three variables the 
discrepancy on fear is not found to be significant (see Tables). The result hence 
suggests that there is no relationship between these variables and views about safety. 
Table 53 
Concern about the Seriousness of Crime when shariy`a was/was not in Operation. 
All Respondents - byAge. 
Persons who thought crime was `not at all serious' No. of 
When shariy`a was In operation When shariy`a was not In 
Respondents 
operation 
Age group % No. % No. 
Under 30 58 193 32 104 330 
Over 30 53 64 36 43 120 
Total 57 257 32 147 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 2 
calculated chi square = 0.9 
D. F. =1 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 3.8 
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Table 5.4 
Concern about the Seriousness of Crime When shariy`a wastwas not in Operation. 
All Respondents by Economic Statur. 
Persons who thought crime was 'not at all serious' No. of 
When shariy`a was in operation When shag y'a was not In 
Respondents 
operation 
Economic % No. % No. 
group 
Didn't mention 61 152 34 85 249 
Poor 59 43 37 27 73 
Low 39 32 29 24 82 
Middle and high 65 30 24 11 46 
Total 57 257 33 147 450 
" Adapted from Appendix Table 3 
calculated chi square = 3.2 
D. F. =3 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 7.8 
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Table 5.5 
Concern about the Seriousness of Crime When shariy`a wastwas not in Operation. 
All Respondents by Employment Status 
Persons who thought crime was 'not at all serious' No. of 
When shariy`a was in operation When sharry'a was not in 
Respondents 
operation 
Employment % No. % No. 
status 
Government 47 44 31 29 94 
employee 
Private business 59 107 35 63 181 
Manual 64 9 43 6 14 
Unemployed 63 59 24 23 94 
Retired 28 5 39 7 18 
Housewife 67 33 39 19 49 
Total 57 257 33 147 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 4 
calculated chi square = 5.4 
D. F. =5 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 11.07 
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Q Political Background and Concern about the Seriousness of Crime 
Table 5.6 
Concern about the Seriousness of Crime When shariy`a was/was not in Operation. 
All Respondents by Political Backgrouncd. 
Persons who thought crime was 'not at all serious' No. of Respondents 
When sharfy`a was in operation When shariy`a was not in 
operation 
Political % No. % No. 
Category 
MSecular right 49 65 30 40 134 
wing 
Islamic Front 67 39 21 12 58 
(2) Secular left 33 14 29 12 42 
wing 
No Party 64 139 38 83 216 
Total 57 257 33 147 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 5 
(1) includes: National Union Party, Democratic Union Party and Umma Party 
(2) includes: Communist and Arab Nationalist Parties 
calculated chi square = (5.37) 
D. F. =3 
Critical level = 0.051 
Critical value = (7.815) 
Table 5.6 suggests the following: 
" The Islamic Front have the biggest difference, which suggests that the fact 
that they favoured shariy`a (46%) influenced their views. 
" The secular left wing have the least difference (4%), which suggests that 
their opposition to shariy`a, influenced their views. 
However: 
" even for the secular left wing groups, a few more felt that crime was not at 
all serious when shariy`a was in operation than when it was not. 
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" Anyway, the differences are not statistically significant, (though this might 
be because of the small numbers in the subgroups). 
-f 
Concern about safety 
This section examines whether the shariy`a experiment in the Sudan resulted in an 
increasing feeling of safety in the society. The hypothesis to be tested here is that; 
shariy'a increases the feeling of safety in the society. 
Table 5.7 
Concern about Safety When shariy`a Was/Was Not In Operation 
All Respondents 
How did you shariy a was i n operation shariy'a was not in operation No. of 
feel about the Respondents 
safety of your 
oho No. % No. 
own self, 
family 
members and 
property in 
this period? 
*1 Very safe 34 151 10 47 
Safe 36 162 32 145 
*2 Not safe 29 132 49 218 
Very unsafe 1 5 9 40 
Total 100 450 100 450 450 
*1 calculated chi square for 'very safe' = 54.6 
"2 calculated chi square for `not safe' = 21.14 
D. F. =1 
critical level = 0.001 
critical value = 10.82 
Table 5.7 generally suggests that the respondents looking back at the time when 
shariy`a was in operation, thought that they had felt safer than when shariy`a was not 
in operation. A greater proportion 34% to 10% when shariy`a was in operation said 
it was "very safe". But a Ratio of 29% : 49% when shariy`a was not in operation said 
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it was "not safe". This result is statistically significant (see Table). The conclusion 
hence is that there is sufficient evidence to show that the shariy`a experiment signifi- 
cantly increased the feeling of safety in the Society. 
0 Sub Group Characteristics And Concern About Safety 
The following analysis examines whether any sub-group characteristics had any 
influence on views about safety. 
Q Gender, Age, Economic Status And Concern About Safety 
Tables 5.8 to 5.10 examine the differences for gender, age and economic status. In 
fact it can be seen that, non of these variables 'shows a statistically significant 
difference. But with the exception of gender, this is probably due to the small numbers 
in some of the sub-groups. 
Table 5.8 
Concern about Safety When shariy`a Was/Was Not In Operation 
All Respondents By Gender 
Persons who thought that It was 'very safe' No. of 
When shariy'a was in operation When shariy'a was not In 
Respondents 
operation 
Sex % No. % No. 
Female 39 87 10 23 225 
Male 28 64 11 24 225 
Total 34 151 10 47 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 6 
calculated chi square = 1.02 
D. F. =1 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 3.84 
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Table 5.9 
Concern About Safety When shariy`a Was/Was Not In Operation 
All Respondents By Age 
Persons who thought that It was 'very safe' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was In operation When shariy`a was not In 
operation 
Age Category % No. % No. 
Under 30 35 115 10 34 230 
Over 30 30 36 11 13 120 
Total 34 151 10 47 450 
Adapted from Appendix Table 7 
calculated chi square = 0.148 
D. F. =1 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 3.84 
Table 5.10 
Concern About Safety When shariy`a Was/Was Not In Operation 
All Respondents By Economic Status. 
Persons who thought that it was `very safe' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was in operation When shary'a was not in 
operation 
Economic % No. % No. 
status 
Didn't mention 38 95 12 30 249 
Poor 30 22 5 4 73 
Low 18 15 11 9 82 
Middle and 41 19 9 4 46 
high 
Total 34 151 10 47 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 8 
calculated chi square = 3.46 
D. F. =3 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 7.815 
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Q Employment Status And Concern About Safety 
.t 
Table 5.11 
Concern About Safety When shariy`a Was/Was Not In Operation 
All Respondents By Employment Status. 
Persons who thought that it was 'very safe' No. of 
When shariy'a was in operation When shariy'a was not in 
operation 
Respondents 
Employment 
status 
% No. % No. 
Government 
employee 
21 20 3 3 94 
Private business 39 70 11 20 181 
Manual 29 4 21 3 14 
Unemployed 44 41 10 9 94 
Retired 11 2 22 4 18 
Housewife 27 14 16 8 49 
Total 34 151 10 47 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 9 
Table 5.11 generally suggests that there are differences across all employment groups. 
However the divergence is most marked for; the unemployed 34% and the manual 
8%. But it is not known whether this is a significant difference or not because some 
of the numbers are very small. 
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Q Political Background And Concern About Safety 
Table 5.12 
Concern About Safety When shariy`a Was/Was Not In Operation. 
All Respondents By Political Background 
Persons who thought that It was `very safe' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was In operation When shariy`a was not in 
operation 
Political % No. % No. 
Category 
Islamic Front 60 35 7 4 58 
(1) Secular left 19 8 7 3 42 
groups 
(2) Other parties 28 37 14 19 134 
No Party 33 71 10 21 216 
Total 34 151 10 47 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 10 
(1) include The Communist and the Arab Nationalist Parties 
(2) include Umma, Democratic Union and National Union Parties 
calculated chi square = 7.4 
D. F. =3 
Critical level = 0.01 
Critical value = 11.34 
Table 5.12 suggests that: 
9 First, in all political categories more respondents reported that they had felt 
"very safe" when shariy`a was in operation than when it was not. 
" Second, as expected the difference is greater for the Islamic Front (60% as 
compared with 7%), and for the secular left groups (19% compared with 
7%). But generally the findings of Table 5.12 are not statistically significant 
(see Table). 
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0 Defensive Behaviour 
This section examines the influence of shariy`a on defensive behaviour undertaken in 
reaction to fear of victimisation. The hypothesis to be tested here is that shariy`a 
reduces reactive defensive behaviour resulting from fear of crime. 
Table 5.13 
Persons Undertaking Defensive Behaviour When shariy`a was/was not in 
Operation 
Whether When shariy`a was in operation When shariy`a was not in No. of 
undertaking operation Respondents 
defensive oho No. % No. behaviour? 
`Yes' defensive 59 265 75 339 
behaviour 
undertaken 
`No' defensive 41 185 25 111 
behaviour not 
undertaken 
Total 100 450 100 450 450 
calculated chi square = 28.5 
D. F. =1 
critical level = 0.001 
critical value = 3.8 
Table 5.13 suggests that: generally more defensive behaviour was undertaken when 
shariy`a was not in operation. Three quarters of the sample said that they had 
undertaken defensive behaviour compared with 59% when it was not in operation. 
This is a statistically significant result (see Table). Therefore this gives sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the research hypothesis, and hence the conclusion is that 
shariy'a had significantly reduced concern about defensive behaviour in relation to 
fear of victimisation. 
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Q Type Of Defensive Behaviour Mostly Undertaken 
Some of the survey respondents pointed out that they had been undertaking typical 
arrangements such as putting wire and glass on walls, more powerful light on outside 
doors a long time before the shariy`a. Consequently these are probably not reliable 
indicators of typical reactionary behaviour. A better indicator would be "stay in home 
at night" since it involves limitations of social activity undertaken at the actual periods 
in question. 
Table 5.14 
Type of Defensive Behaviour Undertaken When shariy`a Was/Was Not In 
Operation 
Persons undertaking defensive behaviour 
Type of defensive shariy a was in operation shariy`a was not in operation 
behaviour 
undertaken 
% No. % No. 
Stay home at night 32 146 41 185 
Keep watchdog at 18 80 23 105 
home 
Keep personal 28 128 34 155 
weapons at home 
Put more power- 22 99 34 151 
ful lights outdorrs 
Put barbed wire 22 101 29 131 
and glass on walls 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 11 
calculated chi square for `stay home at night' = 4.5 
D. F =1 
critical level = 0.05 
critical value = 3.8 
According to Table 5.14, a smaller proportion 32% of the sample showed that they 
tended to "stay at home at night" when shariy`a was in operation. This is a significant 
result (see Table). The conclusion hence is that shariy`a had significantly contributed 
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to the reduction of the tendency among the public to undertake defensive behaviour 
because of fear of victimisation. 
i 
Sub Groups Characteristics And Tendency To Undertake 
Defensive Behaviour 
Like other fear indicators, the tendency to undertake defensive behaviour has also 
revealed some differences for all sub group characteristics. The following examines 
whether these are of any significance. 
Q Gender, Age, Economic Status And The Tendency To Undertake Defensive 
Behaviour 
Table 5.15 to 18 presents the differences in the tendency to undertake defensive 
behaviour for gender, age, economic status and employment status. The findings for 
all these variables do not reveal statistically significant differences (see Tables). 
Table 5.15 
Defensive Behaviour when shariy`a was/was not in operation 
All Respondents By Gender 
Persons responding 'stay home at night' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was in operation When shariy`a was not in 
operation 
Sex % No. % No. 
Female 30 68 39 88 225 
Male 35 78 43 97 225 
Total 32 146 41 185 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 12 
calculated chi square = 0.09 
D. F. =1 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 3.84 
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Table 5.16 
Defensive Behaviour when shariy`a was\was not in operation 
All Respondents By Age 
Persons responding 'stay home at night' No. of 
When shariy`a was In operation When shariy`a was not in 
Respondents 
operation 
Age Category % No. % No. 
Under 30 31 101 41 134 330 
Over 30 38 45 43 51 120 
Total 32 146 41 185 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 13 
calculated chi square = 0.54 
D. F. =1 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 3.84 
Table 5.17 
Defensive Behaviour when shariy`a was\was not in operation 
All Respondents By Economic Status 
Persons responding 'stay home at night' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was In operation When shariy'a was not in 
operation 
Economic % No. % No. 
status 
Didn't mention 25 62 33 83 249 
Poor 36 26 45 33 73 
Law 48 39 55 45 82 
Middle and high 41 19 52 24 46 
Total 32 146 41 185 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 14 
calculated chi square for the middle and high = 0.59 
D. F. =1 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 3.841 
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Table 5.18 
Defensive Behaviour when shariy`a was\was not in operation 
All Respondents By Employment Status 
Persons responding 'stay home at night' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was in operation When shariy a was not in 
operation 
Employment % No. % No. 
status 
Government 44 41 51 48 94 
employee 
Private business 28 51 36 65 181 
Manual 21 3 29 4 14 
Unemployed 30 28 40 , 38 94 
Retired 39 7 44 8 18 
Housewife 33 16 45 22 49 
Total 32 146 41 185 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 15 
calculated chi square = 0.292 
D. F. =5 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 11.070 
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Q Political Background 
Table 5.19 
Concern About Defensive Behaviour when shariy`a was\was not in operation 
All Respondents By Political Background 
Persons responding 'stay home at night' No. of 
Respondents 
When shariy`a was in operation When shariy`a was not in 
operation 
Political % No. % No. 
Category 
(l) Secular 34 52 46 61 134 
right wing 
Islamic Front 24 14 46 27 58 
(2) Secular left 24 10 33 14 42 
wing 
No Party 32 70 38 83 216 
Total 32 146 41 185 450 
* Adapted from Appendix Table 16 
(1) include: National Union, Democratic Union and Umma Parties 
(2) include: The Communist and Arab Nationalist Parties 
calculated chi square = 2.13 
D. F. =3 
Critical level = 0.001 
Critical value = 16.268 
Table 5.19 suggests, the Islamic Front shows the most observable divergence from all 
the other political categories. However according to the statistical test this is not of 
any significance - (see Table). 
0 Understanding Fear Variability 
According to earlier research findings (western) it is suggested that patterns of fear 
are associated with different sub-groups characteristics. (Michael J. Hindelang, Mi- 
chael R. Colt, J. Redson, and James Jarofalo (1978), Riger and Gordon, (1981), Warr 
(1984) and (1985), chambers and Tombs, (1984), and Smith (1987). Most of these 
researchers explained fear variability across subgroup characteristics (mainly for age, 
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sex, economic status, and employment. ) on the basis of life chances and opportunities 
which might expose the individual more or less to high risk situations. 
In the case of the current results, diversity in fear across sub groups is not statistically 
significant. However, since there are very small numbers in some sub-groups, it is not 
known whether this lack of significance is due to the lack of any real differences or to 
the limitations of the sample. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, influence of shariy`a on public security in the Sudan has been examined 
in terms of three indicators of fear of crime, mainly involving concern with; (1) 
Seriousness of crime, (2) Safety of oneself, property and family members, and (3) 
Type of defensive behaviour undertaken to avoid expected victimisation. With each 
of the three indicators of fear, the analysis started with a very broad inquiry to answer 
the following questions: (1) How serious did people think crime was; (2) How did the 
respondents think about their own safety, property and family members?, and (3) 
whether they had taken any type of precaution because of expected victimisation. 
Taken together, the analysis of the findings related to each of the previous questions 
provide sufficient evidence that is in line with the expectations of this thesis. The 
conclusion, hence, is that; the shariy`a experiment in the Sudan had significantly 
deterred fear of crime in the community. 
Nonetheless, as the analysis showed, there are some differences in the way that the 
three indicators of fear are distributed across the different sub group characteristics. 
Some variability was shown when the data was broken down by gender, age, economic 
status, employment and respondents' political background. The application of the 
chi-square statistical test, however, showed that these are all insignificant. 
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Chapter_6 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
0 Shariy`a And Experience of Victimisation 
The an alysis of the findings presented and discussed in the previous chapter showed 
that Shariy`a application has generally resulted in lower levels of fear and concern 
about crime. This chapter turns to examine whether the application of specific types 
of punishment under shariy`a criminal policy has also shown in any way a correspond- 
ing decline in victimisation experience. The analysis involves data relating in particu- 
lar to certain types of victimisation incidents mainly ranging from robbery and 
burglary known as Satw, things taken under threat haraba in the Islamic Legal 
Terminology theft known as sariqa, and physical assault known as jarayim al nafs 
wal'aza. These represent a typical set of offences legally treated under hidud punish- 
ments, during the time when shariy`a was in full operation in the Sudan. Part of the 
information also relates to other minor offences, that might fall under descretionary 
punishment known as ta`aziyr in Islam. 
The data examines the influence of shariy`a criminal policy in the Sudan in terms of 
the following. 
Q Victimisation by legal offence type - hidud and gisas offences 
This includes two types as follows: 
" Personal Experience of Victimisation 
" Experience of Victimisation against other people in the Community 
(community victimisation). 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings 181 
Q Experience of additional victimisation incidents 
This also includes: 
" Personal experience 
" Experience of additional incidents against other people (community 
victimisation. ) 
Q Negative experience of victimisation 
This also includes two types of experience: 
" Personal experience 
" Experience of other people in the community (community victimisation). 
Finally the chapter closes with a general summary and discussion of the findings. 
0 Victimisation by Legal Offence Type 
0A house/shop broken into and property stolen - Saizv 
Q Personal Experience 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of the responses to the question was your house/shop 
broken into and property stolen? The question relates to a specific type of hidud 
offence known as Saw. This was punishable by the amputation of limbs alternately 
during Shariy`a experiment, in the Sudan. The evidence presented in the table reveals 
that for the majority of the respondents in the Sample - 83% when shariy`a was in 
operationversus 84.0%when shariy`a was not in operation, the answer to this question 
has been negative. 
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For the minority who answered `yes' there is no significant difference between the 
two periods (see table) 
Table 6.1 
Experience of victimization when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Personal Experience by Legal Offence Type 
Was your house/shop Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
broken into and property 
stolen? 
% No. % No. 
No 83 372 84 378 
Yes (date specified) 10 47 11 51 
Yes (date not specified) 7 31 5 21 
Total 100 450 100 450 
Chi square = 2.136 
D-F =2 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 5.991 
Q Community Victimisation Satw Against Other Persons in the Community 
In order to include as much victimisation as possible under the previous offence satw, 
the respondents were also asked whether they had experience of other people in the 
community who had been similarly victimised. 
Table 6.2 shows Experience of Burglary Victimisation Satw against other persons who 
are known to the respondents. It is revealed that for the great majority of the 
respondents (79% when shariy`a was in operation compared with 68% when it was 
not in operation) the answer was negative. 
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Table 6.2 
Experience of Community Victimisation when Shariy'a was/was not in operation 
Victimisation Against Other Persons Who Are Known to the 
Respondents by Legal Offence Type 
Did any one whom you Shariy'a was in operation Shariy'a was not in operation 
know has his/her % No. % No. house/shop broken into 
and property stolen? 
No 79 356 68 306 
Yes (date specified) 8 38 18 80 
Yes (date not specified) 12 56 14 64 
All 100 450 100 450 
chi square = 19-26 
d. f. =2 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 5.991 
On the other hand, for the rest whose response was positive, it was not certain to all 
of them when exactly those whom they know had a burglary victimisation Satw. 
In sum table 6.2 reveals that, while a large majority of the respondents said they don't 
know other people who had a burglary when shariy`a was in operation, more reported 
incidents of burglary against other people when shariy`a was not in operation than 
when it was. These differences are statistically significant (see table). 
0 Things Taken Under Threat - haraba 
Q Personal Experience 
The data on table 6.3 presents the respondents personal experience in relation to 
whether they had things taken under threat. The data relates to a hidud offence 
punishable either by death by way of hanging or by amputation of limbs when shariy`a 
was in operation. 
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Table 6.3 
Experience of Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Personal Experience by Legal Offence Type 
Did any one take things Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not In operation 
from you under threat? % No. % No. 
No 96 430 97 438 
Yes (date specified) 3 14 2 10 
Yes (date not specified) 1 6 0.4 2 
All 100 450 100 450 
chi square 
U. 
Critical Level 
Critical value 
= 2.74 
=2 
= 0.05 
= 5.991 
According to table 6.3, the findings reveal that for the greater majority, the response 
to the question was negative. 
For the smaller proportion to whom the answer for the question is positive a very 
slight difference is revealed between those who could specify when exactly they had 
haraba 3% to 2%, and those who could not 1% to 0.4% when shariy`a was/was not in 
operation. But these are not statistically significant (see table) 
Q Community Victimisation : haraba Against other Persons in the Community 
The previous question was repeated to examine whether the respondents have any 
knowledge of haraba victimisation in the community other than their own personal 
experience. 
As presented in table 6.4 for the great majority the response is negative. For the 
minority who did report knowledge of haraba victimisation there was no statistically 
significant difference for the two periods (see table). 
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Table 6.4 
Experience of Community Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Victimization Against Other Persons Who are Known to the 
Respondents by Legal Offence 
Did any one whom you Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
know had things taken % No. % No. 
under threat in this 
period? 
No 95 428 93 420 
Yes (date specified) 4 17 5 24 
Yes (date not specified) 1 5 1 6 
All 100 450 100 450 
chi square = 1.434 
d. f. =2 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 5.991 
In sum, the combination of the data onTable 6.3 and Table 6.4, lead to the conclusion 
that there is no evidence to support any influence of shariy`a in reducing victimisation 
in the case of burglary or haraba. 
0 Car Theft: 
Q Personal Experience 
Duringshariy`a experiment a typical hidud theft (which fulfils the legal requirements 
for the hadd) was punishable by cutting off the thief's hand from the wrist. 
Table 6.5 examines whether the application of such severe unforgettable punishment 
has had any effect on deterring criminal activity, in this particular case when shariy`a 
was in operation. The Table shows more reported car thefts when Shariy`a was in 
operation than when it was not (6% to 4%). But the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 6.5 
Experience of Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
i 
Personal Experience by Legal Offence 
Did you have a car? If Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
yes was lt stolen? % No. % No. 
Not applied (Did not 
have a car) 
58 261 54 244 
Not applied (had a car 
not stolen) 
36 164 41 186 
Applied (had a car 
stolen) 
6 25 4 20 
All 100 450 99 450 
chi square = 2.520 
d. f. =2 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 5.991 
Q Community victimisation : (Car Theft) Against other Persons in the Community 
Table 6.6 displays the responses about whether the respondents have any experience 
of victimisation against any other people who are known to them, in the case of car 
theft. The majority said they don't know of any one. 
For the smaller category in the sample who showed a positive response 2% when 
shariy'a was in operation to 5% when shariy`a was not in operation are able to tell 
when exactly this happened. However, a bit more of this category 6% when shariy`a 
was in operation to 7% when it was not in operation are not able to tell the exact date 
of the event. 
In general the overall reading of table 6.6 shows that in the case of car theft, the 
respondents claimed less experience of victimisation against other people when 
shariy`a was in operation. The difference is statistically significant (see table). 
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Table 6.6 
Experience of Community Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Victimisation Against Other Persons Who Are Known to the 
Respondents by Legal Offence 
Did any one whom you Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
know have a car stolen? % No. % No. 
No (don't know) 92 416 88 395 
Yes (date specified) 2 7 5 25 
Yes (date not specified) 6 27 7 30 
All 100 450 100 450 
chi square 
d. f. 
Critical Level 
Critical value 
= 10-845 
=2 
= 0.05 
= 5.991 
0 Physical assault and Injury - Al jurh zval'aza 
Q Personal Experience 
It has been pointed out earlier that when shariy`a was in operation, the punishment 
for a physical assault or injury against the person jarayim al nafs was retribution qisas. 
The offender had to undergo the same injury or physical loss he inflicted on his victim. 
However, if the victim or his relatives (in the case of death) wish, they or he might 
have compensation instead. Table 6.7 shows the data examining whether shariy`a 
experiment has had any effect in deterring criminality and therefore reducing victi- 
misation in this case. 
It is shown that the great majority (99% in the two periods), said they didn't have a 
personal experience of victimisation. Only 1% in the two periods said they have, 
therefore there is no significant difference in the two periods (see table). 
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Table 6.7 
Experience of Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Personal Experience by Legal Offence 
Were you assaulted and Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
physically injured by 
someonelsome people? 
% No. % No. 
No 99 444 99 445 
Yes (date specified) - 1 3 
No (date not specified) 1 6 0 2 
All 100 450 100 450 
chi square 
d. f. 
Critical Level 
Critical value 
= 2.502 
=2 
= 0.05 
= 5.991 
Q Experience against other persons in the community 
Table 6.8 presents the data in response to whether the respondents know any other 
people in the community who had a physical assault and injury. It is shown that; A 
bigger proportion (98% when shariy`a was in operation to 95% when it was not in 
operation) said they don't know of anyone. 
For the small proportion who said they know of some other people, a smaller 
proportion said they did when shariy`a was in operation than when shariy`a was not in 
operation. 
Table 6.8 reveals that; generally there was less reported victimisation of others when 
shariy`a was in operation than when shariy`a was not in operation. This difference is 
statistically significant. (see Table) 
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Table 6.8 
Experience of Community Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Victimisation Against Other Persons Who Are Known to the 
Respondents by Legal Offence. 
Was any one whom you Shariy`a was in operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
know assaulted and % No. % No. 
physically injured by 
someone/some people in 
this period? 
No 98 441 95 429 
Yes (date specified) 1 3 3 13 
Yes (date not specified) 1 6 2 8 
All 100 450 100 450 
chi square = 13-56 
d. f. =2 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 5.99 
U Experience of Additional Victimisation Incidents 
The previous analysis has only included a sample of offences that had been typically 
treated under hidud and qisas when shariy`a was in operation in the Sudan. However, 
as for the rest of other hidud and qisas offences (i. e. illicit Sexual Intercourse zina, 
Wine Drinkingshurb al Khamr, Apostasy ridda, and MurderAl gatl), it was explained 
earlier why those were not directly included in the questionnaire (see Chapter 4 on 
methods of research). 
In addition the influence of Shariy`a was examined to include any possible offences 
that occured outside the area of hidud and qisas. The respondents thus are requested 
to add further if they had any experiences of any more incidents of victimisation not 
included in the list, whether relating to themselves or the other people who are known 
to them in the community. The following analysis presents the findings in that regard. 
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Q Personal Experience of additional Cases of Victimisation 
Table 6.9 presents the personal experience of the respondents as to whether they had 
any victimisation incidents other than those mentioned in the list. The data revealed 
no statistically significant differences. 
Table 6.9 
Additional Experience of Victimisation when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Personal Experience. 
State of experience Shariy`a was In operation Shariy`a was not In operation 
% No. % No. 
No incident reported 95 428 92 416 
One incident reported 4 20 7 32 
Two incidents reported 0 2 0 2 
All 99 450 99 450 
chi square 
d. f. 
Critical Level 
Critical value 
= 0.17 
=1 
= 0.05 
= 3.841 
Q Experience of other cases of victimisation against persons who are known to the 
respondents 
Table 6.10 examines whether the respondents have any more experience of other 
incidents of victimisation in relation to other people who are known to them. The 
table shows that 7% reported such experience when Shariy`a was in operation, 
compared with 17% when it was not. This result is statistically significant suggesting 
that other people have more additional experience of victimisation when Shariy`a was 
not in operation.. 
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Table 6.10. 
Experience of Community Victimisation 
Additional Cases Against Other Persons who are Known to the 
Respondents. 
Whether more cases Shariy`a was In operation Shariy`a was not in operation 
known! % No. % No. 
No 93 420 83 374 
Yes 7 30 17 76 
All 100 450 100 450 
* derived from appendix Table 6-10.1 
chi square = 22.63 
d. f. =1 
Critical value (critical) = 3.84 
Critical level = 0.05 
Types of Additional experience of victimisation affecting 
other people 
Analysis of additional experience of victimisation showed that the respondents did 
not themselves have any experience of these crimes (i. e. drug abuse, rape and 
attempts, and other cases of sexual abuse). However they tended to report more 
experiences of these crimes on the part of other people who are known to them. It 
might be that, due to social stigma associated to such types of experience, people tend 
to report that experience of such cases is something removed from themselves, 
happening elsewhere to other people, but never to them. Hence it could be that 
reports on other people's experience in such cases are unreliable 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings 192 
Table 6.11 
Summary: Persons not victimised when Shariy`a was/was not in operation 
Persons Responding 'Not Applied' by Legal Offence Type 
Type of offence % Personal % community (against other 
people) 
Shariya was in Shariy`a was not Shari' a was in Shariy'a was not 
operation in operation operation in operation 
A house shop broken 83 84 79 68 
into and property stolen 
sates 
Things taken under 96 97 95 93 
threat Haraba 
*2 A car stolen theft 36 41 92 88 
physical assault and in. 99 99 98 95 
juryAljurh wal'aza 
Other not mentioned in 95 92 93 83 
the list 
* 1. adapted from tables 6.1,6.2,63,6.4,6.5,6.6,6.7,6.8,6.9 and 6.10 
*2. "not applied" for car theft includes only person who own cars. The result is in significant in this 
case 
0 Negative Experience in Victimisation 
Table 6.11 Summarises the findings for Tables 6.1 - to 6.10. The results generally 
suggest that in both periods the vast majority of people were not victimised. In both 
types of victimisation (personal and community experience of victimisation) at least 
2/3 were not victimised. The Table also suggests that (with the exception of car theft), 
more of the negative experience is marked for all the cases involving reports of other 
people in the community (community victimisation), and that the negative experience 
in this case is greater when shariy`a was in operation than when it was not. According 
to the previous analysis this was statistically significant. 
The details of Table 6.11 also suggest that there is more negative experience of 
victimisation in the cases of haraba, and physical assault and injury (both involving 
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individual contact with the offender). But as the analysis showed the difference 
between the two periods is particularly insignificant in the case of haraba. This could 
be due to the particular nature of this offence. According to police experts this offence 
most of the time involves more than one offender and is mostly committed in places 
where police resources are inadequate. Therefore, since, these offenders are less 
likely to get caught, the difference in punishment is likely to be less important. 
Q Diversity in the Negative Experience of Victimisation Against Other People in 
the Community 
Reporting of negative experience of victimisation in the community varies for all sub 
groups in the sample. The analysis examined the, possibility of some influence of 
selected sub-group characteristics (gender, age, education, economic status, employ- 
ment and political background), leading to such differences in experience.. None, of 
these variables however showed a significant effect (see tables 6.12 to 6.14 for gender, 
age and education). The findings for economic status, employment and political 
background are shown in Appendix Tables 6.15,6.16, and 6.17. 
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Table 6.12 
Negative Experience of Victimisation Against Other People in the Community 
% Responding "Not Applied"When Shariy`a was/was not in 
Operation 
All Respondents by Gender 
Negative experience by Female Male 
offense type Shari' a Shari' a % Shari' a Shari' a % 
was In was not In difference was In was not in difference 
operation operation operation operation 
No. No. No No 
A house/shop broken 185 146 17 171 160 5 
into and property stolen 
(Satw) 
Things taken under 209 211 1 219 209 4 
threat Haraba 
A car stolen sariqa 213 197 7 203 198 2 
Physical assault and in- 223 213 4 218 216 1 
juryAljurh wal'aza 
Other (not mentioned in 211 185 12 209 189 9 
the list) 
All 225 225 450 
1. Adapted from Appendix tables: 17,18,19,20,21 
Calculated chi- square for (F) = 3.1 
Calculated chi-square for (M) = 0.47 
d. f. =4 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 9.488 
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Table 6.13 
Negative Experience of Victimisation Against Other People in the Community. 
All Respondents by Age 
%Responding "Not Applied' When Shariy`a was/was not in 
Operation 
Negative experience by Under (. 30) Over (+30) 
offense type Sharry`a Shari' a % Shari' a Shariy`a % 
was in was not in difference was in was not in difference 
operation operation operation operation 
No. No. No No 
A house/shop broken 259 229 9 97 77 17 
into and property stolen 
Sann 
Things taken under 310 305 2 118 115 2 
threat Haraba 
A car stolen sariqa 302 292 4 114 103 1 
Physical assault and in- 322 316 2 119 113 5 
juryAlJurh wal'aza 
Other (not mentioned in 315 281 10 
L 105 93 10 
the list) 
All 330 120 450 
1. Adapted from Appendis tables: 22,23,24,25,26 
Calculated chi- square for (-30) = 1.526 
d. f =4 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 9.488 
Calculated chi square for (+ 30) = 1.371 
d. f =4 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 9.488 
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Table 6.14 
Negative Experience of Victimisation Against Other People in the Community. 
% Responding "Not Applied When Shariy`a was/was not in 
Operation 
All Respondents by Educational Status 
Negative experience by 1. Less than high school 2. High school and college 
offense type Shariya Shariya % Shary a Shariya % 
was In was not In difference was In was not In difference 
operation operation operation operation 
No. No. No No 
A house/shop broken 144 110 19 212 196 1 
into and property stolen 
Sates 
Things taken under 166 170 2 262 250 4 
threat Haraba 
A car stolen sariqa 171 154 10 245 241 2 
Physical assault and in- 170 166 2 271 263 3 
juryAljurh wal'aza 
Other (not mentioned in 165 148 9 255 226 11 
the list) 
All 175 275 450 
* Adapted from Appendix tables: 27,28,29,30,31 
Calculated chi- square for (1) = 3.24 
d. f. =4 
Critical Level = 0.05 
Critical value = 9.488 
Calculated chi square for (2) = 0.905 
d. f. =4 
Critical level = 0.05 
Critical value = 9.488 
Summary and Discussion of Findings 
This chapter aimed to examine whether the application of shariy`a had any influence 
in reducing criminal victimisation. The analysis involved a sample of offences legally 
treated under hidud and qisas systems of punishments. The offences include; 
house/shop burglary known as Satw, things taken under threat known as haraba, theft 
known as sariga and physical assault and injury known asjarayim al nafs wal'aza, in 
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the Islamic Terminology. Some other offences that have no punishment prescribed 
in the Qur'an or Sunna; 'ta`aziyr were also considered. 
Findings of the Examination of the influence of shariy`a on experimental observation 
of victimisation experience reveals the following: 
" In both periods most people were not victims of any of the types of offences 
examined. The findings thus suggest that generally there was little criminal 
activity in the society as a whole. This suggests that Sudan is generally a law 
abiding society. 
" Individuals on the whole, didn't themselves report any significant increase 
in experience of victimisation when shariy`a was not in operation. However 
they did report more victimisation of people known to them. This finding 
will be considered in the duscussion later. 
" The greatest difference between the two periods in terms of respondents 
reports of people known to them not being victimised, was for burglarlysatw. 
The evidence showed less criminal activity when Shariy`a was in operation 
for this particular offence. 
However in both periods, the level of reported victimisation was lowest for this 
offence. Probably this could be because in this type of victimisation offenders are 
more at risk to be caught and taken to court. On the other hand experience reports 
of other people not victimised, showed less differences between the two periods in 
two cases namely; haraba (things taken under threat), and physical assault and injury 
AI jurh wal'aza. The evidence however was particularly insignificant in the case of 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings 198 
E2rraba. This suggests that the severity of the punishment when Shariy`a was in 
operation had no effect in this particular case. 
" Additional experience of victimisation included certain cases; (i. e. drug 
abuse, rape and attempts, and other sort of sexual abuse). These were 
mentioned only as part of other people's experience but never of the 
individuals themselves. However, as pointed out earlier in such cases the 
reliability of the information is suspect. 
Q Discussion 
Evidence has been presented in this chapter that suggests the following: - 
The evidence tends to show that, as reflected in the actual experience of victimisation 
reports, generally the fear of crime in the society was much exaggerated when 
compared with reality. The evidence has also tended to show that reported increases 
in victimisation experience when shariy`a was not in operation was something not 
actually related to the personal experience of the individuals, but rather that it was 
happening to other people in the community. This, of course, is not technically 
possible. For any given community, the individuals who make up that comunity, and 
--the. -individuals-known to-them-are--ultimately- the-same- people. Hence; - the- latter --- -- -- - 
cannot experience an increase in victimisation without the former also doing so. 
The possible explanation of such finding then would be that reports of other people's 
experience are not direct reflections of respondents knowledge about actual events 
but more likely a reflection of their belief about shariy`a law in the previous chapter 
(i. e. that it was much safer whenshariy`a was in operation. ) In other words, this might 
suggest that the findings in the previous chapter, that people believed it was much 
safer under shariy`a could be a belief based on (hearsay) about experience of other 
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people rather than on their own actual personal experience. It is suggested that, 
'people might form a subjective probability of being victimised from the experiences of 
other people, " (Hindelang 1978: 180). 
Earlier western research findings on victimisation experience, safety and fear of 
crime, suggests that certain population groups and cities show higher levels of fear of 
crime but lower measured victimisation rates (Steven Balkin 1979, Hindelang 1978, 
Jock Young and R. I. Mawby both included in Mike Maunguire and John Pointing 
1988, Richard F. Sparks, Hazel G. Genn, and David J. Dodd 1977). Balkin (1979) 
postulated a model of how victimisation rates, safety, and fear of crime interrelate. 
The model suggests that the apparent inconsistency between fear and victimisation 
rates can happen because certain groups that do have higher "real" risks of victimis- 
ation expose themselves less to crime and hence show lower measured victimisation 
rates. Balkin argues that fear of crime is a rational response to the actual incidence 
of crime, and that where discrepancies appear it is because of faulty "objective" 
measures of crime incorrectly calibrating the real risk of crime. (Balkin 1979: 343). 
The model demonstrates that fear of crime has correlations with victimisation rates 
adjusted for exposure, and that exposure appears to be negatively related to fear of 
______. crime_(lbd), 
ýExplanationof_this_relationship 
. suggests_that_anenvironment. may. 
be. soa_ 
unsafe that when the real risk to crime increases, people lock themselves inside their 
fortresses to such an extent that the measured victimisation falls. Hence, the model 
further suggests that the unusual victimisation rates are not the correct calibrators of 
safety, and that safety has to be defined as a probability of victimisation per exposure 
to risk (lbd). "Both victimisation rates and reported crime rates potentially fail to 
calibrate safety because neither accounts for differing exposure to crime" (Boggs, 1966, 
Matlz, 1972, cited by Balkin, 1978: 344. ) 
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In this study the fact that the respondents reported no significant increase in their 
own experience of victimisation when shariy`a was not in operation, while thinking it 
was less safe during this period may fit the exposure model hypothesis. 
For certain individual cases, i. e. haraba the findings suggest that despite the extreme 
severity of punishment for this offence, shariy`a, particularly did not show any signi- 
ficant difference in either types of experience (both of individuals own experience, 
and of other people as well). The evidence also suggests that this offence reflects the 
most common experience of victimisation in either periods. According to police 
records Haraba normally occurs in isolated places where the police resources are 
limited or probably not available. It is also reported that in the case of Jsaraba 
normally more than one offender is involved. Both condition makes the possibility of 
arrest uncertain. Hence it becomes reasonable to assume that in this particular case, 
the severity of punishment alone might have little consistent or independent effect. 
Charles R. Tittle and Alan R. Rowe, (1974) came to the conclusion that support an 
independent influence of sanctions in generating conformity, but added further that 
certainty of punishment is not the only, nor even perhaps the most important variable 
(Charles Tittle, Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates, 1974; 451). The authors sug- 
__. _ 
Bested a significant co-relation between certainty of -arrest-and crime ratet 
According 
__.. - 
to this thesis this could be because certainty of arrest leads to legal sanctions. 
Otherwise certainty of arrest by itself might have little role in generating conformity. 
Reports on the additional experiences of other people suggest that the influence of 
shariy'a was particularly unpredictable for those cases involving stigma and social 
degradation i. e. drug abuse, rape and attempts and other sorts of sexual abuse. This 
is probably because the individuals would be unwilling to admit that they had been 
subject to any of these stigmatising events at any time. 
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And finally taking all the findings together with great caution, the evidence suggests 
that assessment of the deterrent effect of shariy`a as a legal machinery is a rather 
complex task. The capacity of shariy`a as a system of Law must account for all the inter 
related variables and processes affecting the conformity - deviance behaviour. For 
example any careful understanding of the issue should consider the complex pattern 
of relationships between conformity, Law breaking, severity of punishment and 
certainty of Arrest, as part of the legal machinery. On the other hand the complexity 
of this pattern also require careful understanding of other social patterns of reactions 
involving the victim, the offender, and the nature of victimisation. 
To conclude with the previous warning in mind, the findings in this chapter suggest 
that there was no difference in personal victimisation in the two periods. This appears 
to be incompatible with the findings in the previous chapters, where respondents 
reported feeling safer, and that there was less concern about, crime under shariy'a. 
This incompatibility will be discussed in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
The objectives of this concluding chapter are: (1) to give an overview of the study and 
summary of findings; (2) to discuss the findings; and (3) to point out the contribution 
and the implications of the study for future background data and policy recommen- 
dations. 
0 Overview 
In this thesis the plan was to carry out an empirical assessment of Sudan's experiment 
involving the application of the Islamic system of Punishments known as Al hidud wal 
qisas. The experiment was operated by Numaryi (The former President of the Sudan). 
Numaryi and his regime had to survive increasing political pressure demanding the 
application of shariy`a (Islamic Law) as a broad reform affecting politics, the economy 
and society. However, in addition, the claim was made for its specific effect as a 
deterrent against crime and therefore conductive to security in society. 
Hence, primarily basing my research on work on a theory of deterrence, the major 
assumption of this thesis was that it was anticipated that the shariy`a would produce 
a climate favourable to public security by deterring criminality in society. 
The analysis examined data designed to elicit information concerning perceptions of 
crime and security, as well as the actual experience of victimisation by means of a 
victim survey applied to a sample of respondents obtained from the Sudan's national 
capital - Khartum. The findings related to two reference periods in the Sudan (when 
shariy'a was in operation and when it was not) are summarised in the following. 
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0 Summary of Findings and Main Result 
The statistical analysis of the data on fear indicators and the actual experience of 
i 
victimisation suggests that: 
9 Generally there was less fear and more feeling of security when the shariy`a 
was in operation, and that there was more fear and less feeling of safety when 
it was not. 
" In terms of actual experience of victimisation, it was generally suggested that 
the image of crime was much exaggerated in the community compared with 
reality. In both periods the experience of victimisation was mostly negative 
for all the types of victimisation examined. 
9 When shariy`a was not in operation, respondents did not show an increase 
in victimisation in terms of their own experience. However they 
paradoxically reported more experience of victimisation by persons known 
to them. 
9 With both types of experience, the difference in victimisation varied slightly 
by individual cases. The imposition of shariy`a had no observable difference 
in the case of haraba (things taken under threat), particularly. 
" Respondents did not report any personal experience of cases such as rape 
and attempted rape, and other cases of sexual and drug abuse. However, 
they did report knowledge of such incidents among people known to them. 
Taking the above findings together, the main incompatibility of the data was that 
though the imposition of the shariy`a in the Sudan effected a climate favourable for 
a better feeling of safety and security, this was not reflected in an observable decline 
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in terms of individual's own experience of victimisation incidents. But this result is 
not to be generalised beyond the scope of the time, place, conditions and associated 
problems of method. The following limitations and erroneous sources of unknown 
biaswould have considerable effect on the assessment of the "deterability" ofshariy`a: 
(1) The political upheaval behind the experiment; (2) Representativeness of the 
sample; (3) Recall and telescoping of backdated incidents; (4) Reliability in certain 
types of information; and (5) The short dominance of the shariy`a programme (only 
five months from April 1984 - declaration of the state of emergency to September 
1984 - lifting of the state of emergency). 
0 Discussion of Findings 
As far as the "deterability" of shariy`a was concerned in this thesis the following 
observations are very important in understanding the incompatibility of the findings. 
There are six different ways to explain this. 
(i) The first, and most obvious is that shariy`a was mainly operated in response to 
an increasing political upheaval claiming Islamisation of all the economic, 
political, and social aspects of the society. Hence, the emergency situation in 
which it was applied means that in a way it was a special case and not actually 
an emergency response to a crime problem in the society. More support for this 
fact was even shown by the survey findings where it was generally revealed that 
the incidence of victimisation was very low in reality. This might explain why 
the effect of shariy`a on actual victimisation was not observable. 
It is also misleading to assess the effect of shariy`a on the base of the urgent 
political events that led to its application. As a religious system of punishment 
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shariy'a must be viewed as part of Islam's whole scheme of reform which 
encompasses the totality of human life in society. Punishment within such a 
structure works as part of a set of integral sub-systems (i. e. educational, political 
and economic), all based on belief and fear of God and working in harmony for 
enforcement of the "good individual" and the "good society". In such a structure 
an inter-relationship exists between the individual and the society. Provided 
with a free will to choose it is the individual's belief and fear of God that 
encourages him to refrain from what displeases God, and hence behave in 
accordance with his teachings in society. Hence punishment is not the only 
means for the achievement of reform. Rather it is the last vehicle when all other 
educational ways fail to adapt the individual to the right conduct. Perhaps the 
assessment of shariy`a would be more objectively observed if the experiment 
was applied within a social structure that fully enforces its moralistic and belief 
values. It also might need a longer time until a noticeable change of behaviour 
can be observed (i. e. in the case of crime and victimisation). In fact shariy'a was 
operated for a short period of time (only five months)and at a time when the 
country was suffering from economic, social and political unrest. 
(ii) Secondly, it is possible that people's belief about personal safety and security 
are more affected by what is being done about crime than it is by their actual 
experience as victims of crime. This means that such a feeling is probably a 
reflection of the individual's inner feeling that certain laws exist which are 
believed to protect and secure their basic values and interests. According to 
sociologists, Law, as a necessary means of social control, involves two kinds of 
effect: (a) The material effect. This involves the negative sanctions imposed by 
the law on those who violate the norm; and (b) the psychological effect, 
Summary, Conclusions and Implications 206 
involving the connection between laws and certain inner beliefs and feelings of 
those who are affected by them. Hence it might be that the association of the 
two effects (in the case of shariy`a in the Sudan) created a common sense that 
the existing laws satisfied their need for a better feeling of safety and security. 
To achieve this end, despite any failure of the effect of legal sanctions to deter 
the incidence of crime, is in itself a successful goal of the law. As has been 
documented earlier in this thesis, the cost of security in terms of the necessary 
arrangements and precautions to protect one's home, property, etc., far exceeds 
the cost of crime and victimisation in terms of the actual events and losses 
suffered. 
(iii) Thirdly, an alternative possibility is that the individual's image and perceptions 
of crime are probably affected by hearsay about experiences of other victims 
despite their own experiences. Hence individuals might form a subjective 
impression of the probability of being victimised from what they hear about 
other people's experience. This means that fear of crime can spread in the 
society due to concern about the subject of crime only. Consequently, it can be 
inferred that in a law abiding society like the Sudan, news about a single event 
of a burglary might produce tensions and worry within every individual in every 
house in a neighbourhood. 
(iv) Fourthly, some faulty "objectives" measures might have affected the data. A 
number of western research findings - namely those cited in the last chapter - 
by Steven Balkin, Hindelang, Jack Young and R. I. Mawby, Richard F. Sparks, 
Hazel C. Conn, and David J. Dodd, have all found in common with this study 
an inverse relationship between fear of crime and the actual incidence of 
victimisation (i. e. the higher the level of fear, the lower the level of crime). 
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Balkin (1979) explains this in terms of the faulty "objectives" measures affecting 
victimisation statistics. He argues that fear of crime is a rational response to 
actual incidence of crime, and that victimisation rates, safety and fear of crime 
interrelate. Ballein suggests the following model: Fear of crime has more 
correlation with rates of victimisation adjusted for exposure, and that exposure 
and fear of crime are negatively related. This has been explained as follows: 
'An environment may be so unsafe that when the real risk to crime increases, people 
lock themselves in their fortress'to such an extent that the measured victimisation 
falls" (Ibid: 343). Accordingly, safety is defined as "a probability of victimisation 
per exposure to risk" (Ibid). Balkin cited Boggs (1966), and Maltz (172) as 
supporting the same argument. 
Consequently, the exposure model may help to explain the inconsistency be- 
tween fear and victimisation statistics found in this study. 
(v) Fifthly, perhaps the "deterability" of shariy`a can be understood within the 
inter-dependency of the legal machinery as a whole. For example, increasing 
the severity of punishment alone might be useless without increasing the 
certainty of arrest. Also, certainty of arrest should not be understood apart from 
the legal machinery as a whole. According to this thesis, without the threat of 
legal sanctions certainty of arrest alone might not affect conformity. It is argued 
that 'Arrest is not a pure sanction" and that "If higher arrest rates are achieved by 
arresting the suspect on the basis of weak evidence that will not stand up in court 
- with more dismissals as the consequence - the net effect could be to nullify any 
crime prevention effect due to arrest alone" (Greenberg and others, 1979: 849). 
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On the other hand, the certainty of arrest can be mitigated by the efficiency of 
the police role in three ways: (i) Limitations on the size of the police force; (ii) 
Lack of efficient means such as communication, transportation, and advanced 
means of crime detection; and (iii) Corruption and inadequate role-training. In 
addition, in the case of shariy`a in the Sudan certainty of arrest might be reduced 
by the nature of certain crimes and offenders, i. e. haraba and satw both of which 
involve violence. According to police experts the event of haraba normally 
occurs in isolated places where police resources are limited or probably not 
available. On the other hand both satw and haraba, normally involve more than 
one offender who are in most cases better equipped with efficient weapons and 
facilities than the police. In both cases offenders are more likely to assault their 
victims with little possibility of getting caught. 
(vi) Finally, the findings suggest that, in certain cases, the reliability of the informa- 
tion might be questionable. This suggests that the "deterability" of shariy`a might 
be unpredictable mainly for those cases involving socially stigmatising effects, 
(i. e. rape and other sexual abuses). Also, for such cases the certainty of punish- 
ment is restricted by the strict rules of evidence required for conviction. 
On the basis of the above, the assessment of shariy`a in this thesis suggests that it's 
influence is not a touchstone for explaining deterability. The findings can be seen in 
line with what has been inferred earlier from western research and literature showing 
no conclusive evidence for or against "deterrence". 
0 What Contribution this Thesis Provides 
Whilst the findings of the current study are not conclusive, they do have significant 
implications both for policy makers and interested future researchers. An important 
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contribution of the results obtained is that they offer a useful background for a better 
understanding of the research issues. 
As for policy purposes the data suggests that as far as the "deterability" of Shariy`a is 
concerned, policy questions should consider a number of matters concerning the 
police role in controlling crime and achieving security in the community. 
The empirical evidence presented and discussed in this study provides a useful 
background for more elaborate future research. It prepares the way at least to avoid 
the limitations and criticisms of the current study. This is an importantway to promote 
our knowledge about the phenomenon affecting our social life. It might be that the 
citizens have a general idea about the "deterability" of Shariy`a but this has never been 
formulated in such a way that more plausible assumptions can be articulated. It is 
therefore necessary to explore further the assumptions that can more accurately 
quantify the relationship between the incidence of crime and Shariy`a criminal policy. 
It seems that specifications of the mechanisms and variables by which the "detera- 
bility" of Shariy`a can be understood is only possible by work toward obtaining more 
data. The quantity and quality of the data currently available for empirical investiga- 
tion is at the moment inadequate for achieving this purpose. 
On the basis of the above, this thesis specifies the following as imperative recommen- 
dations both for policy purposes and further research and data requirements. 
0 Research and Policy Recommendations to Sudan 
In this area a number of issues which might have significant effects on the `deterability' 
of Shariy`a are awaiting exploration. The most important need by far is for more 
accurate quantitative measures of crime and victimisation. For this purpose data 
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should be obtained in such a way to account for the various components of societal 
reaction to crime and victimisation. 
" Though it might seem difficult to measure the real victimisation rate to assess 
safety, it is not impossible to generate reasonably accurate victimisation statistics, 
This study recommends `the exposure model' (the model relates to Balkin, 1979, 
and was mentioned in chapter six), as a useful technique for this purpose. Balkin 
suggests: 
"Exposure to crime could be measured by using a periodic survey of random 
samples of a community's population, with a set of questions about exposure 
to crime. An exposure index could be created which when multiplied by the 
population sue, could serve as the denominator of the real victimisation rate. 
If such a denominator can not be developed, at least one could inquire, using 
such a survey, whether exposure had changed when the reported crime rate 
changed - if exposure had not changed, then the changes in the real victimis- 
ation rate would be reflected in changes of the reported nominal victimisation 
rate in the same direction. " (Steven Balkin, 1979: 353). 
This model can be adapted to examine the relationship between victimisation, 
exposure, and change in the existing penal system. 
" Critical to an accurate standardisation of crime rates is the way in which victims 
may in part determine the distribution of crime. It can be hypothesised that; the 
distribution of chances of being a victim of crime is to a great extent a function of 
the amount and frequency of contact between potential victims and offenders. For 
further explanatory purposes, more survey data might need to raise the following 
inquiries: Who are the people most at risk? Where are they located? What type 
of common activity do they do?... etc. At the descriptive level such data are 
essential for the understanding of patterns of interaction which criminal 
victimisation might tend to follow. In another way, understanding of such 
`opportunity structures' will also be of practical use to the police authorities. Since 
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the risk of victimisation is not randomly distributed in the population `opportunity' 
can provide good information about the most risky people, places, and times. This 
can guide police strategies to locate more resources where most protection is 
needed. 
" As far as the deterability of Shariy`a is concerned future research should consider 
a number of issues related to offenders. For example, systematic research can be 
planned to obtain information about: To what extent actual offenders have 
previous information about the sanctions applied to them? Who are they? What 
motivates them to violate the law? and in what situations do they commit violative 
acts (i. e. physical ability, state of mind in terms of drunkenness, mental 
disturbance etc. ). Offenders can also be classified by the type of individual cases. 
Such analysis of individual cases might need to answer whether certain offenders 
tend to commit certain offences (i. e. whether there is any pattern for offending). 
" An important area to be mentioned, however, on which data is needed involves 
the relationship between crime and Shariy`a as a criminal justice system. Research 
plans need to be carried out in order to study this aspect of the process in detail. 
To learn exactly what type of victimisation incidents might particularly be 
undeterrable such as in the case of haraba and Satw. How are these handled by 
the police? And whether and how such incidents might effect the system input 
load. 
" For most people, the policeman is known as the protector of the law. He is 
expected to uphold the law and keep the peace. Hence, assessment of the 
`deterability' of Shariy`a in the future might involve policy questions such as the 
deterrent impact of police power. Data is needed to assess different problems 
affecting the police role. For example, empirical resources must be devoted to the 
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development of reasonably accurate arrest and crime measures by following 
individual cases through courts. In this area research is required to deal with a 
number of problems affecting the police role in law enforcement: (i) There is a 
need to develop techniques to discover patterns of corruption within the police; 
(ii) reaction of the police when confronted by danger and serious situations; (iii) 
attitudes of the community to the police, i. e. (how do people respect the police? 
to what extent does the existence of the police in the street generate fear? What 
sort of interaction normally exists between common people and the policeman 
while he is performing his duty? ); and finally the type of training and qualifications 
made available by the police administration. Explanation of such issues would 
provide an idea about the role of the police in enforcement of the legal machinery. 
Q Policy Recommendations 
For the purpose of policy decisions this thesis concludes that; proposals focusing on 
reducing crime by the imposition and carrying out of severe sanctions only (such as 
in the case of Shariy`a in the Sudan) may have little observable influence, unless all 
other aspects of law enforcement are improved. There is a need for reform, promo- 
tion, and better achievement in the following areas: 
" The police 
As has been suggested by the United Nations International Code of Police Ethics, 
the role of the police is to prevent breaking of the law by means of apprehension and 
prosecution of Those who do. This is to suggest that promotion of the police efficiency 
can achieve two benefits: (i) firstly it functions to maintain order and security under 
the law, and (ii) secondly, an important consequence that follows is that less severe 
sanctions will need to be inflicted since few law breakers are taken to courts. 
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However, improvement of the efficiency of the police role may not only require more 
of the individuals who work in the service, but rather it seems that increased efficiency 
in law enforcement on the part of the police could be achieved by better role 
understanding and commitment - this can be accomplished by the following: 
" Training 
" All police officers and men should hold in common with magistrates, judges, and 
lawyers, a legal training programme, based on the ethics and principles of the legal 
system in which they perform their duties. In addition, a police `code of ethics' 
should apply to all members of the police force engaged at any stage of enforcing 
the law; maintaining order, watching aggressive activity in the community, or 
investigating violations. The code should include a clear responsibility for acts of 
commission or omission in contradiction with the principles and ethics of the job. 
9 Evolution in methods of crime commission require the introduction of better 
methods of crime detection and control to be made available. As well, a highly 
intensive, experiential training course should be established, especially in the 
sophisticated use of more advanced technical devices (i. e. electronic equipment 
of communication, information and detection). 
" The need for priorities in the protection and security of the citizenry, perhaps in 
isolated areas where serious crimes mostly happen (i. e. haraba and Satw). A 
specialised force of `Security Guards'should be established to respond to the need 
of security in such areas. The need for such police surrogates is just as vital as the 
need for those police operations in the urban centres (i. e. in factories, retail 
businesses, schools etc. ). If well trained and supervised, these guards can 
contribute to control of urban crime. 
Summary, Conclusions and Implications 214 
" With the exception of those who occupy the higher administrative levels (officers 
and top leaders), the police profession includes individuals who are for the most 
part under-educated. Vocational admission, at the lower ranks tends to include 
individuals with low educational attainment. This may be because work in the 
police is not an attractive job. This problem might have a significant effect on the 
level of training to be offered. 
Perhaps, effective training should require the creation of a new conception of "the 
police social role', particularly in such courses concerned with law and order, socio- 
logy and psychology of crime. To achieve this objective of necessary vocational 
training, there should be a minimum educational background, not less than a success- 
ful completion of high school. 
" Police Status 
At the lower ranks of the service, policemen make many sacrifices in both their 
physical and social lives: They are exposed to all riots and trouble-makers, may get 
shot during a robbery or haraba situation and spend most of their time outside of 
their homes. In return, this category is paid minimal wages. In addition, no social 
security plans are guaranteed for their families. The expected consequence of this 
situation is that such depressing financial and social status might result in a more 
negative role by this category. Unless conditions of the police are improved, there is 
every excuse and many avenues for police corruption. Hence, this thesis strongly 
recommends promotion of the financial and social status of the policemen as follows: 
(i) Payments should not be less than the rising cost of living at any time; (ii) Housing, 
education and health care should all be improved for the families; (iii) Achievement 
should continuously be encouraged by incentives, i. e. promotions, medals, etc.; (iv) 
Good social security plans should be guaranteed for the families; and finally (v) in 
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terms of uniform, the appearance of the policeman should imply to the public a sense 
of authority and respect. 
Q Research and Information 
Police strategies for community protection should consider the developments and 
changes affecting social life. Funds should be allocated to fulfil the requirements of 
periodic research to trace the evolution of crime. The current effort of the criminal 
statistics unit at the police headquarters can have little use for explanatory purposes. 
The activity of this unit needs to be expanded and supported by qualified social 
researchers who can carry out future plans for more scientific research on crime. 
Part of the police strategies should deal with providing the citizens with information 
about crime. The police department can include information units to provide regular 
reports through the media about where and when most of the serious crimes occur. 
This can have two benefits: (i) Help the public to be aware of the risk of times, places 
and people, and (ii) provide another way of reducing crime. 
Q Moral Citizenry Education 
Strategies of crime control are not only the responsibility of the legal system. Law is 
but one aspect of regulating conduct in the society. Along with the effort of the law, 
many educational institutions in the society (i. e. the family, schools, religious institu- 
tions, the media) should contribute to the conception of `the good citizen'. Consid- 
erable influence of such institutions is expected if they are all directed towards the 
goals of the existing ethic. 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire: Survey of Criminal Victimization 
in Sudan (Khartoum) 
September 1983 - September 1985 
Form No. 
A Area: City: 
Contacted and completed 
Contacted but not completed 
Not contacted 
Note: 
We would like to take some of your time to answer the following questions 
contained in this form. We appreciate your co-operation and we would also 
like to let you know that the information contained here is absolutely 
confidential and mainly for scientific use. 
Interviewer: 
Fill in for all respondents please and indicate response by checking [] 
Demographic Data: - 
A-1 Sex: 
A-2 Age: 
A-3 Education: 
A-4 Place of Residence: 
Male [] 
Female [] 
20-30 [] 
30-40 [] 
40 - 50 [] 
50-60 [] 
60+ [] 
Illiterate [] 
Elementary [] 
Intermediate [] 
High School [] 
College [] 
Specify what area 
Khartoum [] 
Omdurman [] 
Khartoum North (Bahri) [] 
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A-5 Type of work: Government employee [] 
Private Business [] 
Manual [] 
Unemployed [] 
Retired [] 
Other (specify) [] 
A-6 Income: Specify amount/month 
A-7 Type of residence: Owned [] 
Rented [] 
A-8 For how long have you been living here? 
2-3 years [] 
3-5"[l 
5-6" [] 
more than six [] 
moved recently [] 
Past experience with Criminal victimization: - 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about your past experience of 
criminal victimization in this area. I am interested to know about your 
experience from September 1983 (just following the big celebration of wine 
distruction and the release of prisoners by President Numeri) to September 
1984 (end of the emergency courts). 
B-1 Just thinking about this period (September 1983 - September 1984) do you 
think crime was a serious; quite serious; not at all serious; problem in this 
area? 
Serious [ 
Quite serious [] 
Not at all serious [] 
B-2 On the basis of your previous experience during this period how was your 
feelings about the safety of your own self; family members; and property in 
this area? 
Very safe [] 
Safe [] 
Not safe [] 
Very unsafe [] 
Do not know [] 
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B-3 What type of the following precautions did you feel needed to avoid 
expected victimization? 
Stay in home at night [] 
Keep wasch dog at home [] 
Keep personal weapons [] 
Put higher light on outdoor [] 
Put barbed wire and glass on walls [] 
None of the above [] 
Now I would like you to go back with your memory to recall some of the 
specific incidents that might have happened to you during that period 
(September 1983 - September 1984). 
Interviewer: (Allow enough time to permit respondent to remember some 
of the important events during that period, then continue -) 
Check from the following list any incidents that happened to you during that 
period. Please take your time and think carefully about each incident, then 
if you remember anything which happened to you that fits the description 
just mention it, and show when, and whether it happened only once, twice, 
or more. 
B-9 Did anything else serious happen to you which is not mentioned here? 
Yes [] 
No [] 
Do not know [] 
B-10 If yes please describe briefly but accurately some of the incidents that 
happened to you which are not mentioned above. 
Interviewer. (Briefly record description of each incident separately) 
month Year 
Incident (1) 
Incident (2) 
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Incident (3) 
Total of incidents 
B-11 Can you remember whether anyone else whom you know was affected by 
any similar incidents during the previous period? 
Yes [J 
No [ 
If yes please check from the same list a typical crime that happened to 
anyone whom you personally know. It is not important to mention to whom 
it happened, the most important thing is to be sure of its occurrence. 
B-12 Did anyone whom you know 
have his/her house broken into 
and property stolen? 
B-13 Did anyone whom you know 
have things taken under threat? 
B-14 Did anyone whom you know 
have a car which was stolen? 
B-15 Was anyone whom you know 
assaulted and physically 
injured by someone/some 
people? 
B-16 Did anything else serious 
happen to anyone whom you 
know which is not mentioned 
here? 
month year once twice more 
[] [] [] [] [] 
[] [] [l [l [] 
Yes [] 
No [] 
do not [] 
know 
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B-17 If Yes Interviewer. (Record briefly description of other incidents not 
mentioned in the list) 
month year 
Incident (1) 
Incident (2) 
Incident (3) 
Total of incident 
This time I would like you to think about a different period. I am interested to 
know about criminal victimization in this area from September 1984 (end of 
emergency courts) to September 1985 (the first six months of the transitional 
government of General Swar al Dahab and Dr. EI jezoli Dafa alla). 
B-18 Just thinking about this period (Sept. 1984 - Sept 1985) do you think crime 
was a serious, quite serious, not at all serious problem in this area? 
Serious [] 
Quite serious [] 
Not at all serious [] 
B-19 On the basis of your previous experience during this period how was your 
feelings about the safety of your own self, family members, and property in 
this area? 
Very safe [] 
Safe [] 
Not safe [] 
Very Unsafe [] 
Not known [] 
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B-20 What type of the following precautions did you feel you needed to avoid 
expected victimization during his period? 
Stay in home at night [] 
Keep watchdog at home [] 
Keep personal weapons [] 
Put higher light on out door [] 
Put barbed wire and glass on walls [] 
None of the above [] 
Now I would like to know whether any of the previously mentioned incidents 
happened to you sometime between September 1984 (end of emergency 
courts) to September 1985 (the first six months of the transitional govern- 
ment of Genral Swar El Dahab and Dr. Jizulie Dafa alla). 
Interviewer: (Allow enough time to permit respondent to remember what 
happened to him during this period then check on the list any incident he 
mentions). 
B-21 Was your house/shop 
broken into and property 
stolen? 
month year once twice more 
[] [] [] [] [] 
B-22 Did anyone take things 
from you under threat? 
[] [] [] [] [] 
B-23 Did you have a car? 
Yes [] 
No [] 
B-24 If Yes was it stolen? 
Yes [] 
No [] 
B-25 Were you assaulted and 
physically injured by 
someone/some people? 
month year once twice more 
[I [] [] [] [] 
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B-26 Did anything else serious happen to you which is not mentioned here? 
Yes [J 
No [] 
It 
B-27 If yes please describe briefly but accurately some of the incidents that 
happened to you which are not mentioned above. 
Interviewer: (Briefly record description of each incident separately). 
month year 
Incident (1) 
Incident (2) 
Incident (3) 
Total of incidents 
B-28 Can you remember whether anyone else whom you know was affected by 
any similar incidents during the previous period? 
Yes [] 
No [] 
If yes please check from the same list a typical crime that happened to 
anyone whom you personally know. It is not important to mention to whom 
it happened, the most important thing is to be sure of its occurrence. 
B-29 Did anyone whom you 
know have his/her 
shop/house broken into 
and property taken? 
month year once twice more 
[1 [1 [1 [1 [l 
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B-30 Did anyone whom you 
know have things taken 
under threat? 
[l [] [] [] [] 
B-31 Did any one whom you 
know have a car which 
was tolen? 
[] [] [] [] [] 
B-32 Has anyone whom you 
know been assaulted and 
physically injured by 
someone/some people? 
[] [l [l [] [] 
B-33 Did anything else serious 
happen to anyone whom 
you know which is not 
mentioned here? 
Yes [] 
No [] 
Not [] 
known 
B-34 If yes Interviewer: (Record briefly any other inciderts to be given by 
respondents other than those mentioned in the list) 
month year 
Incident (1) 
Incident (2) 
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Incident (3) 
Total of incidents 
B-35 Finally I would like to know whether you support any of the political 
parties? 
Yes 
No 
B-36 If Yes which of the following parties do you support? 
The National Union Party 
The Democratic Union Party 
Umma Party 
The Islamic Front Party 
The Communist Party 
Arab/Nationalism/Socialism 
Other (specify) 
None 
End of questionnaire 
Interviewer: (Thank respondent and turn to fill respondent assessment form 
before leaving). 
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Interviewer Assessment of Respondent 
1. Respondent co-operation: 
a) very co-operative [ 
b) somewhat [] 
co-operative 
c) not co-operative [] 
2. Respondent's understanding of questions: 
a) very good [] 
b) good [] 
c) just fair [] 
d) poor [] 
3. Respondent's ability to recall previous events: 
a) very good [] 
b) good -[] 
c) just fair [] 
d) poor [] 
4. Interviewer's comments: 
Note especially questions with which respondent seems to have more 
difficulty. 
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Appendix C 
Presidential Decrees and Orders 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Presidential Decree No. (258) for 1984 
Declaration of a State of Emergency in the Country 
The President: - 
In accordance with article 111 of the constitution and article 2 of the Sudan's defence 
code of 1939.1 order what stated as follows: 
Declaration of a State of Emergency 
In due to this decree the emergency state should be declared in all parts of the 
Democratic Republic of The Sudan commencing from the day 28th of Rajab 
1404, be the 29th of April 1984. 
2 Work should be stopped in accordance with Articles; 40 to 42 exclusively and 
48 to 52 exclusively and 58,66,67 and 79 of the constitution and throughout the 
validity of the emergency state declared in due to this decree. 
3 Work should be followed in Accordance with the Emergency rule issued in due 
of this decree. 
4 No Assembly, Marches and Demonstrations allowed. 
5 Public Institutions and Public Services should be in a state of Emergency until 
the end of the state of Emergency. 
Issued under my signature at the Presidential Palace on the 28th of Rajab 1404 being 
the 29th of April 1984. 
Ja`far Muhammad Numayri 
The President 
Translated by Ni'ma K. Muhammad from the original Arabic 
Copy signed by Ja'far Muhammad Numayri - The President 
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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
The Emergency Order (Delegation of Power) for 1984. 
The President: 
After reading the Presidential Decree no. 258 for 1984, and on the Emergency rule 
for 1984, and accordance with article 3 of the Sudan's defence code for 1939 -I order 
what follows: 
Name of order, and commencing of application and validity. 
1 This order is called "The Emergency Order (Delegation of power for 1984) and 
to be applied from the date of its signature and continue until the abolition of 
the Emergency State. 
Delegation of Power: 
2. A: The Armed Forces are responsible for restoring security and order in the 
Democratic Republic of The Sudan. 
2. B: All the Soldiers of the Armed Forces have all the authorities stated in this order 
or in any other code or rule or order same as the Police forces and that all acts 
issued by the Soldiers of the Armed Forces during the Performance of their 
duties should be considered are issued by the Police forces. 
2. C: Every police officer has the right, while performing his duty to arrest and keep 
any person if he has on the base of a reasonable doubt that this person is 
intending to commit a crime or he is a source of danger against the general 
security of the society. Every person who might be arrested under such circum- 
stances can be kept by order of a police officer not less than Nagib at any place 
appointed in this order. However no person should be kept under this paragraph 
for more than fourteen days without being brought to a judge and has a specific 
conviction directed to him. 
Issued under my Signature at the Presidential Palace on the 28th of Rajab 1404, being 
the 29th of April 1984. 
Ja`far Muhammad Numayri 
The President 
Translated by Ni'ma K. Muhammad from the original Arabic 
Copy holding the President's signature. 
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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Presidential Decree No. (30) 1405. 
Lifting the State of Emergency 
The President: 
After reading the Presidents orders no. 258,331,472,503,637 for 1984 and accord- 
ance with article 111 of the constitution I order what follows: 
Lifting of the State of Emergency 
The State of Emergency should be lifted as from the twenty fourth of Muharam 
1405 be the twenty ninth of September 1984. 
2 Issued under my signature at the Presidential Palace on the fifth of Muharam 
1405 being the 30th of September 1984. 
Ja'far Muhammad Numayri 
The President 
Translated by Ni'ma K. Muhammad from the original Arabic 
Copy signed by the President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri 
Presidential Decrees and Orders 
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